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JOHANNES WEISS: IN MEMORIAM

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The death of Johannes Weiss, Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University of Heidelberg, which took place last August, is a loss to sound learning which ought not to pass uncommemorated, even in the midst of the clash of arms and of national rivalry; and when it was suggested to me that I should write on the subject for *The Harvard Theological Review*, I was very glad to do so. In some ways, it is true, I cannot regard myself as an altogether suitable person. I did not know Professor Weiss personally and I have not read all his numerous contributions to New Testament studies; so I shall not attempt any balanced estimate of his work. What I chiefly desire to do is to put on record the outstanding and permanent sense of respect and gratitude which all supporters of what Schweitzer calls "thoroughgoing eschatology" must feel towards the author of the *Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes.*

Johannes Weiss was born at Kiel at the end of 1863, where his father, Bernhard Weiss, who is still alive in extreme old age, was himself Professor of New Testament Exegesis. In 1890 Johannes Weiss became Professor at Göttingen; in 1895 he moved to Marburg, and from 1908

was Professor in Heidelberg. He was thus less than fifty-one when he died; yet the article to his name in *Wer Ist's?* enumerates more than twenty separate works of his on New Testament subjects, all marked by the learning and the scientific method that we expect and find in the modern German professor.

But it will not be for his really remarkable industry that Johannes Weiss will be chiefly remembered. Nor again is it for special skill or tact in exegesis. Personally indeed I am very grateful for Weiss's study on the composition of *Acts* (published 1897), for it appeared at a time when the reconstruction and consideration of lost sources seemed almost the only occupation of the up-to-date New Testament investigator. Weiss of course recognized previously existing sources in *Acts* and regarded them as the most important element in the book. But he also saw that the final author or editor who gave *Acts* its present form, was no mechanical compiler, and therefore the first necessary step to the study of the book was not a reconstruction, however ingenious, of the sources, but an intelligent comprehension of the author's point of view, as revealed by his completed work. Put bluntly in this way, it sounds almost an obvious truism, but it did not seem quite so obvious in 1897; so that I am pleased to have the opportunity of expressing my debt to Weiss for what I learned from him on this subject.

What distinguished Johannes Weiss from his learned contemporaries was the clearness and vigor with which he set forth the difference between the Gospel Message announced by Jesus and modern religious aspirations for the amelioration of mankind. The essential point of his work is to be found in the first paragraph of the later (1900) edition of the *Predigt Jesu.* "As a pupil of Albrecht Ritschl," says Weiss, "I learnt the importance of the idea of the Kingdom of God, which is the centre

of his theology; and I am still of opinion that Ritschl's system, especially this central idea, is, when properly understood, the most suitable to awaken and sustain for our generation the sound and healthy religious life that we need. But I have long been troubled with a conviction that Ritschl's idea of the Kingdom of God and 'the Kingdom of God' in the Message of Jesus are two very different things."

Here, as I say, you have the essential point. The important thing is that Johannes Weiss was the first modern New Testament scholar of first-rate professorial rank to see it. To bring men into living contact with Jesus Christ is no doubt in all the centuries the chief aim of the Christian teacher, but during the nineteenth century this task had been attempted in a new way. It had seemed that the real Jesus had been hidden from sight under coverings of dogma and ecclesiastical tradition. Behind these trappings it was assumed that there existed not merely a human Personality, but one whose religion was freed from all external and particularistic elements. In the process of unwrapping, much of the traditional Figure had disappeared, for reasons of varied cogency; but it was found that what remained after critical analysis still invincibly belonged to its own time and place. The preaching of Jesus, of the reconstructed historical Jesus, still is occupied with Palestinian conditions of nineteen hundred years ago; the external and particularistic elements refuse to be eliminated. For a long while the remedy most in favor was to regard more and more of the traditional material as unhistorical and secondary. This was especially the case with what we are now accustomed to call the eschatological elements, that is, all that starts from the belief in the intervention of God to deliver His people in the near future. "Amen, I say to you, there are some standing here who will not taste death till they see the Kingdom of God

come in power"—that is only one of a whole series of sayings of Jesus which announce the near coming of a New Age.

Johannes Weiss ventured to sketch a portrait of Jesus in which these sayings, so far from being treated as unauthentic or explained away, are taken as the central nucleus of the Gospel Message. That is his great and lasting achievement.

The first edition of the *Predigt Jesu*, the edition of 1892, is in many ways the more impressive. It is a simple tract of 68 pages and does not attempt any detailed treatment of all the Gospel Sayings. But the central point is touched on page 17, when he declares that the decisive fact in the controversy whether the Kingdom of God was regarded by Jesus as present or future, is to be found in the phrase "Thy Kingdom Come." Whatever may be the case with this or that Saying of ambiguous interpretation, in the Lord's Prayer the Kingdom is regarded as future, and it is God, not man, whose work it will be to bring it in.

The second edition of the *Predigt Jesu* appeared in 1900 as a book of 214 pages. In a sense it is an *Auseinandersetzung* with opponents of the former edition of eight years previously. And to a certain extent it suffers as an artistic production; it is less of a tract, less calculated to convince heedless Liberals of the strength of the eschatological view. But I do not think it was written for that purpose; indeed it is hardly a work of controversy at all. It reads to me like a work written to express the author's considered opinions, written to clear his own views by expressing them in black and white. And therefore it is full of wise sayings, which reward those who will read it carefully with their New Testament in their hands, to see (like the Berœans of old) whether these things be so. I cannot better conclude this imperfect but grateful tribute to the memory of a regretted

fellow-worker than by giving a few extracts from this second edition of Weiss's *Predigt Jesu:*

1. That now and then Jesus should have recognized signs of the present working of God's power, so that for the enlightened eye the Kingdom of God might in moments of insight be spoken of as present, is not surprising. That springs from the very nature of religion. "No active religion can permanently live on hope alone, just as on the other hand an element of hope must always be present in religion" (page 99).

2. Does not the parable of the seed growing secretly (Mk. 4 26 ff.) imply a present Kingdom, gradually developing? No, says Weiss: "The parable is an exhortation to patient waiting; it does not give an answer to the theological question, '*How* does the Kingdom of God come?' but to the burning, impatient cry, '*When* will it come? Can we not do something to make it come more quickly?'" And Weiss goes on to suggest that it has the same reference as Matt. 11 12 (according to his interpretation of that dark saying), that is, that it is directed against the Βιασταί, the violent Zealots who wish to force the Kingdom (page 85).

3. Weiss has also a wise caution called out by the difficult thought of Mk. 10 5; for it is difficult, though the wording is so familiar. He says: "To be a child is just one of the things that cannot be willed and striven for—it is a gift of God. A man either has a childlike nature or he has not. To be deliberately childlike (*gewollte Kindlichkeit*) is the most unchildlike parody" (page 133).

4. That the summing up of the Law into love to God and one's neighbor is not directly eschatological is acknowledged by Weiss, but he points out at the same time that the Gospel tradition itself does not claim this as a point at issue between our Lord and the teaching of the Scribes (page 137). I must also draw attention to his excellent remarks on "Render unto Caesar," though I

can hardly imagine that the interpretation which Weiss rejects has often been seriously taught (page 125).

5. However this may be, in dealing with Lk. 14 26 Weiss has to touch a problem which is serious for all modern Christians in all countries. "Among the things which may hinder a man from coming into the Kingdom of God, Jesus included the ties of family life. On this subject we find some of His most uncompromising and to us least sympathetic utterances" (page 142). It would take too long to quote Weiss's remarks in full upon this most important topic. But it is clear how much better an account the thoroughgoing eschatologist can give of the command to forsake home and parents and children, than can be done by one who has to turn the ethics of our Gospels into rules for a permanent and evolutionist civilization. "These heroic words [about hating one's father and mother and one's own life] can only be understood from the point of view that all things of this world, however high and divine they may be in themselves, have lost their value now that the world itself is perishing and the Judgment is imminent" (page 143).

6. I conclude with a longer quotation: "We must seriously consider whether the Messianic and Eschatological elements were really only a temporary and unessential factor in the preaching of Jesus, which does not affect its kernel. Did He take up the work of the Baptist in order presently to follow His own path, or was He really the inaugurator of a Messianic movement? Was His preaching of the Kingdom of God only the accidental form into which He pours as into old bottles the new wine of another vintage, or was He seriously in earnest when He announces the Kingdom of God as a new epoch in the world? Was He only an ethical and religious reformer, who accepted the part of Prophet and Messiah only as an accommodation, or

was He really convinced that He was standing at the decisive parting of the ages and that He had been chosen by God to be the bearer of salvation? The answer to these questions will be given by the whole of this investigation of ours. But at least we can say this beforehand, that our best and oldest tradition declares over and over again that Jesus understood the movement which He initiated to be Messianic in the fullest sense of the word, and that He held Himself to be the Chosen of God, the One who was more than a Prophet. Simply to set all this mass of tradition aside, or to interpret it as we please by getting rid of all that is Messianic, is a highly arbitrary proceeding, which is not to be excused merely because it cannot be plausibly attempted without ingenuity and a thorough acquaintance with the sources" (pages 64, 65).

Once more, let me express my gratitude to Johannes Weiss. His name will not be forgotten by students of the rise of Christianity, either in Britain or in Germany.

THE PERMANENT SIGNIFICANCE OF MIRACLE FOR RELIGION

THE DUDLEIAN LECTURE FOR 1915 AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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A few days ago, meeting one of my scientific friends, I happened to mention the fact that I was going to Harvard to deliver the Dudleian Lecture, and that I had chosen as my subject "The Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion." "It is a good subject," he said, "but you have left out the most important word. It ought to read 'The Lack of Permanent Significance of Miracle for Religion.'"

The remark reflects a mood which was more common twenty-five years ago than today. It was the age of triumphant science. On all sides men had banded themselves together to subdue the exceptional and the unforeseen, and to organize the territory which had hitherto been abandoned to chance or unreason under the all-embracing generalizations of the schools. Law was a word to conjure with. It not only commanded the reason; it fired the emotion. Men stood under the spell and glamour of the great magician whose wonder-working wand had unlocked so many doors. In view of the achievements of the past no obstacle seemed adamant, no secret impenetrable.

To men of this temper miracle had little interest. It was a synonym for all that was superstitious and out of date. The man who attempted to defend miracle stamped himself at once as an advocate of outworn

dogma—a Canute committed to the hopeless task of bidding the tide stand still. It was not so much that his hearers did not believe in miracles, though that was true of large circles of intelligent persons, as that they were no longer interested in them. They looked upon them as belonging to a past generation, without significance for men whose faces, like their own, were turned toward the future.

A change has come over the spirit of our dream. The confidence, so much in evidence among the scientists of the last generation, is less noticeable today. We are still bent on our task of conquest, but we realize better than we did how vast is the territory to be subdued. We are more modest than we were; readier to confess that the exceptional dies hard, and that there are elements which enter into the explanation of even the simplest things of which we are not yet—of which indeed we may perhaps never become—masters. And with this insight our mood has changed. The phenomena that explain the miracle-faith have reasserted their claim upon our attention. Our men of science no longer think it beneath their dignity to tell or to listen to ghost stories, and the records of visions, voices, prophecies, mediums, appearances from the dead, fill ponderous tomes over which professors, philosophers, and statesmen burn the midnight oil.

Nor is it merely that we have grown more catholic in our attitude toward the facts to be studied. A change is apparent in the philosophy from which we approach them. We are not so sure as we were that law is a term big enough to include the final fact about the universe. We have a shrewd suspicion that we have been carrying our simplification too far. Pluralism—but yesterday a hopelessly discredited—one might almost say, a prehistoric philosophy—now numbers the most respectable among its adherents. Professor William James has a

good word to speak for chance. He sees no ground for believing that contingency will ever be banished from the universe, and when pressed with the charge that this is to throw up the sponge and admit that after all miracles do happen he cannot, nor indeed does he greatly desire to, deny it.[1] In choice we ourselves initiate new lines of development, alter existing situations, determine the future according to our will. Why then should we deny a like power to God?

This change of mood finds systematic expression in Bergson. He is the philosopher of the unexpected; his fundamental dogma, the fact that the future cannot be predicted from the past. This is a world in which new things are coming to pass. Evolution is the law of life; but evolution is essentially creative. It is the forward push of energies as yet unrealized into a future that is unforeseen. Far from science having the right to speak the last word about the constitution of the universe, it is only our abstraction from a far more immediate and indescribable experience. It is through intuition, not reason, that we come closest to the nature of things, and for intuition, the novel and the inexplicable is the most frequent and familiar of experiences.

The effects of this changed attitude are reflected in contemporary theology. Whereas in the past the proof of miracle was the great task of apologetic, and to its accomplishment all the energies of theological science were marshalled, today it is passed over lightly as relatively unimportant. But this does not mean that the conception of miracle has been abandoned. On the contrary, it has been extended to cover phases of experience not included in the older discussions. Bushnell's thesis that miracle is a permanent constituent of the universe is widely accepted. To Ritschl miracle

[1] The Will to Believe, p. 182, cf. p. 175.

is a recurring experience. "Every one," he tells us, "will meet the miraculous in his own experience, and, in view of this, it is entirely unnecessary to stumble at the miracles which others have experienced" (*Instruction*, I, 17, note 3).

Such being the situation, I have been led to wonder whether the time were not ripe for a fresh discussion of the whole question of miracle. A generation ago men were arguing that miracles were impossible. Today we are told that all life is miraculous. Is it not worth while to ask ourselves how we can account for so radical a divergence of opinion? May there not be some fresh viewpoint from which to approach the problem, which will shed light on what would otherwise be an insoluble riddle?

Such, at least, is the question which I propose for our consideration. My theme is the permanent significance of miracle for religion. We shall ask ourselves first how men have come to believe in miracle at all; secondly, what issue is at stake in the belief; thirdly, what place it is likely to hold in the religion of the future.

Observe the form of the question. It is not metaphysical, but psychological. We shall not ask whether miracles happen, but why men believe that they happen, and what consequences for good or for evil follow from this belief. I do not mean that the former question is unimportant. On the contrary, I believe that it is highly important, but only that it is not first in order. We theorize because we have first experienced, and it is this preliminary inquiry as to the experience which accounts for the miracle-belief—an inquiry which, as I shall hope to show before I am through, is not without its bearing on the larger question—to which I invite you today.

I

At the outset a definition is in order. By miracle, for the purpose of the present discussion, we shall understand an exceptional event, or quality in an event, in nature or in human life, the significance of which religious faith finds in the self-revealing activity of Deity. It is a strange fact with a divine meaning—a luminous surprise.

This definition may be criticised from two different points of view. It may be criticised either as too narrow or as too broad. The anthropologist will criticise it as too narrow. He will object to the restriction of the term, miracle, to acts which have a religious meaning. By miracle, as he understands it, is meant any act of a spirit, whether good or bad, meaning or unmeaning. It is a part of the primitive world-view which peoples the universe with a host of wonder-working spirits and attributes to their activity whatever it cannot understand. Of this wider field of the miraculous, miracle in the religious sense is only one among many examples.

The metaphysician, on the other hand, will find fault with our definition because it is too broad. A miracle, as he understands it, is an event inexplicable by natural law. It is not coextensive with the religious experience, but a name we give to a certain part of it, or, better still, to an explanation which theologians have given to a certain part of it. Miracle, in the metaphysical sense of the term, is an event which transcends reason, something which science is unable to bring under law.

We shall have occasion in the course of our discussion to refer to both these conceptions and to show their relation to the special subject of our study. But our present interest is a different one. We wish to understand the significance of miracle for religion, and it is fitting therefore that we should emphasize in our definition the

characteristics which bring this significance to expression. These characteristics are two: In the first place, a sense of surprise—the believer is conscious of the presence of a reality which defies rational explanation. In the second place, a sense of meaning—he discovers in this reality some reference of practical significance for his life. This combination of awe and enlightenment is common to the earliest and the latest believer in miracle, and, in spite of all intellectual differences, makes them kindred spirits.

If it be objected that this use of the term is misleading in that it is open to confusion with the other meanings to which reference has been made, the answer is that the difficulty is inevitable in the case of any word which has gathered associations in the course of history. Words are not rigid things condemned from their birth to a single meaning. They may have many connotations, all alike legitimate. Words stand for emotions as well as ideas. They record experiences as well as express beliefs, and one must be careful that in his effort at intellectual clearness he does not obscure those more deep-seated connections of sentiment and interest in which the continuity of life is found.

Such a continuity of experience the word, miracle, recalls. It expresses the fact that in religion man believes himself to be in communication with an unseen Spirit who deals with him directly in ways which admit of recognition. We shall use the term as a convenient phrase to include the sum total of these communications, real or imagined. To repeat our definition: by miracle, for the purpose of the present discussion, we shall understand an exceptional event or quality in an event in nature or in human life, the significance of which religious faith finds in the self-revealing activity of Deity.

Miracle in this sense is as old as religion and as universal. As far back as we can go we find men confronted

with strange phenomena and interpreting them as messages of the gods. Whatever impressed the imagination as extraordinary or unusual, whether in the larger arena of nature or in the narrower sphere of the individual life—the lightning, the earthquake, the pestilence, the meteor, a dream, a sickness, an accident, a recovery—was at least raw material for the miracle-faith. Every religion ancient enough to have a history has its wonder stories, its divine healings, its heavenly visitants. Christianity, bringing its own marvels, enters a field already tenanted. The chief difficulty of the missionary when he tells his converts of God's wonderful dealings with his people in the past is not the scepticism which disbelieves them, but the credulity which takes them as a matter of course.

Scarcely less striking than the antiquity of the belief is its persistence. It has outlived the passing of many philosophies; it has been killed many times, only to come to life again. Like every other practical conviction which has lasted long enough to make itself a place in history, its expression has been affected by the changing intellectual background. The view of the world held by the dogmatic theologians who formulated the traditional apologetic was not the same as that of the unreflective thinkers whose world was still inhabited by the spirits of brook and cloud and tree; and this in turn differs from that of modern pluralists like James or pragmatists like Ritschl. But outlasting all changes of philosophical theory, we find a recurring experience which is characterized by the union of qualities already described—the sense of wonder, and the sense of meaning—and which brings to the man who has it the conviction that in it God is dealing with him in some immediate and significant way. This conviction it is that we wish to trace to its source, in order that we may estimate its value.

II

Where then shall we look for the roots of so ancient and widespread a belief? This is our first question. What accounts for the origin of the miracle-faith and what explains its persistence?

To our surprise, we find that it has no single or simple answer. Miracle, in the religious sense in which we are studying it, has meant different things at different times and answered different needs for different people. In order to understand the genesis of the belief we have to analyze it into its elements and trace each to its source. Among these elements we find four which recur from age to age and manifest themselves with varying intensity: the sense of wonder, the consciousness of enlightenment, the experience of reinforcement, the longing for certainty.

And first, wonder. We have called miracle a strange fact with a meaning, a luminous surprise. Surprise is indeed the most obvious and the most persistent characteristic of the miracle-belief. We see something startling, arresting, attention-compelling; something that transcends our previous experience, that, think as we will, we cannot reduce to the level of the commonplace and the conventional; something therefore which we have either to dismiss altogether, as wholly unrelated to our present world of interests and activities, or else to approach from some different angle and assign some new and hitherto undreamed-of meaning. Take away the sense of surprise, relate the new experience to what has gone before, as one more example of a well-tried category, bring it, as we say, under law, and the quality which constitutes it miracle would disappear, as the morning star fades and at last is extinguished altogether before the incoming tide of dawn.

Clearly then a primary explanation of man's belief in miracle is to be found in the fact that he is a being capable of surprise, and that the world is full of things that surprise him. Could we exhaust our resources either of new things to be experienced or of new interest to bring to the experience of them, we should outgrow miracle. But so long as these last, its possibility at least is always present.

This explains the persistence of the miracle-belief, in spite of the growth of science. However fast knowledge grows, curiosity grows faster. It finds new material to feed on. Its centre of interest shifts. The things that surprised our ancestors no longer surprise us, or at least not for the same reason, and in the same way; but that is because we have found new things that seem to us more wonderful still. They lived in the immediate present, and each strange experience that came to them was something isolated and independent. When it thundered, a spirit was angry; when it lightened, he was throwing his spear. When they dreamed, they saw the vanished dead face to face and received first-hand messages from realms otherwise inaccessible. But to us contacts appear of which they little dreamed. These isolated occurrences have been shown by science to be parts of a system of occurrences that succeed one another in orderly and predictable fashion. Nature is to us no longer the home of independent and contending spirits. It is a system of forces and relations acting according to principles which we are able in part to catalogue, and believe we shall be able in the future to catalogue more exhaustively still. But for all that, the world is none the less wonderful to us and surprise has not been banished. It has only shifted its hiding-place. The strange thing to us is not so much the event itself as the setting in which it occurs, the consequences which follow from it, and above all the re-

action which it calls forth in the experience of the beholder.

This is what we meant by including in our definition of miracle not merely events but qualities of events. This points to the value-element which is always present in the miracle-belief. It is not simply the fact that something has happened which constitutes a miracle, but something that makes a particular kind of impression, namely, the impression of novelty and uniqueness. And this impression may be present quite as strongly in the case of events which belong to the natural series as of those which we have not yet been able to bring under law—a sunrise, for example, or a birth, or the look in a woman's eyes.

Take, for example, that old puzzle that has baffled scientists so long—the origin of life. Suppose we were able to solve it in the sense in which science understands solution. Suppose we should hit upon the combination of elements for which hitherto we have been searching in vain, whose union would enable us to make the transition from the inorganic to the organic. What should we have accomplished? From the point of view of our practical powers much, but from the point of view of our ultimate understanding nothing at all. How comes it that elements which in isolation remain helpless and inert, receive through contact the mysterious property we call life? What is the origin of the new thing that we experience, of which the scientist's formula is only the shorthand record? Suppose we could be there and see what happened with our own eyes when the contact was made, would it seem any less marvellous, any less inexplicable, any less fitted, in short, to call forth the emotions of wonder and awe which have been the parent of the miracle-faith in every age?

I have taken the simplest illustration. Your own thought can follow into all its ramifications the path

along which it points. When we have explained protoplasm we are only at the beginning of our task. There remain consciousness, species, personality, character, individuality in all its variations, and the endless combinations to which their contact one with another and with physical nature lead. There is history, with its drama of races and of nations; there is art; there is science; there is literature; there is religion—all challenging our interest and awaiting an explanation. Carry our science as far as we please, test and re-test our generalizations in the light of advancing knowledge and enlarging experience, and we need have no fear that we shall exhaust our capital of novelties or render surprise an obsolete attitude. So far as it grows out of our sense of wonder, the roots of the miracle-faith are with us still.

It is evident then that one root of the miracle-belief is the limitation of our knowledge. It is the fact that the things to be experienced so far exceed in number and in range the things that we have experienced in the past; that however much we may have discovered and however much we may have learned, there remains always the boundless sea of the undiscovered and the unexplored, from which new messengers are continually coming to rouse our curiosity and remind us of our ignorance.

But true as this is as far as it goes, it is not a complete statement. If the miracle-faith were no more than a reminder of our limitation, it would be the most depressing of experiences; whereas we know on the contrary that it exalts and inspires. I have spoken of wonder as if it were a confession of weakness. It would be quite as true to call it a prophecy of greatness. Wonder is a window opening upward. It is man's consciousness of kinship to a greater. You cannot surprise a stone—or for that matter (so far as we know) a jelly-fish. But man is always asking why. He is conscious of capacity for appreciating the greatest, and he is never satisfied in

the presence of an unexplained mystery. The unexpected is more than a disturbance. It is a challenge, and miracle is man's way of finding a meaning in what would otherwise be inexplicable.

This second characteristic also appears in our definition. I have called miracle a strange fact with a *meaning*, a *luminous* surprise. It is only when we fix our attention upon this enlightening quality that we appreciate its true significance.

Let us return for a moment in imagination to the prescientific conditions of which we were speaking a moment ago. Suppose ourselves wandering with one of our primitive ancestors through the primeval forest into which he had plunged in search of game. I have no doubt he would see and hear many things which seemed to him strange and wonderful, many things which he could not understand, but this would not constitute them miracle in the sense in which we are discussing it here. They would be at most raw material out of which miracle could be made.

But suddenly he stops and looks about him. He has heard some sound or seen some sight which to us is not more significant than the others but which carries to him some secret meaning. It arrests his attention, and, what is more significant, it affects his conduct. He decides that today is not a lucky day for hunting and turns his steps homeward. A miracle has happened, and he will be wise to heed the warning it was meant to give.

What is the difference between these two classes of strange events which constitutes one a miracle while the other is not? It is the introduction of the element of insight. The first is merely a wonder. He looks at it and passes on. The second is not simply a wonder, but a sign; a spirit has spoken and he has heard and understood.

This distinction is of fundamental importance for the whole question of miracle. It marks the dividing line between the scientific and the religious interest. The scientific man is interested in the cause of the event, the religious man in its meaning. When the scientist has shown that you cannot account for what has happened by natural law (or that you can, as the case may be), his interest is at an end. But the interest of the religious man is only beginning. What has this strange event to tell men which is significant for their life? What message does it bring from the gods?

This illustrates a point about the miracle-belief to which we have already had occasion to refer in another connection, namely, the shifting character of the objects with which it is associated. For primitive man the significant things are the things which happen outside of him—the sounds he hears, the sights he sees, the objects he encounters. With ripening experience and maturing judgment attention turns inward, and the earthquake and the fire are succeeded by the still small voice. Where outward events retain their significance as miraculous, it is because they are associated with some outstanding personality or occur in some unique historic setting. But for later as for earlier ages the world remains vocal, and unsuspected meanings disclose themselves to the man who is on the alert to catch the fleeting messages which are flashed to him across the encompassing night.

It is evident then that in order to explain miracle you must add to man's inherent disposition to ask questions his faith in the existence of some one who is able to answer them. The miracle-belief is a striking witness to man's persistent refusal to believe himself alone in the universe. It is one form—not the only one, but one of the oldest and the most familiar—of that teleological interpretation of life which finds the

ultimate cause of things in a rational will in some sense akin to our own.

But there is something to be added before our account is complete. We have spoken of the miracle-belief as having its roots in man's sense of wonder, and in his consciousness of enlightenment; but there is another factor still which needs to be taken into account which it is not so easy to define in a single word. Perhaps reinforcement comes as near as any other term to describing what I have in mind. In miracle man is conscious of some new accession of vitality and power. It is not simply that his questions have been answered, but that his resources have been enlarged. Some hidden spring of energy has been tapped; the marvel of creation has been repeated before his eyes.

It is here only that we reach the heart of the miracle-belief. Miracle is the way in which man confesses his faith in a God who can do things, and is doing them. The questions of religion are never theoretical merely. They spring from a practical interest. Conscious of a hundred needs, outward and inward—the need of healing, of comfort, of forgiveness, of renewal, of enfranchisement—man looks about him for some source of help adequate to his necessity. Is there, or is there not, some power that can meet this need, heal his sickness, assuage his sorrow, blot out his guilt, renew his vitality, lift him above the limitations of his environment, however leaden the weights that drag him down? Is God, or is He not, alive and free, able to meet present needs as well as the needs of the past, to act here and to act today? Miracle answers this question in the affirmative. It is the point at which God touches man directly in the present. It expresses the creative aspect of religion.

Here again we find wide differences in the form this creative energy is believed to take. When life is simple

and need largely physical, miracle is sought and is found without—in the rain that saves the harvest, in the pestilence that destroys the enemy, in healing for the body, or water smitten from the rock; but where the conscience awakes and man, convicted of sin, realizes that his worst foe and his most formidable dangers are within, the centre of interest shifts from the body to the soul. The miracles *par excellence* become regeneration and conversion, and the prayer in which the miracle-faith finds its most fitting expression is that of the Psalmist, "Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me."

With the rise of historic religions like Judaism and Christianity the miracle-faith takes on a new significance. It is no longer a matter of individual concern primarily, but of social interest. It expresses God's activity in history, and evidences His presence and control in those crises of the national life when great issues have to be faced and new steps taken of permanent significance for mankind. The miracles of Israel's history are associated with great national figures like Moses and Elijah, and those of Christianity cluster about the person of the founder, his birth, his baptism, his public ministry, his resurrection. So in the great climax which lies ahead, when human history shall reach its consummation and the Kingdom of God be ushered in, God will again intervene in direct activity and miracle will inaugurate the final advent of the Redeemer.

It is this wider social reference which explains the concentration of attention in the older apologetic upon the limited group of miracles recorded in the Bible to the exclusion of those continuing evidences of God's creative and renewing activity which are furnished by our daily experiences. It is not that these are less divine, or that they are less truly miraculous in the sense in which we have been using the term, but that they have a different

function in the divine economy. It is a great mistake to speak as though the Protestant confined God's supernatural activity to the past, while the Catholic admitted a continuing activity in the present. To Calvin and the Westminster divines regeneration was as truly an exercise of creative power as the raising of Christ from the dead. Both alike were inexplicable by natural law. The difference was that the first had significance primarily for the man who experienced it, whereas the second had a unique function in the life of the race. It was God's demonstration in terms that could not be successfully challenged of the messiahship of Jesus, and hence of his divine authority and sufficiency for the religion he came to establish.

This reference to the probative significance of the resurrection suggests the last of the four roots of the miracle-belief, namely, man's desire for certainty. Miracle, in the more developed form, at least, is not simply a wonderful event with a meaning in which God intervenes for man's reinforcement and enlightenment, but an event in which this divine activity is so patently manifest as to admit no possibility of doubt as to its author. As distinct from those flashes of insight which come and go, miracle has permanent evidential value. It brings us face to face with God in so direct and firsthand a fashion that there is no possibility of our being mistaken as to His identity.

This too is the expression of a continuing human interest. Later in its appearance than the other aspects of the miracle-belief to which we have referred, coming to full self-consciousness only after life's disillusioning experiences have banished the simple faith of childhood and installed in its room the spirit that questions, the desire for certainty remains as one of the most deep-seated and enduring of our human aspirations. Face to face with the insecurities of life—its unanswered questions, its haunting doubts—we long for some refuge from

which we cannot be dislodged, some guarantee that the end to which we have consecrated our lives is rooted in the eternal.

There are many forms which the quest for certainty has taken. Some men have sought certainty without, in the authority of infallible church or infallible teacher. Others have hoped to reach their goal by the path of reason, and turned to science for the finality they despaired of finding in church or Bible. And still others have looked inward, and in the intuitions of the soul discovered an inner fortress to which they could retire, confident that they could never be dislodged. In that indescribable experience, carrying within itself its own sanction, in which the artist finds his assurance of beauty, and the patriot his loyalty, and the man of the world his sense of honor, the saint has met his God. "Thou hast formed us for thyself, O God, and our soul is restless till it finds its rest in Thee." In these often quoted words, typical of the mystic's experience in every age, Augustine points us to what is at once the most direct, the most accessible, and the most successful of all the paths to certainty.

Of this mystical intuition of God the miracle-faith in its historic Christian form is one of the most notable examples. It is not only in the closet that man has met God face to face, but on the wider stage of nature and of history. In great institutions like the Catholic Church, reaching back into the remote past and claiming worldwide authority; in great classics, like the Bible, bringing to an age grown careless or inert the consciousness of an undying responsibility and an immortal hope; in great events like those commemorated by Christmas and Easter, marking an epoch in the life of mankind and the source of continuing inspiration for future generations; in great personalities like the founder of the Christian religion, speaking as never man spake, and winging his

words past all the barriers of convention and tradition to the inner citadel of the conscience and the will—in these and such as these God has evidenced His presence in the movement of history, and brought to doubting and unstable spirits the certainty and assurance of which they were in quest.

This mystical element in the miracle-belief is obscured by the traditional definition with its emphasis upon the relation of miracle to natural law. The difficulty with this definition is not that it emphasizes the immediacy of the divine activity in miracle, but that it shifts the grounds of our certainty from intuition to logic and so sets the apologist an impossible task. Nature is not an independent power over against God which acts as a cause among causes. It is only our name for certain observed sequences in the order of phenomena. To prove that an event is a miracle in the sense in which the old apologetic claimed to prove it, it would be necessary not merely to show that it had not been possible to assign it its place in any observed sequence, but that it never would be possible to do so in the future, which manifestly cannot be done. It was inevitable that science should accept the challenge thus given and answer the claim of religion to have demonstrated its miracles with a "not proven."

But such a method altogether misconceives the real ground of the religious man's belief in miracle. It is not that he can prove of some particular event that it can never be brought under law—a proof which in the nature of the case involves an appeal to the future which precludes present certainty—but that he has had an experience which irresistibly suggests the thought of God. Somewhere in this world of chance and change he has discovered God at work and recognized His handicraft. Now the assurance comes to him through the impression of power, as in great natural cataclysms

like the earthquake or the tornado; now through the impression of mystery, as in those creative processes which bring us face to face with the wonder-worker we call life; and again in some inner quality, no less inexorable because gentle and gracious in its appeal, such as the love which melts us when we contemplate the cross of Christ, or the joy that thrills us in his invitation to a share in his kingly task of service. But whatever the nature of the appeal, it is always grounded in some antecedent conception of the divine, and as such carries with it its own certainty.

It is clear that if this be a correct account of the genesis of the miracle-belief, there can be no such thing as a final proof of miracle. The experience by which it is justified is a recurring experience. It repeats itself over and over again in the life of the individual, as he faces the old fact in the light of his new environment. It repeats itself over and over again on a larger scale in the life of the race, as the impression of the individual in his solitude is confirmed by the new experiences of those who succeed him.

No one knew this better than the old theologians. They were not so simple as to suppose that you could demonstrate God by logic. Unique as the Bible might be, separate from all other books in the manner of its composition, one could be assured of this fact only because of an immediate witness of the Spirit, bearing witness with his heart here and now that it was the word of God. And Christ might be separated from all his brethren in birth, endowment, and resurrection, and yet his deity could be proved to others only as they experienced for themselves the regenerating and enfranchising influence of his Spirit. In this sense it is true, as has often been said, that it takes a miracle to prove a miracle, and the final proof of the right of the great miracles to hold their central place on the stage

of history is the fact that they have been and continue still to be the parents of an innumerable progeny.

These then are the four roots of the miracle-faith: the sense of wonder, the consciousness of enlightenment, the experience of reinforcement, the longing for certainty; and as long as events occur which arouse this sense, produce this consciousness, induce this experience, and satisfy this longing, we must expect to find men believing in miracles.

III

We have considered the origin of the miracle-belief, we have analyzed the elements which enter into it. We are ready now to sum up the conclusions to which our study seems to point. What may we gather from our analysis of the psychology of miracle as to the place which it is likely to hold in the religious faith of the future? Is miracle something that we shall outgrow and leave behind, or must we give it a permanent place in our definition of religion?

It is clear that our study points to the latter conclusion. Miracle belongs to religion because it belongs to experience. It is the expression in religion of that creative aspect of things which meets us wherever we touch life, and most clearly of all in personality. The evidence for miracle is the same as that which leads us to believe in personality in any form, whether in ourselves, in others, or in the great unseen Spirit at the heart of things, whose nature we are constrained to believe is in some true sense akin to ours. So long as we believe in persons anywhere or for any reason, we shall continue to believe in miracle, for by a person we mean essentially a miracle-worker. Personality means initiative, enterprise, but at the same time interpretation and fellowship. A person is a being who is able not simply to

bring new things to pass, but at the same time to make the new he does or inspires the bond that links him to some kindred spirit. And the contact that unites these two poles of the life of spirit and fuses them into a single experience is miracle.

So stated, miracle is a part of the larger question of theism, and in the last analysis stands or falls with it. If you could disprove the existence of a personal God, you would disprove miracle. So long as faith in such a God exists miracle will remain, for miracle is the way in which the personal God communicates His will to man.

But if miracle is thus a correlate of our conception of personality, it is evident that our theory of miracle will be affected by whatever modifies our conception of personality. Where we emphasize initiative at the expense of interpretation, we shall magnify the arbitrary element in miracle; where fellowship seems to us most important, we shall lay chief stress on meaning.

This changing emphasis appears clearly in the history of the miracle-belief and explains much that would otherwise be perplexing. It explains, for example, why the miracles of the savage seem to us such isolated and unmeaning phenomena. The reason is that he had not yet realized the social significance of personality. Initiative was his test of greatness; fellowship was as yet an undiscovered art. A Peruvian king is reported to have said of the sun that he could not be a god, because if he were, he would not repeat the same course day after day. The remark is eminently characteristic. To primitive psychology arbitrary power appears inherently excellent, and the stranger and the more unusual a thing is, the more it contradicts convention and defies public opinion, the more divine it seems. Consistency may be a virtue for the subject, but inconsistency is the glory of the sovereign. To do as you please without giving a reason is the supreme prerogative of Deity.

Again, the connection of miracle with personality enables us to see what was the original contribution of Christianity to the miracle-faith. This was not so much the assurance that God was able to work miracles, as a new insight into the character of the miracle-worker. When Jesus refused the Jews' demand for a sign and concentrated attention upon his preaching as the true evidence of his messiahship, he shifted the basis of faith from the unmoral to the moral; and the reason was that he had come to believe in a God who was Father as well as sovereign, and so needed for His full self-expression other language than that of power.

Once more, it is the inconsistency in their conception of personality which explains why the older theologians emphasize the arbitrary aspect of miracle even after they have come to perceive its social significance. They realize as the savage could not the moral values of the soul. They have learned from Jesus to believe in justice and mercy and brotherly love, but they have not yet outgrown the older belief that power pure and simple is the supreme mark of greatness, and the final test of right. "God made you," says Calvin. "Why then criticise him? Shall the creature pass judgment on the Creator?" So they put the two side by side, consistency and inconsistency; justice with its laws on which you can count, and grace which knows no law but the divine good pleasure. On the one side, nature with its uniformity; on the other the supernatural which no man can predict. Both are expressions of personality, both are alike divine; but the supernatural—and this is the characteristic thing—seems somehow more divine than the natural.

It is here that our difficulty with the older treatment of miracle begins. It is not an intellectual but a moral difficulty. It is not that we believe that the occurrence of arbitrary acts is impossible, but that they would not mean to us what they meant to Calvin even if their

occurrence could be proved. To us consistency is the highest virtue for a moral being; and the greater a person is, the more consistent we should expect him to be. We do not overlook the transcendence of God and expect to banish mystery from his dealings with man. On the contrary, the more our knowledge grows, the more we are convinced of our littleness and limitation. But we believe that in the measure that God reveals Himself, the mystery is diminished and we are admitted into an understanding of his purpose.

It is clear then that if we are to retain the conception of miracle, we must extend it more widely than was done in the traditional apologetic. It is not simply a question of proving that at certain rare intervals of time God intervenes in the world for man's salvation, but of recovering again for the consciousness of our time faith in a living God actively at work in our world for the realization of moral ends. The division of territory which underlay the older treatment of the supernatural is no longer possible for us. We recognize the interests which explain it, but we feel that they must find their gratification in a different way. Our world is a universe—at least, our Ideal for the world is a universe—and all that it contains must somehow fall into place as parts of a single consistent system.

Holding this ideal, two possible attitudes are open to us corresponding to two different philosophies of life. According to one of these, there can be no room in the world for miracle because there is nothing in experience which cannot in the last analysis be reduced to the terms of mathematical science. The appearances to the contrary are deceptive appearances. This is true even of those experiences of choice on which man has based his consciousness of freedom. Inexplicable as these seem by their antecedents, they are in reality no exception to the universal law of necessity. To those who take this

view, the ethical interest which leads us to pick and choose, to prefer and reject, to desire and to value, to approve and disapprove, in short, to make our world what we would have it, is not the mark of strength but of weakness. The truly wise man is the contemplative sage whose thought rises above the contingencies in which most men's lives are lived, to those unchanging principles which are equally valid in every possible world.

But for most of us such a solution of life's problems is profoundly unsatisfying. We cannot be content to be mere onlookers at the drama of the universe, nor do we believe we were meant to be. We are conscious of energies that impel us to activity, and of ideals that set the goal to which our effort shall be directed. We measure our past by our future, and it seems to us that we have moved forward in the direction toward which we wish to go. And what we believe of ourselves we believe to be true *a fortiori* of the unseen actor who has fashioned star and sun and sea, whose footsteps we can trace in history, and whose voice we hear speaking in the silence of the soul. He too is working toward an end, as we are; and He too, measuring the present by the past, notes progress in the accomplishment of His plan. As we find in our own experience no inconsistency between law and freedom; as we too, using materials given to us according to principles we cannot change, are yet able to bring new things to pass and glory in our creation, so with God. And the forward steps in His onward march, the stages in that creative evolution which is the law of the divine life, are what religion knows as miracle.

There is room then for a new treatment of the whole question of miracle which shall restore it to its place in the theistic argument in a form which is consistent with the principles which govern the rest of our intellectual life; a treatment which shall emphasize the creative aspect of religion, its venturesomeness and originality, without

losing the steadying influence which has come to us through the discovery of law—above all, a treatment which shall make Jesus' ideal of character its supreme standard of value and put the final test of certainty where he put it: for the individual in the appeal of the Christ-like God to the spirit of man His child, and for society in the new impulse given and contribution made to that forward movement of the race whose aim is common service inspired by common love.

THE FUNCTION OF THE EDUCATED AND OF THE UNEDUCATED MINISTRY

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In one sense of the word there is of course no place in the ministry for the uneducated man. The preacher who is so ignorant as to be illiterate—illiterate in that he does not read and study and observe—is not to be thought of as a candidate for the ministry. If, on the other hand, we think of the educated minister as the student who has been graduated from college and from theological seminary, we rather narrowly limit our definition of education. Many men of unusual success in the ministry have preferred to take graduate work along certain specific lines rather than to pursue the course in the seminary. In this they may have been mistaken, but of course they belong by pre-eminent right in the ranks of the educated. Moreover, the fact of actually receiving a degree is not the chief essential. Perhaps for our purpose we may define the educated minister as one who has in a reputable college, university, or seminary mastered the point of view of the scholar, attained some success in the use of scholarly methods, and acquired scholarly habits. For our purpose the uneducated minister is one who has not received his training at such an institution. We assume, however, in our use of the word "uneducated" that the minister has studious habits, and that he does the best he can to make good by incessant effort the lack of early institutional training; otherwise we can hardly see what place he has in the ministry. We may be permitted further to

drop from our consideration both the occasional pulpit "genius," who comes to popular power without formal mental training, and also that bearer of scholastic degrees who is remarkable chiefly for his dulness.

That in the discussion of the theme before us we are dealing with a real problem is obvious. The idea for which we stand and for which we must stand is that the minister should be graduated from college and from theological seminary. As a matter of fact, however, good pulpits in every denomination are filled by men whose technical educational training has been of the slightest, frontier communities are served by preachers who have never been near college, and important Christian bodies like the Church of England are pleading for a greater place for lay preaching. If all the theological schools now in the United States were to be crowded to their utmost capacity, they could not fill with their graduates all the pulpits becoming vacant year by year in the United States. In addition, there is more and more of a conviction that there will always be a place for some preachers who are not in the strict institutional sense educated. The present writer feels that with the abundant collegiate opportunities today only the rarest circumstances should justify the reception of a man into the ministry who is not at least a college graduate; but he faces the fact that there are many who insist that some of the most effective preaching has been done, for example, by laymen whose only training has been in the business career.

We may best approach our theme by considering some phrases in which the common-sense of men has marked out a line between the educated and the uneducated. Some familiar expressions draw the line between the functions of the technically educated and those of the uneducated for human activities in general. It may be that the examination of these phrases will throw light upon the problem before us.

First of all, we have in common speech a distinction between the expert in a particular field and the layman in that field. We hear constantly about reliance upon the expert, and we hear with equal frequency of the need of balancing the skilled knowledge of the expert with the good sense and poise of the ordinary layman. In his very suggestive book on *Public Opinion and Popular Government* President Lowell discusses the spheres of the expert and of the layman in governmental activities. There are some spheres that manifestly belong to the expert. It would be folly for the layman to try to pass upon the merits of a system of water supply, or upon a scheme of municipal sanitation, or upon a bill for the regulation of currency issues. But there are positions of great importance in public life which are better filled by men who are not specialists or who are more than specialists. President Lowell enumerates as the qualities desirable in those who are to occupy public positions which do not call for expert knowledge, quickness of apprehension, breadth of sympathy, and soundness of judgment.

In this distinction between the expert and the man of more general knowledge we have a suggestion of some importance for the question before us. In those phases of ministerial effort which require expert knowledge it is hard to see how we can get along without the aid of the theological school. In the phases which require quickness of apprehension, width of sympathy, and soundness of judgment the formal education may not be so complete. Today we require more of a minister than that he shall be a good preacher or teacher. He must be, as we say, a man among men. There is in one of the Colorado mining camps today a minister who has had more influence upon the miners during the recent months of coal strike than perhaps any other minister in Colorado. He has been better able to hold the miners back from

violence than any other man in the fields. Yet this man has had very little formal education. In his earlier years he was a machinist in Scotland and he has passed all his life since among the day-laborers. He is able to see the meaning of a situation quickly, can sympathize with both employers and employed, and very rarely makes even a slight mistake in judgment. While this particular preacher might not make a very good technical showing before an examining board of a theological seminary, he is simply invaluable in his present position. In reality he is an educated man. Out of a salary of seven hundred dollars he buys and reads such books as Dewey's *How We Think*, Dods' *The Bible; Its Nature and Origin*, Rauschenbusch's *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, Peabody's *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*. It is true that these books are in the course of study prescribed for him by the ministerial organization to which he belongs, but he pursues the studies with such eagerness and success as to pass a good examination in the books.

The lack of at least some measure of expert knowledge becomes most apparent when the untrained men begin to discourse on themes which involve the modern methods of Biblical study. With the attacks on such methods by the untrained men we are all familiar, but the advocacy of the methods and the attempted use of them by untrained men is almost as distressing. It is quite significant that a large part of the reckless and foolish utterances concerning modern Biblical study comes from students of theological seminaries where the critical problems are not frankly faced and thought through, or from men who have tried to work their way through these problems by themselves. The student trained in a school where the modern methods are fully and freely taught is apt to be the true conservative when he gets out to his work. For one thing, he is more apt to see the actual scope of the

critical method and to preserve the correct emphasis. And it is rather a dangerous exercise for the minister to try to master modern methods by himself. He may lose all sense of perspective. In nothing is a theological education more valuable than in the correction of the critical temper by the community-spirit in the school. It is a fair question as to whether a man ought to try to do much with critical methods except in a decidedly human atmosphere which is lit by at least an occasional ray of humor. The writer of this article recalls a young man who went from an Eastern college of high grade into the pastorate of a church without having studied the higher criticism for an hour. It was back in the days when Goldwin Smith was saying that the Old Testament is the millstone about Christianity's neck. In conversation with the writer the young minister announced that as a result of his studies he had concluded that Christianity must strike the Old Testament from the Scriptures altogether! A course in the Old Testament under an expert would not necessarily have made an expert of this particular student, but it would have saved him from some excesses which have marred an otherwise excellent ministry.

It is well known that the great State universities of the Middle West cannot in harmony with their character as parts of the public educational system take direct hold of the problem of religious instruction. It was the custom for many years to leave the religious instruction in these schools largely to the Young Men's Christian Association secretaries. These were for the most part young college graduates with no particular training in theological thinking. They were, with marvellously few exceptions, splendid men who exerted great influence on the life of those with whom they came in touch. The wholesomeness of their character was and is contagious. The Y. M. C. A. college secretary is very

likely to have all the qualities which President Lowell enumerated as making for the strength of the man who is serviceable to the community by his general intelligence, —quickness of apprehension, width of sympathy, and soundness of judgment. One of the ways the secretary showed this soundness of judgment was in calling in the help of someone else when dealing with students perplexed by the teachings in biology and history and social science—the students, for example, trying to harmonize the child's view of the Bible which they brought with them to college with the man's view of everything else which their studies were giving them. But the secretary could not always be calling on someone outside for help; so that the churches have been more and more placing college pastors with the best technical training at the seats of the State universities. These fields, which, by the way, are among the most promising before American Protestantism, are being cultivated today with a sound understanding of the difference in the function of the man of general aptitudes and of the expert, with an increasingly wise use of each type and with an unusually large measure of success.

We would not have it imagined that this line drawn between expert and lay can always be drawn between the formally educated and those whose education has not been institutional. In some fields the expert knowledge can be gained only by actual experience. Some spheres of practical church activity are so new that the theological schools have not until very recently been able to offer systematic courses covering such activities. The writer happens to be connected with the Methodist Episcopal Church. The best two churches to his knowledge in that denomination so far as general community influence is concerned—churches that enter as positive factors into educational, industrial, and civic affairs in addition to what are more technically thought of as religious

activities—are both presided over by ministers who did not complete a seminary course. One of these ministers was graduated from college and went to his field after one year in the seminary. The other was graduated from college and took elaborate courses in post-graduate social science in a university. In their student days nothing was offered in theological schools which would have dealt with the questions which they have been so successful in solving. On the other hand, we do not mean that quickness of apprehension, width of sympathy, and soundness of judgment are the sole property of men who have been self-educated. It would be hard to find a definition of the aim of college education which would be more apt than that of increasing quickness of apprehension, width of sympathy, and soundness of judgment. All that we mean is that these qualities are more likely to be obtained by self-instruction and by large experience in the world than is specialized expert knowledge in a particular field. It will be recalled that so high an authority as President Eliot gave it as his belief that the faithful and considerate reading of a certain set of books, a set which could be contained in a five-foot shelf, would give any man the essentials of a liberal education. But the reading of a five-foot shelf of books might not make a man an expert in any direction.

A second line of division drawn in popular speech between forms of activity which require differing degrees of academic training is that between the extensive and the intensive. The expression has become current through the present day movement toward better farming methods. As the land of the nation has become more and more densely populated there has arisen an increased demand that we get more from the land than ever before. So that the young man who once would have gone West "to take up land," now goes to the agri-

cultural department of the university to find how to produce more from the land which he already holds. The distinction between extensive and intensive is of value at least in suggestiveness in many fields besides agriculture.

There are some preachers of large popular qualities—using the word "popular" in the very best sense—whose education has been of the most general character. Such men have ordinarily been wide readers, have moved among all classes of persons, and have developed the power to discern the mind of the masses with a certainty amounting almost to intuition. They are popular not necessarily in the sense of pleasing the people but in the sense of understanding the people and of interpreting the people to themselves. They meet Gladstone's definition of an orator in that they send back upon their hearers in shower what they take from their hearers in cloud. Now this may be, very often is, most powerful preaching. The denomination suffers which has not some such men. But the preaching belongs to what we might call the extensive type. It is adapted to large audiences, and no large audience remains the same for any length of time. Such men impress immense numbers in the course of a year and impress them for good. But there is apt to be a sameness about the preaching. One sitting under the ministry of such a preacher year in and year out might miss a certain instructional quality in the message. The hearer might feel that vast human aspirations and longings and struggles were being focussed in the preaching week by week to his marked spiritual profit, but he might not hear much that would specifically touch upon particular difficulties on which he would crave light. But we need these capacious pulpit channels of human interest and feeling and thought wherever we can find them. As long as they point toward the loftiest and best we must keep them open by every encouragement

in our power. We must judge such ministers by their success in helping the multitudes, and not put on any airs of superiority toward them if they do not set as much store by formal training as we would like to have done by the accredited prophets of the church.

But there is another type of prophet—the man who after prolonged study and reflection and musing instructs his people in the truth of the kingdom. This prophet does not minister to such crowds as does the other, but his influence—if not on his immediate day then on the day to come—is even more potent than that of his more conspicuous brother. This minister's spirit of self-sacrifice shows itself in the extent to which he is willing to give himself to patient search for truth. His audiences may be comparatively small; they may consist through the years of chiefly the same persons. In the long run, however, his influence reaches out to the multitudes and becomes part of their thinking, even though they are not aware of the source of the spiritual stream. It is not too much to say that there is slight chance of a man's becoming a prophet of this latter type without the advantage of the start given by good academic and professional training. The starting-place for the true advance in thinking is from the best which the student can receive in the schools of his day.

This distinction between extensive and intensive appears very clearly in the difference between evangelistic effort and Christian nurture. Every minister who achieves substantial results must be in some manner and in some degree evangelistic. The kingdom will make no advance if there is not evangelism. Evangelistic skill is rare, and seems not to be as dependent upon academic religious instruction as are some other forms of religious activity. The reason for this is often that the evangelist is a man of some striking religious experience. He has perhaps been a transgressor and has

found his way back to right living; or he is of that particular emotional temperament which is marked by crises. Now there are multitudes of persons in the world who are transgressors and multitudes who are of the constitution fitted to come to sharp inner crisis. What such persons need is just to hear the good news; and when an evangelist can tell forcefully the story of his own experience he will surely bring some others to like experience with his own. Here is a great field for lay preaching in our time. There are men who can tell from their own experience, without violating the religious proprieties or good taste, how to find the way into a new life. To say that there is no place for such preachers is to speak out of blindness. But not every one is fitted for such evangelistic appeal. Some ministers are of such temperament as not to have known a striking experience which compels the attention of men in its very telling. Some have never been outbreaking transgressors. These preachers can speak persuasively to some about the entrance into the kingdom of God, but they are not equipped for attracting those to whom the popular evangelist makes his appeal.

But when the evangelist untrained in theological thinking begins to expound theology confusion is at the door. We speak often of the distinction between religion and theology, but we sometimes forget how closely the two are interwoven. The evangelist himself may hold a particular theory of Biblical inspiration or of atonement and may not discriminate between his theory and his experience. He is not an authority on theology as he is an authority on human repentance. In many regions of the country today an extreme form of premillenarianism is being taught by teachers who are admittedly successful as evangelists. Premillenarianism may be right or wrong, but it cannot be at present anything but a matter of speculative theology. It

surely is not possible for a preacher to speak with the same authority on premillenarianism as on the need of repentance.

We would not leave the impression that the untrained are to look upon evangelism as their particular field. The trained scholar may be even more successful in popular evangelism than the untrained preacher; but we do mean that if a preacher will stick close to life and experience, he can be a winner of men of certain temperamental types or of certain types of moral career without having been formally trained for the ministry. When we enter the sphere of Christian nurture, however, we require a different order of ability. Here we demand all possible light on different types of character and different methods of presenting the truth. As an instance, think how much of psychological data is being placed in the hands of the ministry today as an equipment for winning and holding lives for the Christian religion. The church has come to see that it is Christian duty to hold children fast from the beginning, so that devout scholars have studied the child-life as never before. Moreover, we have come to see that the growing life is most apt to fall away from the church at the period between sixteen and twenty years of age, and the teachers have worked out for the minister a careful set of conclusions as to adolescent psychology. Again, it is becoming manifest that middle life brings its peculiar temptations, and life at that period is being scientifically studied. Now this does not mean that men are to be saved by psychology, but psychology is the study of life, after all. It is hard to see how a conscientious minister, anxious to hold his parishioners for the kingdom of God, can afford to neglect any light upon human life which he can gain from any source whatever. But the difficulty is that the untrained man does not always know how to use rightly the instruments which modern scientific study places at his disposal.

In the pastoral activities there is an extensive work of great value. There is the minister who is somewhat of a hail-fellow-well-met, who meets an almost incredible number of persons in the course of a week and does them good with a hearty greeting. It will not be wise to minimize the importance of such pastoral attention. In some fields, especially in the larger cities, this minister's word of cheer is the only vitally human hail which many persons hear from the beginning of the week to the end. There is, however, a type of service which this man may never render—the work of deep spiritual counsel and of religious guidance through hard stresses. For this sort of service the more highly trained the minister the better. All that he knows and all that he can get from the best institutional influences of his time, all that he has learned in the severest study, will not be too much if he is to help human lives at some bitter crises. Happy the church that has for pastor a well-trained man who is willing to place his full ability at the service of the lives that need serious counsel in times of religious or other strain. Such pastors increase in power through the years. The only minister who stands large chance of being forceful through the long run is the thoroughly educated man. Almost any congregation will bear with shortcomings and inadequacies in a young man, for there is magnetic charm about youth. But after a while the charm of youth wears off, and the shortcomings seem intolerable. The only charm that endures in a minister is the charm of a cultivated spirit which brings all its wealth to bear in helpfulness toward human beings. Except in very rare instances the pastorates of the untrained preacher will be short. Denominations which have some system of centralized administration can carry him through a succession of short pastorates with success, but they can hardly expect from him the intensive work required in a long pastorate.

Still another suggestive distinction worked out into common phrase is that between work which is negative and that which is positive, or that which is destructive and that which is constructive. Some forms of negative and destructive work in every field are valuable. When we see the need of assault upon evils in the social sphere today we realize that there is a task of destructive character which almost every prophet is called upon to undertake. The attack upon industrial and political and social abuses is destructive work and yet is important. The ground must be cleared for the new building.

In this realm of social advance it would seem that we have a sphere where formal academic training does not always seem to be a requisite. True, the universities of our land today are not apt to be lacking in radicalism; but the most telling service in the attack upon evils is often rendered by men who have no wide knowledge beyond that of the distressing facts which they describe. Reform comes through public opinion. The power generated for reform is that of aroused public sentiment; but, public opinion being what it is, carefully balanced statements do not arouse the public mind as do the fiery invectives of the orator-agitator. We are speaking now of the way things are, not of how they ought to be. It does not require any especial skill to ring an alarm bell—and alarm bells are often needed. Now, better have these alarms rung by men whose earnestness is genuine, coming out of first-hand acquaintance with the evils, than to have the earnestness assumed by men who of set purpose omit all qualifications and modifications. We need in the pulpit today that boldness of speech which comes out of experience at first hand with the sufferings of those who are not getting half a chance under present social conditions. Such sufferers never will get their chance unless the prophets cry aloud as unsparingly as did the prophets of old.

A minister need not be a graduate of a seminary or college to see an evil and to call attention to it with vigor and directness. But even the task of destruction on a large scale demands thorough training. The soldier's work is destructive, and the individual soldier can fight furiously without academic training. All he absolutely needs beyond a downright fighting spirit is a knowledge of how to shoot. But in the higher realms of strategy only the educated leader can be depended upon. Only one or two soldiers came to positions of important general command in the American Civil War who had not been to West Point. The minister who expects to attain the largest effectiveness in the attack on social evils must have more than fighting spirit.

When we pass to the constructive aspect, of course any thought of success in social improvement without trained leadership is out of the question. It would be ridiculous if it were not so tragic to see groups of well-meaning ministerial enthusiasts for social reform come together to agree upon plans, and then show by their speech that they know nothing of the literature of such reform movements, nothing of the history of social progress, nothing of political economy or of the theory of the State. Let the minister call attention to social evils with all his power; but before he begins to offer advice as to how to deal positively, and constructively, let him take a few stiff courses in economics and the more serious social sciences, or let him read the solider writers on such themes as trades-unionism and socialism. The result may be that his pulpit utterances on these themes will be few and well considered, and that he will exert his chief influence in these directions through organizations which try to deal with the details of social improvement in expert and intelligent fashion.

As a final distinction drawn in popular speech we would instance that between theology and religion, which is

the application to the sphere of religion of the distinction between theory and life. We have often heard of the persons who "love flowers but who care nothing for botany," and there is, of course, deep significance in the distinction. The supreme qualification for success in the ministry is spiritual life, and the life may have come to great power and fruitage without help from schools. We lay more and more stress upon the contagion of life itself, and we are willing to place any religious life in any position which will lead to the spread of the life. Light is not to be kept in a corner. The preacher must be of value, in the last analysis, because of what he is. We said at the beginning that there is no place in the ministry for the man who is uneducated in the sense that he is ignorant. But for the man whose education has been in the school of life and who in that life has come to profound knowledge of life on the religious side there is large place, especially if he have the gift of communicating himself.

But it is entirely possible so to draw the distinction between botany and flowers and between theology and religion as to suggest that botany and theology are not particularly worth while. Theology correctly understood is an instrument for the enrichment and deepening of religious life; and the fact that a man is trained in theological thinking ought not to imply that he is any the less abounding in religious life. The better the theology, the better the life—just as it is true that the better the religious life of a time, the better the theology. The man whose education has been chiefly in life itself must contribute to theology chiefly indirectly. He can create the type of life out of which the theology arises. But the task of shaping the theology in the best statements will quite likely continue to be in the future as it has been in the past the task of the trained thinker. We deplore the tendency in many quarters to minimize

the importance of theological thinking. It is true that the criticisms have for the most part been against that hard-and-fast dogmatism which took theology as an end in itself. That type has passed. But theological thinking ought not to be neglected, for it is a veritable means of grace and life. Even the botanists have improved on some types of flowers, and have helped mightily in teaching us to appreciate all types of flowers. There is room for the preacher who, as we say, knows life at first hand. There is room also for him who so works over the data which come out of life as to give us better control of life in the service of God and man.

In drawing this paper to a close it may be permissible to remark that it would be almost hopeless to try to find a preacher not academically trained who has not at one time or other expressed regret at his early lack of educational opportunity. For if education amounts to anything, it means that the educated man is more alive than he would have been without the education; and preaching in the end depends upon the abundance of the life of the preacher.

EVOLUTION AND THE OTHER WORLD[1]

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What special students of so-called psychic phenomena will think of Mr. Henry Holt's two generous volumes I do not know, but to me, and no doubt to many like me, they are quite the most important and significant, as they are the most entertaining, exposition of the subject. This is indeed something more than a dead book; it is a life—as it were the voice of a friend confiding to us through the hours of a long winter night the lessons, still mingled with hesitations and questions, of his ripe experience. The publicity of high spirits may abound; but there are pages also which will reveal their full meaning only to those who know the author as a friend in the literal sense of the word, passages, for those who understand, of almost sacred privacy. So, for instance, the minute account of the spectacle unfolding at sunrise to the eyes of the watcher at the author's summer home has its place and weight for all readers as an argument that, as these lovely things are far beyond "our ancestors' universe of darkness and silence," so there may be infinite ranges of perception still to be discovered by mankind; but to one who has entered that hospitable "gate, open to all who care to come," and with the kindly guidance of his host has seen the sunlight falling from mountain top to valley and from valley to lake, the printed words will be something more than the speech of a book to its unseen audience. These

[1] On the Cosmic Relations, 2 vols. Henry Holt. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914. Vol. I, pp. xii, 512. Vol. II, pp. 477. $5.00.

matters I should like to dwell on for their pleasantness and their wisdom; but, like a bad talker, I must use all my time in contradiction. For I need not defer saying that Mr. Holt's work seems to me to consist of two elements strangely compounded. Besides the appealing sagacity of the man of the world, inquisitive, sceptical of dogma, tolerant of all things except impertinence, resting finally in balance and measure—besides this sagacity of experience to which I bow, there is also in the book a philosophy of a more formal sort, to which, from the deepest knowledge of my heart, I am bound to demur.

Mr. Holt is avowedly of the school of "Lyell, Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, and their friends," who swept away "the flood of associations on which the old faiths depended"; he is a Spencerian *à outrance.* Such a state of mind might be set down as merely belated; but Mr. Holt is anything rather than tardy in his views. My quarrel with him is because, while adhering to the letter of evolution in its strict mechanical form, he would open his mind to the flood of spiritual associations with no sense of the incongruity of such a position. I do not mean to imply that there is anything singular in this procedure, unless it be in the peculiar frankness and honesty of Mr. Holt's ideas. On the contrary, however individual some of his conclusions may appear, he has been borne onward on one of the great tides of the intellect. In the exaltation and lust of conquest that came with the Victorian demonstration of evolution, men's heads were a little turned, and whatever reservations they might make in deference to the Unknowable and the outlying realms of mystery, they were really and pugnaciously convinced that here was the word of truth which should silence the riddling questions of man's soul, as certainly as the Copernican system had led to the untangling of the orbits of the planets. The

comparison of Darwin or Spencer with Copernicus became in fact one of the commonplaces of the wise and the unwise.

But this assurance of science was bought at a terrible price. It meant that every appearance of spontaneity in the universe must be subdued to a law of inflexible regularity, and that the soul of man was held to be no more than a momentary centre of molecular force in the vast abyss of matter. Naturally, the imagination of endless space and of the infinite mechanism of time, when the first enthusiasm of assertion calmed down, seemed to the human spirit a chill substitute for its intuitions of independent existence. In many thoughtful minds it even awoke a kind of horror, and the supreme word of Spencer himself, the codicil, so to speak, to his evolutionary testament, is an ever memorable confession of that feeling:

"The thought of this blank form of existence which, explored in all directions as far as imagination can reach, has, beyond that, an unexplored region compared with which the part which imagination has traversed is but infinitesimal—the thought of a Space compared with which our immeasurable sidereal system dwindles to a point, is a thought too overwhelming to be dwelt upon. Of late years the consciousness that without origin or cause infinite Space has ever existed and must ever exist, produces in me a feeling from which I shrink."

Now it is nothing to our purpose here to say that the notion of infinite space or of any cosmic mechanism is as purely a piece of self-engendering logic as was Anselm's or any other Schoolman's ontological proof of the being of God. The point is that the hearts of men are never very brave before the truth, or what they deem the truth, when their own deeper desires are thwarted. "The chief component of mind," as Spencer observes, "is feeling," and it is an "enormous error" to suppose that reason, whether right or wrong, will long endure

the attack of our emotions. And so the revulsion from the cruder dogmas of Victorian materialism has been swift and sure. In many ways, whether in open rebellion against science or ostentatiously under its banner, men have turned their eyes once more to

> "that true world within the world we see,
> Whereof our world is but the bounding shore"—

calling it "true," perhaps, because faith is greater than perception.

Now, outrageous as such a statement may sound, I confess that the conversion of the professional student of science, as, for example, that of Sir Oliver Lodge, has little meaning for me; the very character of his work in investigation seems to have a restricting effect on his mind, so that his sense of the relative value of evidence in other than his own narrow field is likely to be feeble or distorted. But there is deep meaning in the fact that a wary man of the world, who has been imbued with the mechanical theorems of evolution, should yet find this philosophy inadequate to his inner life, and should devote the dearly purchased leisure of his later years to the study of phenomena which, if genuine, must break asunder all the links of Huxley's causal chain and shatter into bits the steadfast cosmic machine of Spencer. For what have cause or calculation to do there where Mr. Holt would take us, even "beyond the region of congruities"? If any one paragraph may be selected as giving the central motive of Mr. Holt's book, it is, I take it, this:

> "Certain it is that without an abiding consciousness that the known mass of phenomena is not all, and that behind them is a cause transcending our imaginations, life loses some of its best emotions, the imagination grows arid, and the moral impulses shrink. While what we know, and the increasing of it, can more than occupy all our working powers, they work all the better for an occasional dream of greater and less troubled things."

These two bulky volumes, in fact, are essentially the confession of a strong inquisitive mind seeking, under compulsion, to reach some assurance in that "dream of greater and less troubled things." Mr. Holt is one of those who admit that wisdom has come to them by way of sudden conversion. The first warning fell when he was still a young man: "It came," he says, "with the blaze of light, but the light was from the natural sunset which, however, seemed that evening not confined to the far-off clouds, but to pervade the whole atmosphere and all other things, including me, and to be pervaded by energy and mind and sympathy." This, if I interpret his story correctly, was of the preliminary and general sort not unknown in conversions of the more orthodox kind, and needed to be fixed and directed by a later experience. He was turned finally to the new way by a figure and admonition, as he firmly believes, from the other world—an epiphany so dear that he can only hint at it in pious reticence. He had already seen a little of what the commoner sort of mediums can do in furniture-smashing and mind-reading, but now he who—I cannot forbear the gentle reproach—can find small time for Plato, is impelled to give year upon year to the forty-one volumes of the Proceedings and Journal of the Society for Psychical Research. It is not strange that, after this long confinement and the completion of his great work, his "desire to get back to the studies of our usual life is like the desire to get from the fog into the sunlight"; but to some of us his report from that realm of fog is strange indeed, passing strange.

A considerable part of his book consists of extracts from the publications of the S. P. R., supplemented by a few hitherto unprinted documents and furnished with a running comment. For the form in which this material is given us we are bound to be grateful. The selection includes matter of a later date than that in

the *Human Personality* of Mr. Frederic Myers, and is constructed in such a spirit of freedom and fairness as to justify the reader in feeling that he would gain little by wading through the enormous mass of the sources. Nor is Mr. Holt's tone repellently dogmatic. He admits that he himself is still groping in these obscure regions, and he does not hesitate to point out the paradoxical and often contradictory nature of the evidence. The rôle of fraud and collusion in the manifestations he does reject as insignificant and impertinent; and in this most of us are ready to follow him. No doubt there has been a vast amount of deliberate deception in the table-turning and other so-called mediumistic phenomena, but the residue of facts which cannot be accounted for by the ordinary faculties of man is large and presses for explanation. What shall we do with them?

Now a complete Spencerian, and indeed any one who marches under the exclusive flag of science, is bound to hold that these phenomena have their proper place in the scheme of evolution, and so Mr. Holt is at great pains to connect them with the development of man's perceptive powers. I have referred to his eloquent account of the joy of our larger contact with the visible world as compared with the dark and limited horizon of the amœba, from whom man is supposed to be descended. And so analogy suggests to him, as it has suggested to others, that our sensitiveness to "super-usual" phenomena is but the beginning of a new faculty, comparable to the spot on the tegument of the primitive organisms which reacted to a ray of light, and that in time this faculty will be trained to respond to the fulness of the spiritual world as the human eye has grown to embrace the wonders of material vision. The dimness and confusion of psychic perception now are due to our inexperience, and all our knowledge of evolution warrants the hope

that some day our children's children shall see with a wide-open inner eye, and shall be able *veras audire et reddere voces.*

Meanwhile all is not darkness. Beyond the incidents of telepathy and telekinesis, which many of the most sceptical of us are beginning to accept, there are those—not the sentimentalists of the old sort, but highly educated men and women—who believe that we already have abundant evidence of true communication with denizens of the other world. Mr. Holt wavers a little when he comes to theorize on these things, but at bottom his conviction is pretty firm that in some way, sometimes obscurely and deceptively, sometimes clearly and commandingly, the dead speak to us through what material mediums they can employ. The "subliminal self" he rejects as a meaningless fiction. In its place he assumes what he calls the Cosmic Soul—the great reservoir from which our mind or spirit emanates, gathers strength and personality by the discipline of life, and then in due time returns to its source, remaining at once a part of the whole and a separate individuality. I can best set forth his views of this delicate matter by quoting three short paragraphs from different parts of the book:

". . . Indications of a consciousness aware of everything that is going on or has gone on, at least within the sphere of its activity, and which includes and reaches far outside of our activity and our knowledge. All individual consciousnesses seem to be, in some mysterious way, not only themselves, but part of that universal consciousness; for we get from it not only wondrous dream-images of all kinds, but mysterious impressions from individual consciousnesses other than our own, which with our own are part of it."

"But though perhaps we flow back into this constantly increasing aggregate of mind—the Cosmic Soul—it seems much more obviously to flow into us, at times and in degrees that vary enormously, as we vary. Into the least sensitive or receptive it does not go perceptibly beyond the ordinary psychoses of daily life; into others it seems to penetrate in ways to which we hardly know how to assign limits.

Will it not presumably, as evolution goes on, flow more and more into all of us?"

"It looks too as if these possibilities might be the supreme justification for the evolution of the universe. There may be justification enough in birds and flowers, in the play of lambs and children, in sex, in love, in the maternity around which so much of the world's worship has centred, in knowledge, in wisdom, even as they have been ordinarily understood; but a new significance, a new joy, a new glory over and beyond them all sometimes seems to have been lately promised by that as yet dim conception of the Cosmic Soul."

In my small reading in this field I know of no other expression so clear and persuasive of the "dream of greater and less troubled things" which may come to a strong mind from spiritualism. Nothing certainly in Frederic Myers's elegant and learned exposition of the subject has ever given me the same shock, so to speak, of veracious experience. Now in one way there is nothing new in these conclusions. It would be hard to distinguish between this Cosmic Soul and that all-embracing Mind with which the Stoic Emperor sought to think in common, as we breathe with the circumambient air (*μηκέτι μόνον συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοερῷ*); hard to see how it differs essentially from the *anima mundi* of certain mediæval philosophers, or from the Deity of certain half-pantheistic divines—and indeed Mr. Holt does not shrink from calling it by the sacred name of God. Even the attempt to furnish such a belief with a scientific sanction is not altogether unknown, for the Stoic creed was the direct outgrowth of an age of science; but the peculiar kind of confirmation which the devotees of psychical research claim for their hopes from the analogies of evolution is emphatically a new thing. I suspect that the adherence of many "tough-minded" men (as William James would call them), so different from the credulity of the earlier spiritualists, is due in large measure to the illusion of these analogies.

Illusion, I say, for I cannot see one particle of justification for these claims. The publications of the S. P. R. are sufficient evidence that psychic phenomena in these latter years have received a kind of study unknown in the past, and they have manifestly been dislocated into what may seem to be the region of science by the imposition of a classification decked out with the proper furnishing of Greek names. But in essential matters I cannot see the slightest proof of advance in our communication with the other world since the remotest records of history. I can only hint at one or two reasons for my belief, and leave the argument to the reader to fill out as he may. Mr. Holt gives several cases of supposed levitation, but is rather doubtful of the facts. Well, if one will turn to the ancient religious books of India, he will find that the power of raising the body into the air is universally taken for granted as an every-day event. A saint who could not practise levitation was a mere novice in the higher life. Did the holy men of India really float before the eyes of innumerable observers in this uncanny fashion, and did some of the mediæval mystics enjoy the same sort of privilege? I do not know; but I am sure that the evidence for the tradition is as good as any of the tales accepted by the S. P. R. Again, the trance life was developed by the ancient Buddhists, and its various stages were analyzed by them with an apparatus of scientific terminology which makes the modern séance seem in comparison the amusement of a spiritual kindergarten. So too the knowledge of the other world obtained by these reputable gentlemen was incomparably superior in scope and precision to any light of recent years. It would be idle to refer to the records of similar powers through the classical and middle ages and in later times, without filling these pages with examples. Those who are looking for entertainment from this subject may be directed to Defoe's *Duncan Campbell*, where,

by the way, they will learn that when English was still a living speech, telepathy was merely "a sympathy with souls." And as there is no warrant for asserting any progress in these psychic phenomena, so the hope that some faculty of the soul, now in its primitive state, will develop to wondrous capabilities, is a pure assumption, and cannot be confirmed by analogy with physical evolution. Myers virtually conceded this when he said that the "actual possession and control of human organisms by departed spirits . . . carries us back to the most outrageously savage group among the superstitions of the early world." Yet with that sublime indifference to consistency which is the universal mark of pseudo-science, he is ready almost in the same breath to base the certainty of religious faith on our presumed evolution in this direction: "Assuredly this deepening response of man's spirit to the Cosmos deepening round him must be affected by all the signals which now are glimmering out of night to tell him of his inmost nature and his endless fate. Who can think that either Science or Revelation has spoken as yet more than a first half-comprehended word? But if in truth souls departed call to us, it is to them that we shall listen most of all." Alas for the blind hopes and the dark minds of men! How long ago the great evolutionary poet of Rome uttered those words, and these:

> "Denique si vocem rerum natura repente
> mittat et hoc alicui nostrum sic increpet ipsa,
> 'quid tibi tanto operest, mortalis, quod nimis aegris
> luctibus indulges? quid mortem congemis ac fles?'"

That was, and still shall be, the only true consolation, not ignoble indeed, from Nature's voice in the law of evolution. No, these phenomena that transcend the scheme of calculable physical forces, wherever they belong, do not fall within the province of science, and

Huxley, though he may have gone too far in denouncing them as gross imposture, was entirely justified as the apostle of evolution in declaring that, even if proved true, they would have no interest for him.

Nor, with the best will in the world, can I see that in themselves they offer any hope of less troubled things in the future. After balancing the evidence with open mind I am bound to say that, in my judgment, it seems to weigh strongly, overwhelmingly, against the hypothesis of communication with the dead. The bulk of the supposed messages from spiritual "controls" are palpably within the natural powers of the medium. Of the few that show knowledge beyond the reach of the medium the majority are easily explained by chance or telepathy, and those that seem to evade this kind of explanation are so extremely rare as scarcely to count at all against the mass of negative arguments; the only safe logic in these exceptional cases is to assume that we are ignorant of some of the circumstances. It is obviously impossible within the compass of an essay to marshal the negative arguments, but one or two of them may be indicated.

In the first place, then, the prearranged tests of a crucial character have failed. "Myers shows lack of memory of languages," says Mr. Holt, "but apparently only where his medium doesn't know them; but there's that envelope which he left with Sir Oliver Lodge for the express purpose of giving its contents, and he gave something else! It seems a hopeless muddle of contradictions." I should rather call it a very clear argument. The muddle of contradictions is in the stories which the spirits of wise men and women are believed to send us of life beyond the grave. They say one thing today and the very opposite thing tomorrow. When they do not talk nonsense, they commonly talk platitudes. So far as my reading goes, there has never come

one single word about the future state, though it be a George Eliot or a Walter Scott who speaks, which goes beyond the imagination of a commonplace or vulgar medium, though, as a matter of fact, some of the unprofessional mediums are refined, intelligent people, when their minds are awake. This, for instance, is the kind of education that follows us into the other world (George Eliot *loquitur*):

> "I being fond, very fond of writers of ancient history, etc., felt a strong desire to see Dante, Aristotle, and several others; Shakespeare, if such a spirit existed. As I stood thinking of him, a spirit instantly appeared, who speaking said, 'I am Bacon.' . . . As Bacon neared me, he began to speak, and quoted to me the following words, 'You have questioned my reality. Question it no more. I am Shakespeare.'"

Nor can I at all follow Mr. Holt in finding an argument for direct possession in the dramatic power of a Mrs. Piper—"more exact and comprehensive," he thinks, "(not more poetic, of course) than that of Shakespeare or Sophocles." I simply cannot see that this power of speaking for various persons surpasses what should be expected from such a medium in the trance state; there seems to me nothing at all miraculous or "super-usual" in it.

Even if it were left a matter of taste, and as such *non disputandum*, to me belief in the genuineness of these "controls" would simply add a new terror to death. Shall there be no escape in this broad universe from folly and ignorance? The believers apologize for the prevalence of these qualities by appealing to the difficulty of establishing communication between those in the spirit and those in the body. I cannot see that the defence applies. If the communication is established, as they say it is, why should it be harder to give us a bit of real information about the new life than to utter contradictory platitudes? Charles Eliot Norton once had a

sitting with Mrs. Piper in the home of William James, and this was the conclusion of his report: "As to the origin of many of the phantasmagorias of her trance dreams, I formed a very distinct opinion, but many experiments would be required to test its correctness, *and these I shall never make.*" I hold Mr. Norton's taste to be a deeper wisdom than the unregulated "open-mindedness" of his friend. When the last balance is made up, I even suspect that Mr. James will have been found among the disintegrating and deteriorating forces of the age.

For in its sum this movement, to which Mr. James lent the prestige of his great name, seems to me to lie in a backward direction towards disintegration. As it is not science, so it is not religion. Here is the significant fact. The physical phenomena produced by mediums and "sensitives" are invariably, whether genuine or fraudulent, the work of disorganization and destruction. I have yet to hear of anything constructed or brought into order by the forces of telekinesis, or what not; but I hear of tables foolishly rising into the air, of bells inanely ringing, of guitars smashed, and furniture generally hurled about the room. The literature of the subject has a capital name for the perpetrator of these absurd freaks—the Poltergeist, or demon of confusion; and certainly if there is any god of this world, it is he. Nor does his sway end with material objects, but so far as there is anything super-normal in the spiritual phenomena, here too his mischievous will would seem to be displayed. I do not mean by this that the human soul is chained to a dull mechanic exercise; the word "normal" is not necessarily synonymous with creeping routine. It is possible that in the dream-state there may come to the liberated soul intimations and visions that in one sense quite surpass its normal range, and in deep slumber we may enjoy a foretaste

of a divine repose that is by no means the same as sluggish death. I have gone far enough in the old Hindu mysticism to hold my mind open to such beliefs without waiting for confirmation from the reports of modern instances. And these images of the beloved dead that appear to men privately and in secret utter warnings and exhortations of a kind

> "to shake our dispositions
> With thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls"—

these, though they be called the creation of fantasy, may yet speak from the deeper wisdom of the heart, piercing with magic voice through the crust of diurnal circumstance. Nevertheless, even here is danger. The critic of literature is bound to protest against identifying the inspiration of genius too closely with the automatic creations of the dream state. That leads straight to the super-romantic exaltation of Coleridge's *Kubla Khan* as the supreme type of poetry, and to a belittlement of the higher organizing imagination and of the reflective use of experience in art. Of this sort of criticism we have seen vastly too much for a hundred years and more. In like manner we know how the ready hearkening to "airy tongues that syllable men's names" has in the past brought many a sturdy mind to credulity and dilapidation. These things we may say with no lack of deference to those admired names that have thought, and still think, otherwise.

If I might add another conjecture to the many that have been thrown out to explain these mysteries, I should say that there may well exist a great reservoir of free mental and spiritual energy out of which some selective agency within us has drawn together the stuff of its being and created what we call our personality, and that in the same way the universe has its centripetal will—a deity, a God, men name it—which shapes about itself

a sphere of order and harmony and divine purpose, amid the purposeless fluctuations of what Plato called ἀνάγκη, fate. If this were so, then the strangely haphazard and insignificant communications that reach the mind in the trance state, would be no divine intimations passing between our soul and the Cosmic Soul, or World Soul, properly speaking, but would be the result of suspending the inhibitive force of personality and opening the soul to the influx of those uncontrolled and unassimilated influences which stray, as it were, from the fringe and loose ends of the unseen realm. Glimpses of beauty may come to the soul by chance in those moments, and miraculous divinations from the ragged edge of things, but the outcome at last, if the mind becomes inured to the medium it works in, is mental disorganization and spiritual confusion. I remember many years ago hearing a Presbyterian evangelist, who had once been a professional spiritualist, discourse on the experiences of his unreformed days. Most of the supernatural phenomena he denounced as pure imposture; but with great earnestness he declared that there was a residue of mystery which the mediums themselves could not explain, and he warned his hearers to keep their eyes and ears from meddling with what was manifestly the direct work of the devil. Well, let us cry peace to the devil. That august personage is probably too busily engaged in graver pursuits to be diverted to the amusements of the séance. But if mythology is to be called in, let us ask rather in wonder why a scholar such as Frederic Myers, who had drunk so deep of the well of Hippocrene, should have turned his attention from Apollo to the Poltergeist? Not here, in the close atmosphere of trance and convulsion—

> "Not here, O Apollo!
> Are haunts meet for thee;
> But where Helicon breaks down
> In cliff to the sea."

How then, we ask, has a scholar like Myers or an experienced man of the world like Mr. Holt brought himself to seek comfort in looking at what one of them at least does not hesitate to call "a photograph of chaos and old night"? I suspect it is largely through the glamour of a word, the much-repeating of the mystic syllables of "science." The specious analogy with evolution has a power, like charity, to cover the evils of many an inconsistency; and it is probable also that the grandiose achievements of science in the sphere of material motion and change have confirmed the revolt from everything in religion that bears a true or fancied resemblance to quietism. It is, in fact, perilously easy to infer from a philosophy of natural selection that repose and stability are the marks of death and that life and growth are the product of purposeless activity. Hence, in part, the widespread tendency to honor the tumult rather than the strength of the soul; and hence, perhaps, the readiness of men of great intellectual ability to put the Poltergeist in the place of the old-fashioned God of Providence, whose commands were in the form of prohibitions. It is a strange obsession, a stranger faith! If there is any divinity to be learned from these conclusions of pseudo-science, it should seem to be the admonition to close the ears of the spirit to those random calls, whencesoever they come, and to listen once more for the still small voice, that was heard thousands of years ago and is the same today as yesterday. The whisper of the Cosmic Soul so heard may be only our own soul speaking in the silences of the flesh—I am not concerned to explain these things—but its message is clear and certain. "God," it says, as the great philosopher declared, "is a being simple and true both in act and in word; neither doth He Himself suffer change nor doth He deceive others by fantasies or messages or by the sending of signs whether to the waking or to the sleeping." This is the

same voice that proclaims the hope of immortality in the presence of that within us which amid birth and decay knows itself independent of these and a partaker of the divine nature; that announces the final grace of happiness in a peace that passes understanding; and speaks in the life of Socrates and Jesus and ten thousand other witnesses—but if there, then not in the words of Spencer or William James. Why, if a man needs the consolations of religion, should he seek further than that? Why, if he believes that a verbal revelation is possible, should he discard the sacred books of mankind for the fumbling reports of the Society for Psychical Research? And why, in the name of conscience, why, if a living medium is demanded, is it more reasonable to suppose that the mystery of life speaks through Mrs. Piper than through the Bishop of Rome?

And so, "having laid hands on father Parmenides," I recoil at my own temerity. The truth is, in whatever spirit you may take up this book on the *Cosmic Relations*, its arguments will impose themselves on you in one way or another by the sheer weight of the personality behind them. At least I am sure that, in the very act of criticising, ignorantly perhaps, its avowedly tentative explanations of psychic phenomena and the Cosmic Soul, I have felt myself fortified in my position by a something within it that is not tentative at all, but spoken with the authority of certain experience. There are pages here that any attentive reader will mark for their pungent expression of knowledge accumulated from many phases of life; for the privileged few there are passages of intimate, almost sacred self-revelation; and then there are other pages for the world in which the S. P. R. is forgotten and the author speaks of immortality and the reasonableness of faith in a way that must arrest the mind of the sceptical materialist and bring courage to the timid believer. If, as I am bound to think, much of the specific theory

of the book is drawn from the false usurpations of science, the real motive power behind the arguments is a well-fortified assurance of those greater and less troubled things for which we used to look in places and minds withdrawn from the world. Not many things of recent years are of more significance than that deep intuitions of religion should reach us unmistakably from this source and in the manner of this book.

THREE NOTABLE DREAMS

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I have been a dreamer from my earliest childhood. My dreams have been of all kinds, from the most fantastic and grotesque to those that were orderly and coherent; but I have never had any others like those which I am about to describe. My ordinary dreams often take the form of short stories or adventures of various kinds; among them is one recurrent dream in which I find myself in some house in the Middle West, very hospitably entertained by hosts to whom I am an unwelcome guest. I try to go home, but eastward-bound trains are difficult to reach and the baggage-express is never available. Such experiences seem to have no important meaning. Commonly they fade with the coming of daylight and make no definite or deep impression on the mind.

Set apart from all such commonplace dreams are three visions of the night which came in quick succession, and left me, on awaking in the morning, deeply impressed with a sense of the supernatural. I have no belief that they were revelations having any source outside of my own mind and experience; but they gave me a clue to the understanding of those things that happened of old when in a dream some important revelation was made to a patriarch or prophet; and, whatever their source, they wrought a change in my thought and feeling concerning the reality and nature of the future life that still abides and after five years makes the thought of an incorporeal existence seem perfectly natu-

ral and very attractive. They have also made me understand some events in ancient history, and have given a new meaning to the belief that dreams were the favorite channels through which the divine wisdom flowed into human life.

What I have to relate happened in this wise: being in a hospital five years ago, recovering from a desperate illness, I awoke three mornings in succession with the memory of dreams vivid and ineffaceable. The three dreams were all of the same class and in structure and substance entirely unlike any that have come to me before or since. They were visual representations of passages of Scripture and some other materials skilfully selected and put together so as to make a rational and intelligible presentation of the meaning they were intended to convey. One peculiarity of them all was that time and space were identical, so that to go back in time was exactly similar to a movement in space. Figures of speech became visual realities, and without the aid of sound, knowledge was conveyed to the mind at every moment. As the Psalmist wrote about the utterances of the day and night, "There is no speech nor language, their voice is not heard"; so I found it when exploring the universe, except in one case, which I am about to describe.

My first dream began with a vision. I was looking into the distance in a vast hall which I knew to be one of the "corridors of time." It extended from me to the beginning of the Christian Era. When I see pictures of ancient halls, temples, crypts, and cloisters I am often reminded of my dream, although I never see anything more grand and imposing than this vast "corridor." It was filled with dusky light and shade, and seemed to be exceedingly dry and salubrious. As I gazed in wonder, suddenly all the air became vibrant with the tones of a strong musical voice saying, "Be of good cheer; I have

overcome the world." I answered, "I am of good cheer; for I also have overcome the world." Then I awoke, and behold, it was a dream. But the impression left reminded me of Wordsworth's vision of the morning, after which he says, "On I walked in thankful blessedness, which yet survives."

The second dream came on the following morning. It was remarkable for the skill with which passages from the twenty-third Psalm and the twenty-first and twenty-second chapters of the Book of Revelation were fitted together and then the completed whole visualized in a picture of extraordinary beauty. In my dream I stood on the bank of a river which stretched across a grassy plain for two or three miles. It was deep and still, "clear as crystal." The turf under my feet was green and soft. I was in green pastures beside still waters. The river flowing down through the landscape towards me was a broad band of silver; and at its source there was a city of such splendor and beauty as no painter could put on canvas. It seemed like one of Turner's Venetian pictures, only much more splendid because, as recorded in the twenty-first and twenty-second chapters of the Book of Revelation, the city from foundation to topmost stone was in all its parts of gold and jewels, representing everything that was rare and beautiful, so that walls and gates and roofs, "transparent as glass," reflected the light which was in itself the glory of God. This light which glorified the landscape was unlike sunshine because it was not yellow, and unlike the light of the moon because, although it had a silver radiance, it was at the same time softer and more intense than sunshine or moonlight upon natural landscapes. The river was the "water of life, clear as crystal, proceeding out of the throne of God in the midst of the street thereof." On each side of the river was planted the tree of life, giving rare beauty to the landscape. As in wonder I

watched and communed with myself, I saw on the left of the river a deeply shaded highway. It ran between the tree of life on the right and an elevated woodland at the left. As I mused, I said, "This is the valley of the shadow of death"; and then I asked myself, "What is it that casts a shadow over the valley of death? Why certainly, it is the tree of life; without that there could be no death and no shade." The thought was wonderfully comforting, and I awoke from my dream cheered and exhilarated by the picture my subtle fancy had shaped out of biblical phrases.

My next dream, which caused me to awake on the third morning exclaiming to my nurse, "It was glorious," was unlike anything I had ever seen or imagined. When it began, I seemed to be standing on the verge of things solid and tangible. Before me, quite above the level line of vision, before a white background, were the figures 8,000,000,000. The figures were intensely black, and to me signified the fact that motion in the fields of light before me was at the rate of eight billion miles a second. At my left, near at hand, was a white casket; on the raised cover were the figures 5,000,000, which signified that the capacity of the casket was 5,000,000, but whether souls or bodies I did not know. Moved by some silent impulse, I crept into the casket; the cover came down; and, as it closed with a snap, the casket suddenly vanished, together with all that was corporeal in myself, and I, a disembodied intelligence, was looking out into a boundless universe in which nothing was to be seen or felt but oceans of light and infinite energy. I had no organs by which to see or hear or think, but my intelligence included everything. All that we know upon the earth by the use of our senses I could know as forms of thought; and so far as motion was concerned, I had only to think of any part of the universe, however distant, and instantly I was there. At one point, as I

swept through space where nothing was visible but waves of yellow light, recalling the description of the creation when wisdom was present, I was conscious, without seeing it, that we were passing over the "habitable parts of the earth." Soon after, in a vast distance of time and space, which were identical, I heard sublime strains of music and was instantly present "when the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy." When I awoke, cheered and exhilarated by my dream, thoughts that had accumulated in my studies of physiological psychology and various speculations about the nature of mind, soul, and spirit, and the possibilities of the continuation of intelligence when the physical organs of the body were destroyed, crowded upon my mind and made me reflect, with a certainty that five years later, at the threshold of my eightieth year, I have never wholly lost, that consciousness in human beings is a fact to be accounted for, and that, in spite of all the physical facts which are cited to disprove the thesis, we may still assert that consciousness does something.

Many have taken in hand in our time to discuss theories of dreams and to account for the curious combinations made by the unconscious sleeper through some sleepless faculty of the mind; but nothing that I have ever heard or read in explanation of the act of dreaming furnishes me with an explanation of the skill shown in the selection and putting together in rational and beautiful forms of the scraps of sacred literature which had never been worked over in this way in my conscious moods. The sudden disappearance of all physical things in my last dream was probably a reminiscence of Shakespeare's wonderful description of the changes in Prospero's vision which would leave not a rack behind.

Occasionally I dream of attempting to preach, but nothing ever comes right. There are books in the form of Bibles and hymn books but nothing inside of them

which can be used in the pulpit. The desk is always unstable, and, after many vain attempts to conduct a service in a decorous manner, the audience always fades away. People who dream about their daily tasks commonly have similar experiences; nothing happens as it ought to happen, and the mind seems to be under the control of some perverse faculty. But in my three notable dreams everything was orderly, rational, beautiful, and consistent. He who can explain them will have found a clue to some of the mysteries of the human mind and to some of the phenomena of occultism and inspiration and revelation as they present themselves in the annals of religion.

RECENT CHURCH UNION MOVEMENTS IN CANADA

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Three recent movements in Canada towards a clearer expression of Christian unity have special significance—the co-operation of the Theological Colleges affiliated to McGill University, the organization of the Church Unity League, and the negotiations for the organic union of the Congregational, Methodist, and Presbyterian Communions.

(1) Montreal College Co-operation. The latest calendar of the co-operating Theological Colleges contains this general statement: "Four Theological Colleges are affiliated to McGill University, namely, the Congregational, the Diocesan, the Presbyterian, and the Wesleyan. Ever since their foundation these Colleges have taken advantage of the classes in the University for training their students in the Arts subjects required of candidates for the ministry, and the results have been so satisfactory as to encourage the idea of extending the sphere of co-operation.

"Early in the year 1912 careful investigation was made by representatives of the four Colleges into the requirements of their several theological curricula with a view to ascertaining what subjects, if any, could be taken in common classes. As a result of prolonged consideration and negotiation it was unanimously agreed that a large portion of the work which had hitherto been done separately by each of the Colleges could be taken profitably in joint classes without prejudice to the principles

of the Communions represented and with increased efficiency in the work.

"The authorities of the four Colleges accordingly offered for the session of 1912–1913 a series of intercollegiate lecture courses from which each College might select according to the requirements of its own curriculum. The co-operative plan which was inaugurated in October, 1912 . . . has been abundantly justified by the results."

This movement has no immediate connection with any proposed plan of organic church union and does not involve even a "federation" of the Colleges participating. Each College still retains its individuality, its autonomy —appointing its own professors and conferring its own degrees—and its responsibility to the church which it represents. Nor does it involve any change in the relation—loosely defined as "affiliation"—of the Theological Colleges to McGill University. It is simply the co-operation on the ground of expediency of four independent self-governing Divinity Schools. It is an outward expression of the mutual good-will which is a tradition of this collegiate group, a witness to the public of the non-sectarian character of theological scholarship, and an effort to avoid the waste of overlapping, for example, in class-work and library equipment. What the future has in store for the movement—in the way of union or federation or of larger recognition by the University of theological courses in its requirements for degrees—is a thing of pure conjecture. No plans have been officially considered by any of the authorities concerned. It is possible that the study of theology in a scientific spirit will, as a result of its manifestation in the co-operative movement, affect the constituencies of both the Colleges and the University; but whatever happens will likely be the result of normal growth, not of arbitrary manufacture.

That there is real co-operation is evident from two considerations. First, the Colleges offer intercollegiate courses in such a wide range of subjects as Old and New Testament Literature and Exegesis, Church History, History of Doctrine, Patristics, Comparative Religion, Philosophy and Psychology of Religion, Christian Ethics, Systematic Theology, Homiletics, and Pastoral Training including Pedagogics and Sociology. Secondly, while the four Colleges require on the part of all their students in the three years of theological study 168 hours per week in the joint classes, they reserve for denominational teaching only 17 hours. With the exception of the Diocesan (Anglican), the Colleges reserve no subjects in the first and second years and only one subject each in the third year. Even this small reservation is made in no sectarian spirit, for it is practically necessary that students take up in separate classes the "rules and forms of procedure" of their several Communions.

This educational co-operation which involves 16 professors and about 200 students is now completing its third year and seems to have safely passed the experimental stage. The enthusiastic financial support of the movement by the laity of all the Churches, the comparative ease with which it was inaugurated, and the unbroken harmony of its internal progress, indicate that Canada is good soil for the seed of unity. This conclusion is confirmed by the success of more recent attempts at similar co-operation by the groups of Divinity Schools affiliated to the provincial Universities of Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia.

(2) The Church Unity League. Early in 1913 an appeal on behalf of Christian Unity, prepared by a few Anglican clergymen, was sent to the clergy and laity of the Church of England in Canada, inviting signatures for its presentation to the House of Bishops. The appeal referred *inter alia* to the deliverance of the Lam-

beth Conference (1908) on Church Unity, the summons of the Edinburgh Conference (1911), and the necessity of recognizing in some definite way the manifest Christian experience of the Reformed Non-Episcopal Churches. For promoting the cause of unity two practical steps were recommended—the admission of ministers of other churches, under certain restrictions and by rightful authority, to the pulpits of the Church of England, and permission to members of other communions on occasion to communicate in the Church of England. The appeal was approved and signed by nearly 300 clergymen and about 1,000 laymen.

This encyclical at once drew forth the following pronouncement from the (ten) Bishops of Eastern Canada: "While earnestly desirous of promoting the visible unity of the Church, they [the Bishops] deeply regret the publication of the circular in question, believing that such unauthorized action will inevitably hinder rather than promote the cause of real and lasting unity.

"While recognizing the right of every Churchman to hold and maintain his own views in things non-essential, they regard the specific proposals of the circular as calculated to subvert the Church's historic order, to imperil her internal harmony, and to retard the progress of her legitimate work.

"They admonish the brethren, clergy and laity alike, not to act precipitately and to beware lest in their desire to come closer to their brethren in non-episcopal Communions they weaken the bonds by which the Church of England in Canada is united to the Anglican Communion throughout the world."

In spite of this admonition, however, and within a month of its deliverance, the signatories of the appeal met and organized "The Church Unity League"; the objects of which are: "(*a*) to promote by all constitutional means the cause of Christian Unity, and (*b*) to examine

and set forth by meetings, sermons, and literature the grounds upon which our divisions rest, and to discover the lines of demarcation between those things that are always and everywhere essential and those that are expedient." No mention is made in the Constitution of the two practical suggestions in the original appeal which were disapproved by the Bishops, and the method of campaign is evidently that of prayer and conference with the representatives of other churches. Even this quiet propaganda, however, is not to be despised, for mutual understanding is a fundamental requisite of friendly co-operation, and the scientific study of the origins of our present forms and especially of the early Church forms is the surest way to dispose of the divine-right idea, which is one of the most serious obstacles to union. It is manifestly inconsistent that we pray for unity and piously deplore our "unhappy divisions," while we cherish dogmatic prepossessions—or obsessions—of Episcopacy or Presbytery as constituting the *esse* of the Christian Church. A multitude of Church Unity Leagues throughout Canada, following the method of honest study, friendly conference, and common intercession can hardly fail to be a wonderful influence in promoting interdenominational comity and co-operation.

(3) Of all recent church union movements in Canada, however, there stands out pre-eminently the proposed plan for the organic union of the Congregational, Methodist, and Presbyterian Communions. The beginnings of the movement go back to 1902 and were almost casual in their nature. The late Principal Patrick, of Manitoba College, with two other delegates, conveyed the greetings of the Presbyterian General Assembly to the General Conference of the Methodist Church then in session at Winnipeg. Without consulting either of his colleagues, Dr. Patrick, a Scotchman of two years' residence in Canada, decided on the spur of the moment to press the

subject of organic union. In response to his appeal the Conference appointed a Committee on Union to meet with representatives of the Congregational and Presbyterian Churches. The Congregational Union, which as early as 1887 had affirmed the readiness of its churches to enter into any movement in the direction of union "consistent with what they believe to be the New Testament principle of righteousness and freedom," and the Presbyterian General Assembly, which since 1899 had had a "special Committee on co-operation with other churches," accepted the Methodist invitation; and since 1903 joint meetings of the official representatives of these three churches have frequently been held.

The idea of union was no novel one to any of the negotiating churches. "The Congregational Union of Canada" is a title that speaks for itself. "The Methodist Church of Canada," which dates in its present form from 1884, is the result of two or three previous unions between such bodies as the Wesleyan Methodists, the Methodist New Connexion, the Methodist Episcopals, the Primitive Methodists, and the Bible Christians. "The Presbyterian Church in Canada" is the result of six unions whose history can be traced intelligently only by an expert student of the manifold divisions of Scottish Christianity. As early as 1817 the Associate or Burgher Presbytery of Truro united with the General Associate or Anti-Burgher Presbytery of Pictou—an action by the way that was almost immediately imitated by the parent sects in Scotland. Later on Presbyteries that stood for the principle of voluntaryism joined forces with those that conformed to establishment, United Secession and Relief Churches buried their obsolete differences, Free and United Presbyterian bodies abandoned the folly of perpetuating in this new land Scottish traditions that are meaningless here, until in 1875 was consummated the union of all its parts in "The

Presbyterian Church in Canada." None of the three Communions, therefore, inherited prepossessions unfavorable to the idea of organic union.

In 1908 there resulted from the negotiations a series of documents as a proposed Basis of Union under the five heads, Doctrine, Polity, Ministry, Administration, and Law. The last two do not concern our purpose here. Under "Ministry" the matter of greatest interest is "The Relations of a Minister to the Doctrines of the Church." In the Congregational Church no creed-subscription is required from a candidate for the ministry. Before his ordination he makes a statement of his belief to a Council or Association of local congregations, and the living faith of the church in the community is made the test of his doctrinal fitness for the office. In the Methodist Church the candidate is examined at an early stage of his student career in the Sermons and Notes of John Wesley and the Twenty-five Articles which are selections from the Anglican Thirty-nine. His ordination vows are connected with experience and practice rather than doctrinal beliefs. In the Presbyterian Church there is required an apparently rigid subscription to the Westminster Confession as a subordinate standard. "Do you believe the Westminster Confession of Faith, as adopted by this Church in the Basis of Union, to be founded on and agreeable to the Word of God, and in your teaching will you faithfully adhere thereto?" Various methods of casuistry are resorted to in order to mitigate the severity of this ordination test. The phrase "as adopted by this Church in the Basis of Union" sometimes affords relief, for it is commonly understood that there was a tacit understanding in 1875 between the Old Kirk liberals and the Canada Presbyterian conservatives that large liberty should be allowed in interpreting the Confession, and it was partly on this ground that the heresy-

charge against the late D. J. Macdonnell of Toronto was dropped. Again it is represented that only acceptance of the system of theology embodied in the Confession is required and that departure from many detailed statements is not forbidden. Moreover, the tolerant spirit of the Presbyterian Church is evident from the fact that the General Assembly has never disciplined a Professor or minister in the interests of orthodoxy. At the same time many a sensitive candidate for ordination finds himself in an embarrassing position. If he gives unqualified assent to the prescribed questions, he doubts his loyalty to absolute intellectual integrity; and if he gives a qualified assent, he seems to cast reflection on the sincerity or enlightenment of his "fathers and brethren." For many years there has been widespread dissatisfaction with a subscription that worries consciences even that are not finical at the solemn moment of ordination, that involves the appearance at least of lowering one's moral standard for entrance to the ministry and that gives to many outsiders the impression either of obscurantism or insincerity.

The compromise effected in the proposed Basis would seem to meet fairly well the needs of all the Churches. "Candidates shall be examined in the statement of Doctrine of the United Church and shall before ordination satisfy the examining body that they are in essential agreement therewith, and that as ministers of the Church they accept the statement as in substance agreeable to the teaching of the Holy Scriptures." The questions at ordination which bear on this are: "Are you persuaded that the Holy Scriptures contain sufficiently all doctrines required for eternal salvation in our Lord Jesus Christ? And are you resolved out of the said Scriptures to instruct the people committed to your charge and to teach nothing which is not agreeable thereto?" The terms of this subscription would

seem to allow standing-room in the ministry of the United Church for men of differing attitudes to questions of inspiration, infallibility, and inerrancy of the Bible.

The statement of "Polity" is practically Presbyterian. This was to be expected, for it involves least compromise. The Congregationalists of Canada have never followed the system of Independency and are not really more Congregational than either of the other negotiating churches. With all due deference to Presbytery, the congregations of the Presbyterian Church have practical autonomy, and the same is true, perhaps to a slightly lesser degree, of the Methodist congregations. Moreover, the Wesleyans of Canada follow the Presbyterian order of government as their colleagues in the United States follow the Episcopal. Evidently then to the satisfaction of all, the professed aim of the Joint Committee on the question of Polity has been realized, namely, to "provide substantial congregational freedom and at the same time secure the benefits of a strong connexional tie and co-operative efficiency."

The statement of "Doctrine" contains twenty articles, and both in form and content is a palpable compromise. The form indeed seems to involve on the part of the Congregationalists not so much compromise as capitulation. They pressed earnestly for a brief and simple creed, but received scant sympathy from the overwhelming majority; and solely in the interest of union, which for the time being was the supreme interest, they yielded what they regarded almost as a sacred trust, knowing as they did that many in the other Communions sympathized with their view and hoping that ultimately that reasonable view would prevail. Their disappointment is expressed in subsequent resolutions placed on the records of their Union. "We believe that any summary of Christian doctrine of the United

Church should be simpler than the proposed statement and should lay greater emphasis on Christian experience and conduct. . . . We consider that the distinctive elements we are called upon to contribute are simplicity of creed, liberty of terms of subscription, and local responsibility of the individual church. . . . We regret that nothing has been done in the direction of a simpler creedal statement, but express the hope that the door is not yet closed against the possibility of such action."

The statement places in the forefront the doctrine of the Trinity. "We worship Him in the unity of the Godhead and the mystery of the Holy Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, three Persons, of the same substance, equal in power and glory." The United Church, then, according to A. V. G. Allen in his *Christian Institutions* (page 327), will be a branch of the "catholic" Church in the authoritative sense of the term. "According to this decree (of 380 A.D.) the Nicene Doctrine of the co-equality of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost is declared to be the Catholic Faith. Those who accept this faith are alone to enjoy the privilege of being known as Catholics. . . . Efforts to appropriate this renowned historical designation in the interests of some restricted view of the Church, whether of its usage or its organization, whether in ancient days or in our own, have no value and certainly no prestige compared with the definition which gave a new foundation for Christian society." Like the reformers, then, of the sixteenth century, the compilers of this Basis, not necessarily with a conscious intention, have preserved the ancient technical charter of catholicity. The catholicity of the United Church, in the popular sense of the term, must be judged by Article XIV: "We acknowledge as a part, more or less pure, of this universal brotherhood, every particular Church throughout the world which

professes faith in Jesus Christ and obedience to Him as Divine Lord and Saviour."

The traditional difference between the Presbyterian and Methodist Churches on the problem of determinism and free will has always been one largely of emphasis. The metaphysical dispute has practically disappeared from modern religious discussion, and from the pulpits of both Churches is preached on occasion the scriptural doctrine of election as a missionary vocation, an election not to privilege but to service, not to be exclusively saved but to save others. The Calvinistic bold doctrine of absolute predestination and the Arminian doctrine of foreordination based on foreknowledge find no place in this proposed Basis, and Article VI leaves a member still free to grapple with the everlasting philosophical antinomy: "We believe that God in His own good pleasure gave His Son a people, an innumerable multitude chosen in Christ unto holiness, service, and salvation." Or again, Article III: "We believe that the eternal, wise, holy, and loving purpose of God embraces all events, so that while the freedom of man is not taken away nor is God the author of sin, yet in His providence He makes all things work together in the fulfilment of His sovereign design and the manifestation of His Glory." The wording of these articles, however, reveals that the compilers had the old dispute in the background of their minds.

There are evidences that the compilers did not always find it an easy task to "mediate" between the traditional and scientific theologies. Take, for instance, Article V: "Of the Sin of Man." Its prescientific account of the origin of sin, its pathological view of human nature, and its crude statement of human solidarity, represent a distinct victory for the traditionalists. "We believe that our first parents, being tempted, chose evil, and so fell away from God and came under the power of sin, the

penalty of which is eternal death; and that by reason of this disobedience all men are born with a sinful nature, that we have broken God's law, and that no man can be saved but by His grace."

As a further indication of the theological temper of the compilers, take Article VII: "We believe in and confess the Lord Jesus Christ, the only mediator between God and Man, who, being the Eternal Son of God, for us men and our salvation became truly man, being conceived of the Holy Spirit and born of the Virgin Mary, yet without sin. . . . For our redemption He fulfilled all righteousness, offered Himself a perfect sacrifice on the cross, satisfied divine justice, and made propitiation for the sins of the whole world."

These documents were sent down in 1909 to the members of the three Churches for acceptance, rejection, or suggestion of changes. A few negligible suggestions of minor changes were made, and the result of the voting was as follows:

	Congregational	*Methodist (Members and adherents)*	*Presbyterian (Members only)*
Number of qualified voters . . .	11,253	344,590	297,619
Percentage voting	33	78	55
Percentage of those voting who favored union	71	87	69
Percentage of qualified voters who expressly favored union . . .	26	68	38

The Congregational Union and the Methodist General Conference declared their willingness to go forward immediately to the consummation of the proposed organic union; but the Presbyterian General Assembly, in view of the strong minority and in keeping with its previous assurance that "a union to be real and lasting must carry the consent of the entire membership," invited the other Churches to continue negotiations in the hope of being able within a few years to reach a definite

conclusion. This invitation was accepted; and meantime a statement of the whole case is being sent down to the members of the Presbyterian Church for their final decision on the present proposal. A favorable vote, however, approaching anything like unanimity, is rendered improbable by the recent formation and aggressive activity of a committee for "the preservation and continuance of the Presbyterian Church in Canada" —a committee that already has a membership of 126 ministers and 448 laymen.

The real opposition, then, to the proposed organic union comes from the Presbyterians, and a brief analysis of their opposition may shed some light on the situation. Allowance must be made, of course, for a large number of qualified voters who are indifferent to ecclesiastical and theological questions. They are willing to take the word of their "spiritual advisers" on these high matters! But of the 45 per cent who did not use their voting privilege, many have no desire, certainly no enthusiasm, for the proposed change; and only the serious-minded will be considered in this attempted analysis.

In the first place, there are the irreconcilable traditionalists. They repudiate the suggestion that they believe in the divine right of Presbytery and they claim to be the spiritual descendants of the Scottish reformers who fought against all ecclesiastical—and for that matter political—tyranny based on *jus divinum*. But their appeal to the system of Presbytery as historically ideal shows that they are practically in bondage to ancestral ecclesiastical forms, while their eulogies of the logically consistent and comprehensive system of Westminster doctrine convey the impression that for them the Confession of Faith possesses finality. This uncompromising element, however, is not taken as seriously by others as by itself. It is frequently said by those instinctively out of sympathy with the proposed union that if any-

thing could make them vote in its favor it would be the bad arguments of these opponents.

In the second place, there are those—found chiefly among the ministers—who constitute what may be called for want of a better term the "liberal" element in the opposition. They feel that the doctrinal burden of the proposed Basis will be heavier than that of the Westminster Confession. They are quite content to give assent to the ancient creeds or the reformed confessions as symbols of the Catholic faith, as the banner about which the champions of truth and freedom rallied, so long as they are allowed liberty to interpret them in their historic setting; but they cannot work up any enthusiasm for a modern statement of Christian belief which is so largely an apparent compromise between systems that have had their day and ceased to be. Why suggest the old theological controversies in a working theory of life for today? Why not let Calvin and Arminius—to say nothing of our First Parents—rest in peace? Or why be compromising on questions of scientific and historic study? Should a pre-Christian Semitic poem of the origin of evil be set down in cold prose as binding on the Christian intellect in the twentieth century? Should a doctrine of the Fall of Man be put forth in a form that conflicts with the scientific theory of evolution? Is a child born with a sinful nature? If so, is it because of the sin of Adam and Eve? Are the Miraculous Conception and the Virgin Birth of the essence of the Christian faith? If they are lacking in our highest Christology, that of the Fourth Gospel, are they necessary to a modern statement? Should not the Church unequivocally allow reverent investigation of these high themes? Did Christ make satisfaction in the forensic sense for the sins of the world? Why not give a doctrine of Atonement which preserves the scriptural and universally human principle of vicarious suffering and

which will be intelligible to those brought up in the atmosphere of evolutionary thought? A Canadian Professor of theology was recently dismissed from his chair ostensibly on the ground that he was not loyal in his teaching to the letter of his Church's creed. If there is a disposition to curtail liberty of interpreting ancient and reformed documents, shall we not be expected to give a rigid allegiance to the *ipsissima verba* of a modern statement? Such a statement, then, should be brief and fundamental, religious rather than theological, and devoid of reference to matters of controversy. The proposed doctrinal Basis appeals neither to the head nor to the heart of a large number of ministers and thoughtful laymen in the Presbyterian Church.

But these are not the only elements in the opposition. There are, in the third place, a great many silent folk who are governed by sentiment rather than by reason. Church loyalty, like patriotism, is not always rational. Many private members have an instinctive reluctance to merging their Church in this big union, although their feeling is hardly articulate. They are almost bewildered by the enthusiasm of their leaders in planning the sacrifice of their Church's identity. This, they feel, ought at best to be a last resort. They would rather have its individuality preserved in a more comprehensive scheme of co-operation. They doubt if a larger federation, including the Anglicans and the Baptists, would be brought any nearer by the proposed organic union. They are not very enthusiastic over some of the militant leaders of the Methodist Church. The recent attacks on Dr. George Jackson and Dr. George Coulson Workman—the latter a distinguished Old Testament scholar—left an impression of dogmatic intolerance of scientific investigation, scribal literalism, a lack of human kindness, and a certain almost cynical indifference to causing public scandal. The expediency of the union move-

ment has not been made quite clear to them. The problem of overlapping could surely be tackled first by a generous and statesmanlike policy of co-operation. Several missionary superintendents deprecate the charge of waste owing to sectarian rivalry in the western fields. In any case, if we cannot work side by side in a friendly spirit, are we capable of having any useful part in an organic union? Besides, is not the urgent need of all our churches that of intensive development? In missionary, educational, and social effort, are our present organizations really effective? If not, shall we secure an efficient by adding three inefficients? Perhaps our first duty is to concentrate on deepening spiritual life and perfecting methods in our own Communion, that we may become capable of making a distinctive and worthy contribution to such a union as is proposed. The policy of union is sometimes advocated as one almost of pessimism regarding the present situation. But we cannot create a new spirit by changing external forms. The Christian spirit in the lives of its members will make any Church, however defective its system, a really efficient instrument of service. Denominational effort born of devotion to specific tasks, missionary zeal, forgetfulness of self in the cause of humanity, will assuredly cultivate the spirit of unity with all others engaged in the same high and generous aims, and the spirit of unity will inevitably result in corporate union of some sort. But many who cherish the sense of unity feel that in view of present conditions in Canada the best contribution they can make to whatever permanent and effective union the future has in store for them is to devote themselves amid the congenial environment of their own Church to the actual work which that Church has at hand to do. Now this may be the result of native timidity or a conservative temperament, but it is not necessarily sectarianism.

WHAT AILS THE CHURCH?

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I remember a certain country church in a Western State as it was about forty years ago. It was a plain, wooden structure with uncushioned seats, uncarpeted floors, and with plain glass windows through which the farmers could keep an eye on their horses, hitched to the racks outside. The men and boys sat on one side of the central aisle, while the women and girls sat on the other, and there were about as many on one side as on the other. The congregation was made up mostly of farmers and their families, who came to church in farm wagons, drawn by work horses. The father and mother in each case usually sat on the spring seat, while the children and the hired men sat on seat-boards, sometimes indulging in the luxury of a cushion made by folding a quilt. Within the church the elderly men sat in the "Amen corner," and the elderly women sat in the opposite corner. The small boys, for some reason which I did not then understand, sat with their fathers instead of with other boys of their own age.

The services were rather plain and unpretending, with little adornment or embellishment. There was no choir, though a small reed organ had recently been purchased. The singing, which was by the whole congregation, had considerable volume to it. I am told by my elders that it used to make me cry; but that is further back than I can remember. You will probably infer that there was a good deal of it, such as it was. It seemed to come up out of the very viscera of the congregation. I do not remember very much about the

preaching, as there were some other and very important things to occupy the mind of a small boy at that period. I remember, however, that the preacher used his arms and his voice pretty violently, and I can distinctly remember seeing the roof of his mouth a good portion of the time. I remember also that he said a good deal about death and the Judgment, but more about the joys of religion, which used to puzzle me a good deal.

Probably none of us would be satisfied with a church or a religious service of that kind today. Nevertheless, one thing stands out in my memory of that church, not only at the time of which I am now writing, but for a number of years later. It did not give one the impression of being run solely for the purpose of apologizing for its own existence. I can faintly remember the day the church building was dedicated. It was the one theme of conversation in the neighborhood for an indefinite period—an aeon it seemed to me—before and after the event. The impression which formed itself in my mind was that "The Dedication" was an event in the same class with the Creation and the Day of Judgment.

I have attended a number of country churches in different parts of the country during the last decade, and the one I am about to describe is typical of many if not all of them. There are some outward evidences of financial prosperity, such as cushioned seats, carpeted floors, and stained windows. Carriages and automobiles have taken the place of the old farm wagons, though they are fewer in number. The singing is done mainly by a choir, though a few straggling singers from the congregation join in a faltering sort of way. The hymns are seldom chosen from among the great classics, but frequently from cheap song-books published by commercial publishers of religious literature. One in particular remains in my memory as a kind of nightmare—some mawkish verses sung to the tune of "Old Black Joe."

The sermon was less vociferous and probably in better taste than those of forty years ago. By some peculiar irony, one sermon which I recently heard in such a church as I am now describing was an attempt to show that since the Church was God's own institution it could not possibly die. This was delivered in the face of the fact that the preacher's own church was obviously dying before his very eyes.

I do not wish to imply that all the country churches of forty years ago were so vigorous, nor that all those of today are so feeble, as those which I have described. Nevertheless, it is my impression that there were then more country churches of the kind first described than there are now, and that there are now more than there were then of the kind last described. This impression is strengthened by the testimony of many men older than myself and with wider observation than mine. I think that there are few persons of wide observation who will deny that there has been a general decline in vigor, though exceptional neighborhoods and churches may be found which show the opposite tendency. The investigations of Mr. C. O. Gill prove conclusively that, in certain areas, this decadence has taken place.

What has happened? What has caused this change? It is easy to say that the change has come about because men do not believe what they once did. This is undoubtedly true. Whether we like it or not, we cannot honestly close our eyes to the fact that people do not believe as they did even forty years ago. Yet if this were all, we should find the liberal churches either progressing, or at least decaying less rapidly than the more narrowly orthodox churches. Since the opposite is the case, something more than a change of belief must be found to account for the decline.

Growing out of the change of belief perhaps, but more important than that, is the loss of a definite, soul-com-

pelling purpose or program. Formerly the Church knew exactly what it was for; now it does not seem quite certain. Then there was no wavering; now those churches which are not merely drifting are running around in a circle looking for some "cause" to espouse, or something vaguely called "social service" to perform. Then the Church preached a clear and definite gospel of salvation, with damnation as the unattractive, though varyingly emphasized alternative; now it is not considered quite polite in the best religious circles to mention damnation, and, since there is nothing very definite to be saved from, salvation has lost its meaning. This is a change which has affected the liberal churches quite as much as the orthodox churches. Then their chief purpose was to combat the narrow and unattractive doctrines, particularly the doctrine of damnation, of the orthodox churches. Now, since the orthodox churches have practically, if not tacitly, abandoned those doctrines, the liberal churches, since they have nothing to combat, find themselves with as little to do as the orthodox churches themselves.

When men believed with all their hearts that the unredeemed soul was doomed to everlasting torment, while the redeemed were rewarded with eternal joy, the Church had one clear and definite purpose to fulfill. Moreover, this purpose was so big that all others shrank into pitiful smallness when placed beside it. The salvation of men was the biggest work there was in the world. What were the temporal affairs of this world in comparison with the eternal interests of immortal souls? What were industry and government, whose purpose was to promote temporal interests, when placed alongside the Church, whose purpose was to safeguard eternal interests? Talk about social service! What service deserved to be mentioned in the same breath with that of saving men, when the Church believed the doctrines of that

day? Any individual who professes to believe those doctrines and is not stirred with a mighty impulse to preach the gospel of salvation, who does not feel "Woe is unto me if I preach not," is either extremely hypocritical or cruelly selfish.

But why mince matters? The simple fact is that the Church does not really and in its heart believe in the old doctrines of salvation and damnation. There is an acid test which may be applied to determine this. Speak of the devil or hell, not in too coarse a manner, but as a bit of gentlemanly persiflage, before a body of preachers of any large or influential church. If your allusions provoke a smile, you may be sure that they do not take these names seriously. Or again, let any enlightened minister try to preach on these themes before any enlightened congregation. If he can bring himself to a genuine religious fervor, or, better still, if he can succeed in stirring his congregation to a genuine desire to "flee from the wrath to come," that will be an evidence that they really believe; if not, it will prove that neither he nor they believe. If, in the face of this evidence, they subscribe to a formal statement of belief in these things, you have evidence that they are self-deceived.

Whatever one may think as to the validity of this test, he will doubtless agree to the general principle that the Church, like any other organization, must have a program, a definite work to do, and that this work must be such as to appeal to the imagination of its members as being of vast importance. This, as it seems to me, is precisely what the Church today lacks. I realize, however, that two objections will be raised to this point of view. In the first place, it will be insisted that the Church has been urging its people to work, that we have been singing, "Work, for the night is coming," etc., for many years. In the second place, it will

be pointed out that all the churches have practically adopted the program of "social service," and that they are earnestly engaged today in carrying out such a program.

To the first of these objections I reply that it is not enough to preach a gospel of work unless you mention the job at which you expect people to work. Instead of merely singing, "Work, for the night is coming," it is necessary to be somewhat specific and say (if the metre can be fixed up), "Improve this road, for the night is coming. Build this bridge, for the night is coming. Drain this swamp, improve this crop, for the night is coming." Under the old doctrine of salvation, Christian work had a definite meaning. It meant saving souls, persuading men to cease from doing evil and to begin doing good, bringing them into the kingdom. In the absence of some kind of a doctrine of salvation, it means little more than persuading them to join the Church. Under these conditions, the Church becomes very much like an initiation society, such as you would find in many colleges. Until the Church has a program which extends beyond the mere increase of its own membership, its program of work will consist merely in working for new members; these new members, in turn, will have no work except the work for more new members, in endless and unprofitable repetition.

Under these conditions, a religious revival is merely a round-up, and baptism merely a branding operation, each church aiming to get its brand on as many individuals as possible without assuming any great amount of responsibility for the work of breaking them in to useful labor. The missionary work of the church, together with a very limited amount of charity work, furnish at the present time the chief exceptions to this rule. But in so far as the missionary work merely consists of efforts to convert the heathen, it fails to be constructive. It is

only when it seeks not only to convert them, but to *convert them to more productive and useful lives*, to put a new economic and social vigor into *their every-day work*, that it can be regarded as positively useful. As to the charitable work of the Church, it is generally agreed that much of it is misdirected. The only really charitable work, the only work which really does a man any good, is that which makes him more useful, which succeeds in getting him to do what he ought to do.

This perpetual program for membership brings the Church under that class of organisms whose energy is all expended in keeping alive, in trying to save their own life. Such an organism ought to die, and in a rational universe it must eventually die. But an institution which forgets that it has a life to save, whose energy is expended not in trying to keep alive, or to save its life, but in trying to serve, which loses its life or its energy in service, ought to live, and in a rational universe cannot die. "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever will lose his life for my sake, the same shall save it."

This points undoubtedly to the principle of social service, and brings us to the second objection mentioned above. The trouble with the program of social service as ordinarily preached is that we have a very limited idea as to what social service really is. I think that it is safe to say that the idea of social service which is most generally accepted is that it consists in stopping our regular work and proceeding to do something else. This idea, carried to its logical extreme, would require that every individual should neglect his own work in order to do some one else's. Things would then be in a pretty mess. Surely we ought to be able to see that any useful work is social service. So long as potatoes are needed, it is social service to grow good potatoes, as truly as to live in a settlement-house or espouse a political reform.

Another popular idea of social service is summed up in the formula attributed to the late Professor Sumner—"A conferring with B as to what C ought to do for D." Very few discussions of social reform ever get beyond that formula. That is particularly true of the efforts of religious bodies, social service institutes, and similar organizations.

What a spectacle it is to see so many religious organizations running from one thing to another, in a fever of anxiety to stand in with "labor," to array themselves on the side of God and sociology, to find some "advanced" position or "progressive" principle to defend! What is the use of talking about advancement or progress until you have a clear and comprehensive idea as to what progress really is? We are always prone to imagine that the direction in which we are already headed is the path of progress and human advancement, even though we are headed straight toward perdition. When we realize that nations have declined about as often as they have advanced, and that they have always thought that they were advancing, we shall become somewhat less cock-sure in our use of the word "progressive."

With political and social changes it is very much as it is with fashions. When we have become tired of one style of dress, one school of art, or one type of social institution, and are desirous of a new sensation, we invariably, unless we are old fogies like Cato and some others, regard the change which is actually occurring as progress. When one thing begins to bore us, and another thing attracts us by its newness, we think we are progressing. We get more pleasure from a new toy than from an old one; and from the point of view of the "pig-trough philosophy" of life, that is all we need to consider. From the very nature of the case, voluntary political and social changes must consist in the substitution of that which we like for that which we dislike. We may per-

suade ourselves that what the majority likes must necessarily be better than what it dislikes; but the majority never votes, for the excellent reason that it is not born yet. One of the most fundamental works of reform, more fundamental than any kind of legislation, is the persuading of men to like the right things.

A really constructive program must, of course, consist of something more substantial than talk, and more fundamental than dropping pieces of paper into a box. Speaking broadly, and allowing for a few exceptions, it is almost a rule that those countries, States, and cities in which most attention is paid to balloting and politics, are the least progressive or the most degenerate. There is no mystery about this. The larger the fund of human energy expended in running the machinery of government, the less there is available for running the industries, which are the real sources of human welfare and the objects for which governments exist. Sometimes, however, our ideas become so perverted that we begin to think that industries exist for the support of government. This is what leads to that worst form of modern idolatry, the worship of the Almighty Ballot, which is doing vastly more harm than the worship of the almighty dollar. Show me a community where the only themes of conversation are politics and doctrinal religion, and I will show you a community that is backward, unprosperous, and unprogressive. On the other hand, show me a community where the common themes of eager conversation are different forms of productive work and enterprise, and I will show you a progressive and prosperous community.

This suggests a constructive program of social service. Suppose that every time a doctor got religion he began to give himself to the study of medical science with a new zeal, and to the practice of the healing art with a new devotion. The more doctors there were who got

this kind of religion, the more rapidly medical science would advance, the better medical practice we should have, and the lower the death rate would be. Spreading this kind of religion would be a very good way of reducing the death rate. The man who would not try to spread such a religion would have something wrong with his mental and moral make-up, and would be a candidate for the madhouse or the jail.

Suppose that every time a farmer got religion he began to give himself to the study of agricultural science with a new zeal, and to the practice of his productive art with a new enthusiasm. The more farmers there were who got this kind of religion, the better agriculture we should have. The effective preaching of such a religion as this would be one of the very best ways of reducing the cost of living.

Suppose that every time a business man got religion he began to give himself with a new enthusiasm to the study of the science of business management, and with a new devotion to the art of business administration. The more business men there were who got such a religion as this, the better business conditions we should have, the more productive enterprises would be started, and the larger the demand for labor would be. Spreading such a religion as this would do more than anything now being done by any organization for the improving of industrial conditions and the elimination of poverty.

And suppose that every time a mechanic got religion he began to give himself with a new devotion to the study of the sciences underlying his trade, and with a new zeal to the application of his skill. The more mechanics there were who got this kind of religion the more rapid would be the advancement in the mechanic arts. Spreading such a religion as this would be one of the most effective means of promoting general mechanical improvement.

And so on through all the other occupations, trades, and professions, including that of the statesman; suppose that the spread of this type of religion made every one who came under its spell a better worker in his own field of useful endeavor, not only stimulating him to greater expenditures of energy, but leading him to conserve and utilize his energy in the most useful and productive ways, avoiding waste and dissipation, lavish consumption and ostentatious display, and all the other uneconomic vices. One would then be able to detect the spread of this religion in the vital statistics of the country, in the statistics of production, of the increase of capital and the rise in the rate of wages. In short, the more people we can save from going to waste, or the more we can put to work up to their highest capacity, the better community we shall have.

There is probably no one who would withhold his general approval of such a religion as this and the church which promulgated it. The only difficulty would be to get him to apply it to his own individual case. He would be compelled to admit, if he were at all reasonable, that it would be an excellent thing for the community if every one would accept the standards of such a religion, and each one, in his own way, render the utmost service in the way of useful work. He might even agree to act upon such a principle, provided, or whenever, all the rest of the community would begin. But the test would come when he was asked to act at once on the principle of larger service without waiting for others to begin. Then he might object and say, What is there in it for me? Why should I begin working harder at my trade, and giving better service, when others are not? What good will that do me? Where do I come in? etc., etc. Now a sound religion not only demands of each individual that he shall act upon that principle which would work best for the

whole community, provided every one acted upon it (that is what a moral principle is); it demands of him that he shall act upon it at once and continuously, and without waiting for anybody else.

This type of religion could base itself upon a very definite doctrine of salvation, which always implies a doctrine of damnation as its counterpart. This doctrine of salvation would be quite as clear-cut as the old doctrine but would differ from it in some particulars. Having a clear-cut doctrine of individual salvation instead of a vague doctrine of social service, the Church could preach to individuals with all of the old fervor, and would need no longer to make a spectacle of itself by running around in a circle trying to find something in the way of social service or political reform to espouse in order to justify its own existence.

A thing may be said to be saved when it is prevented from going to waste. If a man's life is going to waste, it is lost. If he can be prevented from going to waste and put to some use, he is saved. The only rational definition of immorality is the waste of human energy. That, and that only, is sin which results in the waste or dissipation of human energy. When a man's energy is being wasted, the man is to that extent going to waste, his life is to that extent lost, and he stands in need of salvation. Perhaps it would be better to say that the community needs his salvation. The most precious resource of any community is its fund of human energy. If that resource is wasted, the community will be impoverished. If it is saved, the community will be enriched. Here is a doctrine of salvation in which the whole community is vitally interested. This kind of a program of salvation is the greatest conservation program ever conceived.

Possibly we may conclude that we have been talking prose all our lives without knowing it. As a by-product

of the old gospel of salvation, men were taught such economic virtues as industry, sobriety, thrift, forethought, and mutual helpfulness. These are virtues because they are ways of economizing human energy. That is what a virtue is. Men have been taught to avoid such uneconomic vices as sloth, drunkenness, riotous living, frivolity, and quarrelsomeness. These are vices because they are ways of wasting human energy. That is what a vice is. In so far as the churches have been means of promoting those virtues and discouraging these vices, of conserving human energy and turning it into useful channels, it has been performing the greatest possible social service. Compared with this kind of conservation, all other programs of social service are trivial.

This by-product of the old gospel of salvation, which some of our more ardent religionists have affected to despise, must become the chief end and aim of all preaching. "The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner." The wild, untamed energy of human nature, which tends too much to run riot, to waste itself in the pursuit of whims, to dissipate itself in vice or luxury, to consume itself in fruitless conflict, needs to be tamed, harnessed, and put to work. This is a task of even greater importance than that of taming and harnessing the winds, the tides, and the waterfalls.

Aside from those forms of waste forbidden in the decalogue, the leading types of wasted human energy may be grouped under five heads—idleness, vice, luxury, conflict, and distraction.

Idleness is universally condemned in those who need to work in order to earn a living. But the more capable the man is, either by heredity or training or both, the greater loss it is to society if he is idle. When the man of little capacity works, he adds but little to the product

of the community. Consequently, when he is idle he does only a little less well than he can. But when the man of large capacity works, he adds largely to the product of the community; consequently he does a great deal less well than he can when he remains idle. One is, of course, not idle merely because he does not work for a living. He may be doing very useful work and doing it voluntarily without expecting any material gain for himself. It is only when he fritters away his time in self-amusement, in trying to acquire a "gentlemanly appreciation" of literature, art, golf, and whiskey, or when he is perpetually trying to acquire "culture," with no idea of ever employing his acquired talents usefully, that he can be said to belong to the idle class.

The idle class shades off gradually into the leisure class. They who go to their offices at ten o'clock and remain until two, who require the rest of their time to enjoy their income, or to make use of the opportunities which their wealth and social position provide, are doing only about half as well as they might. They are half lost, and that half needs salvation. Again, when a man who is capable of highly productive work busies himself with the common type of social reform, and succeeds in persuading himself that he is tremendously busy, telling B what C should do for D, when he himself ought to be draining swamps, clearing fields, building factories, or doing something else to give D employment or to produce the means for satisfying his needs, he is doing very much less well than he might and needs to be saved from going to waste.

Vice must include not only those personal habits which dissipate the energy of the human body and weaken the will, but also anything which occupies the mind to the exclusion of useful work. Even a game or amusement which is otherwise harmless becomes a vice when indulged in beyond the point where it functions as

recreation or preparation for work. He who spends enough time in games and amusements to keep his working capacity at its maximum is doing as well as he can. He who spends more is doing less well than he can. The game which fascinates the mind and holds it under such a spell as to prevent the profitable utilization of one's time becomes, by that very fact, a vice. The man who succumbs to this temptation is going to waste and needs to be saved. The business of the Church is to save him.

One of the most persistent fallacies in the world is the idea that luxurious expenditure on the part of the rich is good for the poor. There is surely no peculiar merit in spending for luxuries rather than for useful things. If I should spend a dollar for an article of luxury, I do, to be sure, set labor to work making luxuries—to the extent of a dollar. But if I spend it for a tool, I also set labor to work—to the extent of a dollar—making tools. It is certainly at least as good for labor if I spend my money for tools as it is if I spend it for luxuries.

As a matter of fact it is a great deal better to buy tools. After the tools are made and I have them, the tools are serving the rest of the world. The world is thereafter better provided with tools, and its productive power is increased. Moreover, I have not only given employment to labor by spending my money for tools; I must thereafter employ labor to use them. A community which does not practise thrift and invest in tools is universally a community where labor is badly off, and from which it tends to emigrate. A community which practises thrift and invests in tools instead of buying luxuries is a community to which labor is glad to come. In other words, if I buy luxuries, I do less well than I can with my money, therefore I do ill. I am to that extent going to waste and need to be saved. The church which does not try to save me is not doing its work.

By conflict is meant not only brawling and litigation, but competitive consumption. When the farmers compete in growing crops, no harm and much good results. That is rivalry in well doing. It helps to feed the world. But when they and their families try to outdo one another in ostentation and display, or even to keep up with the pace set by other people in matters of consumption, nothing but evil results. Of all forms of competition, the only really bad form is competition in the consumption of wealth. More evils have their root in this soil than in any other. It is the source of more heart burnings, jealousies, and covetousness than any other single habit. It is competitive consumption which causes us to worry over our economic and social positions. It is not so much fear of coming to want as fear of not being able to live as well as our neighbors, or the fear that the world will not take sufficient notice of us, that drives men and women to strain every nerve for more income with which to make a show, or to do or say smart things in order to attract attention. This is what drives business men to unscrupulous methods of competition, and writers, actors, speakers, and sometimes preachers, to exaggeration, innuendo, and other methods of falsification in order to win notoriety. It is closely associated with both greed and vanity.

As between the two, the latter is probably the worse, though either is bad enough. A great popular preacher said recently that no man could succeed in business without being dishonest. He would have been no farther from the truth if he had said that no one could be a great popular preacher without being a liar. One who expects to prosper in business must, of course, get business. If he cannot get it honestly by reason of the excellence of his goods or service, he must get it, if at all, by fraud, false advertising, adulteration, shoddy, or some similarly dishonest method. Men do not usually

prefer dishonesty to honesty. They would probably prefer a small income honestly won to a large one dishonestly won, were they not driven as with whips by the fear of falling behind the social procession, the fear that they, and more especially their families, may be outshone by some one else.

The evils of this form of conflict have long been recognized. Well-meaning but misguided people have assumed that these evils are inherent in competition itself. Such people ought never to play a game of croquet, for there is competition there. Even an innocent amusement of that kind, however, becomes vicious when played solely for a prize, *and* when the prize is regarded as the one thing in the world worth possessing. He who comes between me and the one desire of my heart is my enemy, and I shall kill him if he doesn't watch. If the one desire of my heart is to win an athletic prize, my opponents are my enemies and they must beware. If we are all animated by that kind of a spirit, even a game of croquet is wickedly played. Similarly, when the one desire of my heart is social distinction, or even to keep up with my neighbors, and when my social position depends upon my income, the man who stands between me and my income, that is, my competitor in business, is my enemy. Where we are all in the same state of mind, business competition becomes a wicked game. Inherently there is no more harm in business competition than in an athletic contest. Both become equally bad when played with a bad spirit. Discriminating reformers, therefore, will not inveigh against either form of contest as such. They will try rather to get at the root of the difficulty by eliminating the source of the evil. Football, for example, degenerates into a brutal game when the students of each college come to prize victory above everything else, including honor. But when honor, courtesy, fair play, and genuine sport are prized more

than victory, even football becomes a game fit for gentlemen and Christians. The same spiritual change will clean up business competition. The church which preaches the right kind of religion, which creates a state of mind under which social position depends upon character rather than upon scale of consumption, or where men no longer compete in the consumption of wealth, will be doing more for the improvement of business and social conditions than all the tinkering socialistic reformers put together.

This form of conflict is very closely related to those forms of wasted energy which are grouped under the head of distraction. Few of us realize what a source of waste this is. Did you ever try to work out a difficult problem or do any severe mental work, in a room full of noise, conversation, and confusion? If so, unless you possessed remarkable powers of concentration, you must have found it hard to get anything done. The reason was not a lack of mental power, but the waste of that power by reason of its being scattered and spent upon other subjects besides the right one. When you went out into a quiet room, you accomplished your work without great effort. Your mind was no better in the quiet room than it was in the noisy one, and you did not expend any more energy, probably not so much. The reason was simply that you economized and utilized your mental energy, whereas, under the distractions of the crowded room, it was scattered, dissipated, or wasted.

The individual who has not the anchorage which religion ought to give, who does not see things in their larger relations, as a religious person ought to see them, who does not have a sense of the larger values, which a religious person ought to have, is like the person in a crowded room full of distractions. He does not realize what things are really worth while, therefore he allows trivial things to occupy his attention; he does not see the larger

aspects of life, therefore the petty things worry him; he does not feel his feet planted upon the larger truths, therefore he is blown about by conflicting winds of economic, social, and religious doctrine. A sound religion gives him a sense of quiet, of poise and balance; it enables him to enter the quiet room where problems become simple, and lessons easy. "The peace of God which passeth all understanding" is the first condition of the highest economy of human energy and the most productive life. To the individual who has thus freed himself from distraction, the yoke of service is easy and the burden of the productive life is light.

All this becomes perfectly clear to one who has grasped the full meaning of the two fundamental and antagonistic philosophies of life—the "work-bench" philosophy and the "pig-trough" philosophy. By the work-bench philosophy is meant that philosophy of life which regards the world as an opportunity for work, for the active joy of productive achievement. By the pig-trough philosophy is meant that philosophy of life which regards the world as an opportunity for consumption, for the passive pleasures of absorbing the good things which the world supplies. Under the former we consume in order that we may produce; under the latter we produce in order that we may consume. Under the former wealth is regarded as tools to be used in further production or usefulness; under the latter it is regarded as means of self-gratification. Under the former as wealth accumulates it is invested and put to work; under the latter it is gathered into barns in order that its possessor may say, "Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years; take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry."

He who has adopted the work-bench philosophy of life will obviously avoid idleness, vice, and luxury. Since he is intent upon production rather than consumption, on seeing how much he can put into the world rather than

how much he can take out, he will as naturally avoid destructive conflict as he will idleness, vice, or luxury. But precisely the opposite happens to him who has adopted the pig-trough philosophy of life. He continually tries to avoid work, and seeks idleness as soon as he is able to live without work. If one's purpose in life is to get as much out of it as possible rather than to put as much in it as possible, the manners and the morals of the pig-trough prevail as a natural consequence. And finally, the distractions of life have a peculiar hold upon people who are not anchored to a purpose outside themselves.

Though the work-bench philosophy of life differs from that which is vaguely called altruism, it produces very much the same results in conduct as altruism does when it is rightly understood. Suppose that you were a pure altruist, with no desire whatever except to be of the maximum service to the rest of the world. You would naturally look about to see where the greatest needs were. You would soon discover that there were two classes of needs; first, those of which the people are conscious, and second, those of which they are unconscious. When people are conscious of their needs, they are willing to pay for the service which satisfies them. When they are unconscious of them, they are naturally unwilling to pay for the service which supplies those needs. If you supply needs of the latter class, you must do it on a philanthropic basis. But if you would satisfy the former class of needs, those of which the people are conscious, you will find that your services will command a market price. If you decide upon that kind of service which supplies needs of which people are conscious, you will become rich and a capitalist, and you cannot help yourself. But while you are rich in goods you may remain poor in spirit, regarding your wealth as tools to be used in further production or service. But this will make you still richer. There is not a single step

in this process which you can avoid if you are a genuine altruist and have chosen to serve those needs of which people are conscious. You dare not remain idle, you must work even though you are rich. You dare not do a less useful if you are able to do a more useful work, though this will make you still richer because people will be willing to pay more for it. You dare not consume more of your income than is necessary to sustain your working capacity at its maximum, even though you accumulate wealth by your frugality. You dare not allow your accumulated wealth to lie idle so long as tools are needed in any industry which supplies needs, though you become a capitalist when you buy tools. You dare not invest in tools for which there is a small need if there is a greater need for tools of another kind, though men will pay more for the service of the latter. You dare not give either your own service free or that of your tools, if you see ways of utilizing the income which you might receive by adding to the world's stock of useful tools. And so on, up to your limit, you are under compulsion. Incidentally, you would be obeying in the fullest detail every teaching of the New Testament with respect to wealth.

A community in which every scrap of human energy was saved and applied to useful work would be the kingdom of God. It would in time prevail over all other communities by reason of its greater usefulness and its vastly superior strength. It would have within itself the power to become the chosen community, and would need no supernatural aid. A gospel of salvation which saves men from going to waste must be a vital factor in the creation of such a community. The church which preaches such a gospel effectively must necessarily become the true Church. It will need neither historical claims, miracles, nor any other advertising devices to establish its title.

BOOK REVIEWS

NIETZSCHE AND OTHER EXPONENTS OF INDIVIDUALISM. PAUL CARUS. The Open Court Publishing Co. 1914. Pp. 144.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE. H. L. MENCKEN. Luce & Co. 1913. 3d ed. Pp. xiv, 304. $1.50.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NIETZSCHE: AN EXPOSITION AND AN APPRECIATION. GEORGES CHATTERTON-HILL, Ph.D. D. Appleton & Co. Pp. 291.

NIETZSCHE, SEIN LEBEN UND SEINE WERKE. RICHARD M. MEYER. C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. München. Pp. 690.

America has not been altogether fortunate in the introductions it has had to Nietzsche from home talent. Aside from Dr. Grace N. Dolson's early philosophical study, now out of print, and Miss Emily S. Hamblen's *Friedrich Nietzsche and his New Gospel*, which shows rare sympathetic insight, little of value has been written.[1] Lack of knowledge is the main reason; critical talent and literary skill, as in the case of Mr. Paul Elmer More, do not make up for this. Nietzsche has to be studied (contrary to the general impression), and almost no one has thought it worth while to do this.

One might expect better things of the professional philosopher, but Dr. Carus has disappointed us. He has no lack of good will, but his book is the result of hasty and superficial reading; necessary distinctions are not made; the treatment is "plump." Nietzsche is "pure-hearted and noble by nature," but "goody-goody"; his "life might have earned him the name of sissy." *Zarathustra* is spoken of as "the last work of his pen" (!), and is recommended to those who would know him at his best; though it is safe to say that without a previous reading of earlier works it is almost unintelligible. In general, Nietzsche is "a poet, not a philosopher, not even a thinker"; he "must not be taken too seriously . . . he criticised and attacked like the Irishman who hits a head wherever he sees it." Indeed, his philosophy is "a harmless display of words," and wherever he is mentioned by professional philosophers, "it is in

[1] I do not forget occasional single articles in out-of-the-way technical journals by scholars like Professor Bakewell and Professor Thilly, and Dr. C. C. Everett's early discussion in The New World. The latter (with all respect be it said) would have been greatly improved had Dr. Everett lived to revise it in the light of Nietzsche's complete *Werke*.

criticism" (strange that philosophers should concern themselves with mere "displays of words"). His best-known German expounders are said to be Rudolph Steiner and Alexander Tille. Dr. Carus appears to be ignorant of the more significant and authoritative works of Professors Riehl, Simmel, Ziegler, Vaihinger, Richter, Dorner, Drews, Joël, and of W. Weigand, J. Zeitler, and E. Eckertz. Of Frenchmen he mentions Professor Lichtenberger (credited to Nancy, though now long in Paris); not Émile Faguet, E. Seillière, C. Andler, nor the Belgian Professor R. Berthelot. We are told that Nietzsche was "too proud to submit to anything, even to truth," too proud "to recognize the duty of inquiry"; he "expressed the most sovereign contempt for science, exhibited a remorseless contempt for everything that comes to us as a product of history." Indeed he scorned "not only law and order, church and state, but also reason, argument, and rule." He did away with "moral maxims," and it is this that "has made him popular." Nietzsche knows nothing of "self-control"; he "made himself the advocate of vice and gloried in it"; among the thoughts of George Moore which Nietzsche might have written is, "I boasted of dissipation." If his doctrines prevailed, "the selfishness of mankind would manifest itself in all its rude bestiality." Sympathy is to him a relic of the ethics of a negation of life; "good and evil" are "distinctions invented for the enslavement of the masses." His "ideal is brutal strength, his overman the tyrant who tramples under foot his fellowmen"; "a ruthless demagogue, a self-made political boss," such is "the overman."

Any one familiar with Nietzsche's writings knows the occasion for all these judgments, and equally that they amount to a caricature of him. Max Stirner is called his "predecessor." He "adopted Stirner's extreme individualism," "stole his thunder," and, if he does not give him credit, "why should he?" since he acknowledges no "rule which he feels obliged to serve." "The fundamental error of them all [Nietzsche, Stirner, and 'other kindred spirits'—I quote here the publishers' announcement, presumably Dr. Carus's own] is an extreme individualism, which regards every single person as an absolutely autonomous sovereign being." But this is just what Nietzsche does not assert and rather denies. His philosophy is directed, he tells us in so many words, not toward an individualistic morality, but toward a *Rangordnung*. A sweeping individualism, as Dr. Carus justly says, tends to anarchy; but anarchy (save in a highly spiritualized sense and with exclusive application to the most spiritual class of men) is what Nietzsche abhors. Indeed it

must be said with great regret that Dr. Carus, instead of correcting and clarifying ordinary public opinion about Nietzsche—and what is the philosopher for but to correct and clarify ordinary opinion?—does little more than reiterate and confirm it. This does not mean that he does not say many wise things here, as in his other books.

The announcement of a new "fully revised" edition, "with much new material," of Mr. Mencken's much-read book (originally published in 1908) is a matter of interest. Mr. Mencken is a Baltimore journalist and musical critic of reputation. He wisely recommends reading other books of Nietzsche's before taking up his *Zarathustra* (mentioning, oddly enough however, but one earlier and several later ones); discreetly says, "Nietzsche's poetry had better be avoided by all who cannot read it in the original German"; and, apropos of the English edition of the *Works*, remarks that one feels his charm, "*even* when one reads him through the English *veil*" (the italics are mine). He is not, however, quite accurate in speaking of the English edition as "complete," the "whole canon" of Nietzsche's writings. Several volumes of posthumous work are not included, and they are of considerable importance. He treats successively of "Nietzsche the Man," "Nietzsche the Philosopher," and "Nietzsche the Prophet"—an admirable arrangement, save that under the last heading little or nothing is said of Nietzsche as prophet, the two chapters being devoted to his "Origins" and his "Critics." These chapters belong to the revised part of the book. Just what improvements have come with the revision in general I am unable to state, as I have not the original edition with me, but some crudities and partial apprehensions appear to remain. For example, Nietzsche is still represented as asking, "Why should any man bother about moral rules and regulations?" "He should judge a given action solely by its effect upon his own welfare; his own desire or will to live and that of his children after him." "To put it more simply, Nietzsche offers the gospel of prudent and intelligent selfishness, of absolute and utter individualism." But for and from the great mass of men Nietzsche desiderates, as a matter of fact, a regard for social morality as something absolutely sacred (an "*unbedingt Heilighaltung der Heerdenmoral*"). Mr. Mencken explains in a footnote (one of the additions, I imagine) that Nietzsche's "selfishness" is only for the exceptional, superior man (he keeps the "any man" already quoted), and that this is the only kind of human being Nietzsche takes into account, the rest being "unworthy of consideration." This last is emphatically not true. But even with such a limitation, the view fails to reckon with the fact that the higher man,

as Nietzsche conceives him, may risk or even sacrifice his life on occasion, instead of cleaving to it, and that in such giving and spending of himself his elevation and greatness in part consist.

Mr. Mencken thinks that, according to Nietzsche, the strong sacrifice the weak, putting them, for instance, "in time of war into the fore-front of the fray"; the result being that "the weakest are being constantly weeded out and the strongest are always becoming stronger and stronger"—a fantastical construction both of history and of Nietzsche's thought. "'The strong cannot give of their strength to the weak without decreasing their store,' it is said; but it is, according to Nietzsche, just because of their strength that they *can* give; it is the weak for whom the law of prudence is so imperative. So Mr. Mencken does not give quite accurately, because he does not himself perceive clearly, Nietzsche's distinction between "good and evil" and "good and bad." He is also more or less confused about the contrast of Apollonian with Dionysian; even speaking of the "apollonian morality of the ancient Jews," and of Roosevelt's "centralization" as "a truly dionysian idea"! He misstates the motives and processes of thought by which Nietzsche was led to believe in "eternal recurrence"; and he gives a very one-sided idea of Nietzsche's attitude to what he calls "the drudge class," "the proletariat." He has little sense of the part which self-control plays in Nietzsche's general ethical philosophy, imagining that it stands to Nietzsche for lack of courage (!), and also of the part which discipline plays in his view of education. Mr. Mencken too has good-will and might almost be called a Nietzschean, but he has not studied his subject thoroughly and patiently enough, and is evidently too much under the influence of his old-time anarchistic and materialistic perspectives, and yields too much to the journalistic instinct for smart writing and piquant statement. And yet he makes certain distinctions admirably and knows his subject much better than Dr. Carus. He points out, for instance, that while Stirner's "plea is for absolute liberty for all men, great and small," Nietzsche is for liberty only in the higher castes. He sees and says that Nietzsche was not a revolutionist or advocate of sudden change. His teaching, he recognizes, is addressed, not to men in the mass, but to the small minority of exceptional men; while at the same time it is not a caste-system (in the ordinary sense) in which he believes, since there is to be in it free movement up and down. He recognizes too that Nietzsche did not wish to abolish Christian morality completely nor propose a "unanimous desertion of the idea of sympathy for the idea of intelligent self-seeking." Further, he

discriminates as to Nietzsche's "romanticism." Altogether we have good hopes for a fourth edition of Mr. Mencken's book.

Dr. Chatterton-Hill's *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* is probably the best large book of all those originally written in English on Nietzsche —leaving then to one side the smaller works of Dr. Dolson and Miss Hamblen and the well-nigh perfect short manual of Mr. Anthony M. Ludovici in the *Philosophies, Ancient and Modern* series, as also a translation of Professor Lichtenberger's fine treatment of the subject. Dr. Chatterton-Hill is a *Privatdocent* in the University of Geneva (Switzerland), and writes as one who has known Nietzsche's spell though he is under it no longer. He at once goes to the bottom of things by characterizing Nietzsche as "always an essentially religious nature." He notes that Nietzsche even regarded Christianity and the moral law as "indispensable in their proper place," and that *Zarathustra* borrowed from the Gospels much of his method. What Nietzsche opposed, he says, is "the monopoly of Christianity"; for however useful it is to the mass of men, it acts like poison on those who are by their nature above the mass—the great, exceptional men who are humanity's final justification. He sees, indeed, that Nietzsche found a place and function for the slave and mediocrity, and quotes, as if to correct Mr. Mencken, Nietzsche's remark that contempt for the toilers is unworthy of the philosopher. And yet above the "gregarious animal, living with and by the herd," is, he knows, "the solitary individual, strong in his solitude," who was the supreme object of Nietzsche's concern. Christianity would practically outlaw him; Nietzsche would again give him room and scope. He also happily corrects Mr. Mencken (I do not mean that the latter is referred to), when he says, in giving Nietzsche's view, "He who is strong and powerful and a lover of life consumes his energy without further thought. He spends out of the overflowing richness of his vitality. He cares not for a long life. . . . Only in the measure that we can afford to live fully, to be extravagant and thriftless with our vital power—only in that measure are we strong and powerful." There are also happy reproductions of Nietzsche's views as to the differing *intellectual* character of the stronger and weaker races, and as to the essentially nihilistic tendency and direction of Schopenhauer's ethics based on *Mitleid* ("pity" is the more correct translation here, not "sympathy," the word which the author mostly uses).

Of criticism Dr. Chatterton-Hill gives us little; perhaps the best is that of Nietzsche's varying conceptions of truth (cf. pp. 175–183). Nietzsche is spoken of as at once a genius and a lover of paradox;

his general influence is, indeed, explained by his style and the force of his expression, but his influence on the world of thinkers is credited to other reasons. Some of the representations of Nietzsche's views are not quite satisfactory; *e.g.*, as to the Apollonian and Dionysian states of mind, though the author comes nearer the mark than Mencken. Again, he says that Nietzsche regarded "the cosmological process in its entirety as an æsthetical manifestation of the universal Will." But this holds only for Nietzsche's first period, and for a portion of that. The maturer Nietzsche knows no "universal Will"; he is pluralistic *au fond*. So his "worship of art as the *raison d'être* and object of life," which the author makes general, holds only of the first period. To mould life *itself* after the ideal, his ideal, becomes the aim of his later, and particularly latest, years. Dr. Chatterton-Hill even says that Nietzsche's message is sufficiently "Neronian to enable us to conclude that Nietzsche must have been an admirer of Nero." But he should read what Nietzsche says of Nero in *Will to Power* (§ 874). He quite misconceives Nietzsche's meaning in speaking of eternal life as wished for, because only in eternity can the plenitude of life's expansion be realized. For good or ill, eternal life is to Nietzsche only a recurrence of the heights and shallows of this life. So he misses the meaning of Nietzsche's glorification of "free death," and he sometimes overstates, *i.e.* states one-sidedly, Nietzsche's hostile attitude to morality —a subject that requires much refinement in handling. When he says, "Morality is necessary to the construction and continued maintenance of the social structure," he in effect only repeats Nietzsche; but for Nietzsche the social mechanism is not an end in itself, and its law is not the only law; and when this is set up as the only law, it becomes tyrannical and has to be fought. Here, as Dr. Chatterton-Hill lets us see, is the ground of Nietzsche's hostility to morality (*i.e.*, taken as something final and absolute)—and to Christianity. Unsocial or even, within limits, anti-social qualities may mark the great man, in Nietzsche's view of the matter; at least, he (the great man) wants to be himself, not one of a crowd, whatever *Bosheit* and hardness that may involve.

Professor Meyer's book has pathetic interest for students of Nietzsche in that it is the last work of his laborious life (he died in October, 1914). The distinguished author of the standard *Geschichte der deutschen Literatur des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* was for many years Professor Extraordinarius in the University of Berlin (only not made Ordinarius, it is said, because of his Jewish ancestry; even as Professor Simmel, to become an Ordinarius, had

to leave Berlin for Strassburg—and Berlin is *not* in Russia). His present book is perhaps the best all-round book on Nietzsche in any language. Philosophical students will still go to Riehl and Vaihinger, and above all Simmel and Richter, and those with biographical interests mainly will go to the *Leben* by Nietzsche's sister and the *Vie* of M. Halévy; but for a view of the total human phenomenon—thought and personality—and especially of its historical and literary setting, nothing thus far compares with Meyer. It is a work to make us sensible of the disparity of our American and English culture. Meyer is a man of letters, but a philologist as well. He has philosophical training also, and deals, however lightly, almost always surely with Nietzsche's various philosophical problems; and he has wide historical knowledge and enormous literary erudition. Perhaps the book is a little over-supplied with the latter.

After several introductory chapters and three which may be called biographical (devoted in turn to Nietzsche's life, his studies and the method of them, and his distinctive personality), Meyer takes up the works chronologically and his book might be described as an illuminating commentary upon them. Of special interest is a preliminary chapter on the *Vorarbeiten*—the philological, philologico-philosophical, philosophico-pedagogical, and pedagogical studies, and also the University lectures, which antedated (or at least were independent of) the first-published book, *The Birth of Tragedy*. In general Meyer is at once sympathetic, penetrating (with the insight that sympathy alone gives) *and* critical. His relations with Nietzsche's sister, to whom we owe so much (he too), we perceive have not been altogether cordial. He finds her *Leben* no "*unbefangene historische Quelle*," and he deplores her treatment of Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (who attacked the *Birth of Tragedy*). He makes no concealment of the "all-too-human" side of Nietzsche himself; remarks on an uncivil and unlovely letter to Deussen (when the latter did not take solemnly enough his appointment to Basel), on an insulting communication to Paul Rée's brother about Rée, and cannot justify Nietzsche's injurious words to his old friend Rohde, which produced the final rupture between them. Constantly we come on signs of independent judgment. He corrects Nietzsche's interpretation of "science," disagrees with his view of E. von Hartmann, criticises his depreciation of "practical" men, finds him one-sided in his attitude to Christianity and sinking to the level of "ordinary theological polemics" in *The Antichristian* (he justified this as the proper translation of

Der Antichrist in a private letter to the present writer—it is also Professor Lichtenberger's); finds a mythological element in the doctrine of "eternal recurrence"; notes his occasional slips and negligences of style, in particular, the too frequent use of italics and the tastelessness of some of the word-combinations in *Zarathustra*. At the same time Meyer thinks that there is more continuity, consistency, and "system" in Nietzsche's views and their development than is commonly recognized. He regards him as a thinker *par excellence*. He has high words of praise too for his poetry—at least some of it. The conditions of a great letter-writer, however, he finds unfulfilled in him. For one thing, he was too exclusively concerned with his central problems (an excellent selection, I may add, from the five published volumes of Nietzsche's *Briefe* has been made by Dr. R. Oehler, Leipzig, 1911).

It is with diffidence that one ventures to differ from so great an authority on points of interpretation, but I question whether "no transition [for humanity] into a higher order," as asserted in *The Dawn of Day*, refers to a possible order of superman or supermen. It is rather the ordinary thought of immortality that is there in mind. So Meyer appears to me to omit something in his account of the psychological origin of the doctrine of "eternal recurrence"—namely, the element of intellectual necessity; I mean the general philosophical or scientific reasons. He overstates the mythical and mystical features of the idea. If "mysticism" simply means a state of transport and exaltation, Nietzsche certainly participated in it at times; but if it means that exaltation *takes the place* of thought and confuses intellectual perception, I question whether Nietzsche had much part in it. He once happily says, "*Wenn Skepsis und Sehnsucht begatten, entsteht die Mystik.*" It perhaps applied to Newman and certainly does to many refined and tender minds of the present day, but hardly to Nietzsche. Equally is Meyer's view questionable, that Nietzsche would rather have an endless movement in a circle than a fixed state on however high a level, *hence* "eternal recurrence." If I read his mind and soul aright, he would rather have progress *ad infinitum;* but he takes the world's forces and the sum of them, after current "scientific" fashion, as measurable, finite. Hence when a certain point in their development and elaboration is reached, there *can* be no further progress, and, in a world of movement and change, disintegration and recession become inevitable, with, in the course of infinite time, a repetition of the original developmental process. It was not wishes, but the logic of reality (as he saw it) that compelled to "eternal recurrence." But I must not

close without expressing deep respect for this monumental work of Professor Meyer, and for the spirit which animates it.

William Mackintire Salter.

Silver Lake, New Hampshire.

The Jews of Today. Arthur Ruppin. With an Introduction by Joseph Jacobs. Henry Holt & Co. 1913. Pp. xxiv, 310.

This is a translation of a book which first appeared in 1904, and in a second form in 1911. The author exhibits the dangers which threaten Judaism from the facility with which the Jews have always been assimilated to the environing population and absorbed in it, a process which is going on in our own time with increasing rapidity; he discusses the causes and phases of this assimilation, and the remedy, which, in his opinion, is to be found only in a re-created Jewish nationality, having a Hebrew-speaking Jewish state in Palestine as its centre. Whatever may be thought of this theory, the description of the actual conditions of the Jews in the several European countries and in America and the large body of statistics which Dr. Ruppin has compiled, make the volume instructive reading and useful for reference.

G. F. Moore.

Harvard University.

The Problem of Individuality. Hans Driesch, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg. The Macmillan Company. $1.00.

Is life a mechanism and nothing more? Is it possible to interpret what happens in the living body wholly in terms of physics and chemistry? Can a complete interpretation of Nature be made in terms of bodies moving in space? These are some of the many formulations of the problem of "Vitalism *vs.* Mechanism," and some of those discussed by Professor Driesch in his latest book, *The Problem of Individuality*. As those who are familiar with the earlier works of the same author would expect, the present volume is an attempt to defend the vitalistic thesis. To Driesch, as to philosophically-minded biologists generally, nature and life may be only partially interpreted in terms of mechanism. To demonstrate the truth of vitalism and the inadequacy of the mechanistic hypothesis Driesch in the present volume uses both inductive and deductive methods of reasoning.

The author finds the fundamental problem of vitalism presented by the phenomena of embryology, regeneration, and adaptation—

all of which tend towards *wholeness* in the individual. "Is organic individual wholeness produced on the basis of a machine, *i.e.*, by processes which, though arranged in a special given manner are in themselves inorganic processes, as known from physics and chemistry; or are there in the organism whole-making processes *sui generis*, *i.e.*, processes not reducible to the forms of inorganic becoming?" Driesch accepts the second alternative, and advances three inductive proofs to support the conclusion that a non-physical, non-spacial directive agency which tends towards wholeness operates within the living organism. In his first argument he lays special stress upon the remarkable results of experiments upon the eggs of lower animals and upon the Ascidian Clavellina. If the blastula stage of such an animal as the sea-urchin be cut in any direction, it will grow—provided the fragment be not less than one-quarter the size of the whole blastula—into a complete organism, just as if it had not been cut at all. Similarly, if the branchial apparatus of Clavellina be cut into two pieces in any direction whatever, each piece will grow into a complete Clavellina.

Driesch argues that were an organism constructed on the principle of a machine, such growth—or restitution—making for wholeness would be impossible. Fragments of a *machine* could not of themselves restore the missing parts of the machine nor do what the entire machine could do. The experiments on the blastulæ appear to Driesch to indicate that at this stage of development the organism is not differentiated in the three dimensions of space. But the adult organism which develops from the blastula—or from fragments of the blastula—is so differentiated. Since it seems to Driesch that the determination of this result could not have been internal or mechanistic, he concludes that in the processes of development and of regeneration of lost parts—processes which make for the integrity of the individual—some agency is at work which is not of the type of chemico-physical agents.

This first proof of vitalism sounds very plausible if it be assumed that there is nothing mechanistic or machine-like within the fragments of the blastula or the branchial apparatus. The difficulty with Driesch's first proof of vitalism is that his premise is notoriously weak. In maintaining it as a valid argument in the year 1914, he wholly ignores the evidence of definite organ-forming substances in the cells of blastulæ as well as the evidence that the cells of organisms possess in their nucleus a structure which may, and probably does, mechanically determine their development. It has been experimentally shown that a particular alteration in the substance

of the nucleus of an egg effects a definite alteration in the organism which develops from the egg. The more recent experiments in embryology and regeneration strongly support the mechanistic hypothesis.

Driesch's second independent proof of vitalism is based on the fact that the egg from which the organism develops is formed within the ovary as a result of thousands of repeated cell-divisions. He regards this fact as evidence that the organism cannot be preformed machine-like within the egg. "How could a machine be divided and divided—*and always remain the same?*" He concludes that the ovarian eggs are essentially undifferentiated. How then can an organism, obviously differentiated in the three dimensions of space, arise from such an egg? Since he finds no evidence of structural or mechanistic determination of such a remarkable result, Driesch concludes that it is necessary to postulate some non-mechanical, directive agency to which he gives the Aristotelian name entelechy. The objections to the second proof are the same as those already stated against the first and it is not necessary to repeat them. The one who raises such objections, however, if he be open-minded, cannot help admitting that the precise way in which the nucleus mechanistically determines the development of the egg is wholly obscure. But it is well known that ferments or hormones may effect amazing results in a *living* body.

The third proof of vitalism is found by Driesch in the phenomena of instinctive action and of intelligent behavior. The main feature of instinctive action is the fact that it is not based on experience but is "perfect in its manifoldness *the very first time it occurs*, just like regenerations." It is not a little surprising that while most biologists regard the definiteness and limitation of instinctive action as a reason for regarding the organism as a mechanism, Driesch draws precisely the opposite conclusion, viz., that instincts prove that the organism is not merely a machine. In intelligent action the organism does not merely repeat mechanically past experience like a phonograph. The significant fact is that it uses and utilizes its past experiences and therefore shows itself more than a machine. Man is "master of his personal history." In his behavior "nothing is fixed in the sense of what fixation means in anything like a machine." To the reviewer this assertion sounds rather optimistic, but it may readily be granted that an interpretation of human action in terms of mechanism alone is inadequate.

Driesch's entelechy is neither a property of matter nor a form of energy. Neither is it intellect nor soul. Entelechy is assumed to

operate, sometimes by suspending and making potential transfers of energy in the living system, sometimes by relaxing its suspensory action so as to allow chemical or physical events to occur. Since by such operation the total amount of energy in a given system would be neither increased nor diminished, entelechy would not violate the principle of the conservation of energy.

Since, however, through the operation of entelechy upon physical and chemical processes in the organism it would not be possible to predict from a knowledge of the physical conditions *alone* just what would follow any particular change of conditions, the practical result of the action of entelechy would be experimental indeterminism. Therefore Driesch postulates experimental indeterminism but still holds to absolute determinism. How entelechy might act under definite conditions could be foretold on the basis of previous experience, but predictions would not have the same certainty as in the case of events in the non-living world.

Driesch regards the logic of vitalism as a branch of the logic of *wholeness*. He assumes as an axiomatic principle that "the degree of manifoldness of a natural system cannot increase from itself," since the conclusions must be implicit in the premises. But a living system may pass from one state to another which is more complex. In such a process an arrangement which is a mere sum is transformed into an arrangement of the character of unity or totality of some kind. There is no logical necessity for assuming a machine-like preformation as a prerequisite for such an increase in complexity in the system, which is effected by a rearrangement of the component elements through the agency of entelechy, which thus acts as "unifying causality."

The author attempts to bring his vitalistic doctrine into conformity with the Kantian system by asserting that wholeness or individuality is a category as valid as those recognized by Kant and his followers.

Wholeness is manifested not only by the biological individual but also by the race, and therefore Driesch is led to postulate a supra-personal kind of entelechy that realizes itself in space in the phylogenetic or historic process, just as personal entelechy realizes itself in ontogeny. The existence of a supra-personal unity, however, is attested by the existence of moral consciousness in man more than by anything else.

May nature be regarded as *one ordered whole?* Driesch finds in the existence of "laws of nature" evidence of wholeness in nature. But he is unable to accept the Spinozian dogma of the union of a

universal teleology and mechanism. Not every character of the Absolute has a spacial symbol. However, from our piecemeal experience we can never say whether there be not a monism of order in the Absolute. We simply "know in part," as St. Paul says.

While a monism of order is not altogether impossible, Driesch is compelled to accept the dualistic doctrine in spite of all logical postulates. "The Absolute is in any case such as to possess properties which at least in part are not symbolized to the human mind in spacial symbols." "What is not a mere belief and not a matter of feeling is the existence of factual wholeness in nature, the existence of something that is certainly more than a mere sum. And to have proved this, and thus to have given a sound foundation to all further speculations about natural and metaphysical *wholeness*, is the merit of vitalism."

Since *The Problem of Individuality* is itself a summary of the views of Professor Driesch concerning the science, logic, and philosophy of vitalism, it is impossible to do justice to the argument advanced by Driesch in a brief review. The book will interest the philosophical thinker as well as the biologist as the expression of a highly original and independent investigator in the field of vitalism. Whatever may be the merits of the inductive or the deductive argument of Driesch, most will agree with him that life includes more than is dreamed of in the materialistic philosophy. To have emphasized this in departments of thought and investigation where materialistic assumptions prevail is one of the great services of such men as Driesch and Bergson.

Herbert V. Neal.

Tufts College.

Crime and its Repression. Gustav Aschaffenburg. Translated by Adelbert Albrecht. Little, Brown, & Co. 1913. Pp. xxvi, 331.

Gustav Aschaffenburg is known to American psychologists as the former assistant to Kraepelin in the psychiatric laboratory at Heidelberg, and to American criminologists as the editor of the *Monatsschrift für Kriminalpsychologie und Strafrechtsreform*. He is known popularly through the experiment which he performed at Cologne upon type-setters, testing the amount of work accomplished with and without "moderate" dosage of alcohol. This experiment is frequently quoted by the Scientific Temperance Federation and the Poster Committee of the Boston Associated Charities.

This volume, *Crime and its Repression*, was first published in 1903 under the title *Das Verbrechen und seine Bekämpfung*. It

has been selected by the committee on Translations of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology as a work which may "best represent" one of the "various schools of thought in criminal science." The committee has made no mistake in translating this work by Aschaffenburg. His training in psychiatry added to an understanding of statistical method, and a deep well-tempered interest in and appreciation of social problems, has made possible the preparation of a book which is original and valuable in a high degree.

The volume opens with a Preface by Maurice Parmelee and an Introduction to the English Version by Arthur C. Train. Together these two statements offer a useful summary and criticism of the book that follows. Aschaffenburg begins his treatise with a discussion of problems and methods, and proceeds to a treatment in Part I of the social causes of crime, in Part II of the individual causes of crime, and in Part III of the struggle against crime.

Part I shows the relation of crimes to season, noting the usual correlation of a high rate of sexual crime and suicide with the early summer months, and a high larceny rate with the winter months, analyzing shrewdly the ultimate psychological causes of these phenomena. Similarly, in the next section, which deals with races and their relation to crime, he notes the low criminality rate among Jews, the higher rate among Protestants, and the still higher criminal rate among Catholics, and traces the causes of these variations to economic conditions and to the *mores* of each group. The next sections deal with the variation in crime in city and country, the influence of alcohol and other drugs on crime, accord special treatment to prostitution and gambling, and correlate crimes with general economic and social conditions.

Part II deals with the parentage of criminals, their education, age, sex-distribution, and domestic status. It examines the physical and mental characteristics of the criminal and the mental diseases among criminals. The overstatements of Lombroso are laid bare, but the important part played by Lombroso in initiating psychological study of the criminal is conceded.

Part III is penological, dealing primarily with the methods of punishing and preventing crime. Especial emphasis in Part III is laid upon modern penological methods—suspended sentence, probational release, indeterminate sentence, and the special treatment of juveniles. The necessity of individually adapted treatment for each case and of permanent detention of dangerous defectives is emphasized. Altogether it is an excellent concise summary of improved modern methods of treating criminals.

There are few weaknesses in Aschaffenburg's treatise, for the tone is in general dispassionate, the method of treatment, analytical, searching, and psychological. Illustrations are largely drawn from and references frequently made to sexual crime and alcoholism, in which the author has made frequent and important studies. The treatment of these two subjects, however, is not altogether above reproach. In introducing the subject of alcohol on page 69, he states that "the descendants of inebriates are seldom of normal health and intelligence," and quotes Demme's study of the children in two groups of ten families each, and Legrain's study of 761 children of drunkards. Aschaffenburg appears to deduce from these studies that alcoholism has been the cause of the degeneracy of the offspring —a conclusion which is not clearly warranted by the facts of the cases in question. There is reason to believe that mental deficiency or some form of nervous instability was a factor prior to the alcoholism of the parents in these families, that the drinking of the parents was but a symptom of this feeble-mindedness or nervous instability. It is probable that the children were feeble-minded or otherwise degenerate through inheritance, perhaps according to the Mendelian formula—because their parents were deficient or carriers of deficiency. Degeneracy of parents, not alcoholism of parents, is the presumptive cause of the degeneracy of the children of inebriates until the contrary is clearly proved. (See H. H. Goddard's recent study *Feeble-mindedness, Its Causes and Consequences.*) The use of a diagram like that on page 71, which deals with the offspring of a single drunkard, concerning the mentality and heredity of whom nothing is told us, is unscientific and altogether unworthy of a writer of Aschaffenburg's general ability. The dispassionateness which characterizes the rest of the book appears to be lacking in this section which deals with alcohol, and to lead to loose statements like the following: "We cannot over-estimate (*sic*) the significance of these facts for the prophylaxis of crime." Loose phrasing of this sort may have some value in an emotional appeal to action, in the pulpit or on the public platform, but it is quite out of place in a work of science.

The author's treatment of prostitution is not satisfactory. He does not sufficiently consider the basic causes and their removal. He furthermore urges segregation of prostitutes and medical oversight, and is thus at variance with the conclusions of American vice commissions. He may have reached his conclusions concerning social control of this evil by a careful and scientific process, but he fails to reveal that process adequately and does not consider the

counter-arguments. His most important constructive suggestion in this section is for the rigorous prosecution of persons who make profit from commercialized immorality.

It should be said of this work, despite the faults suggested above, that it is a notable addition to criminological literature. Its major contribution within this field is the analysis of the factors which produce crime, but the book has the further merit of being concise, sane, comprehensive, and readable. This volume of the Criminal Science Series will be of marked value both to the specialist and to the general reader.

JAMES FORD.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

A HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF THOUGHT. J. A. BURY, F.B.A., Regius Professor of Modern History, Cambridge University (Home University Library). Henry Holt & Co. 1913. Pp. 256. 50 cents.

It is strange that a writer of Professor Bury's great ability and immense learning should have cared to write a bitter anti-religious pamphlet of this kind. Considered in that light, it is very well done. All the absurdities which have been taught in the name of Christianity are duly paraded, and all the intolerance and cruelties which have been shown in defending them are duly paraded. And no doubt it is not amiss that we should from time to time be reminded with some plainness of speech how extraordinarily weak has been the evidence upon which learned men were at one time prepared to defend stories and beliefs now abandoned as incredible, and be led to face the question whether much which is still gravely defended by educated men rests upon any better grounds. In fact, I should regard this book as very wholesome reading for orthodox persons, but as very bad for those whose prejudices it will confirm and whose passions it will stimulate. It will be bad for them, because the book wholly fails to suggest that there has been any higher side to the religion of the past, or that there is in the present any form of the Christian religion which is independent of the impossible historical and scientific views with which that religion was once associated, and which may still commend itself to persons as learned and as enlightened as Professor Bury himself. In fact, this little book is a piece of apologetic of the worst order. Arrogant contempt for opponents is as little to be commended in the apologist of "Free-thought" as in the apologist of Christianity. It is just as bad for "free-thinkers" to suppose that all Christians are fools as it is for Christians to imagine that all "free-thinkers" are knaves.

As a rule, of course, the actual facts are correctly given; but, looking at the matter merely from the point of view of objective history, Professor Bury's generalizations seem to me often one-sided and unwarranted. He systematically minimizes the severity and extent of the pagan persecutions, and he essays, in a truly Gibbonian spirit, to reduce the catalogue of the martyrdoms. All recent research has, if I am not mistaken, tended in quite an opposite direction. When Professor Bury declares that during the later persecutions "no effort was made to suppress Christian literature," he states what every one who possesses an elementary acquaintance with that literature at first hand, knows to be false. It is strange that the editor of Gibbon should have made such a mistake. Gibbon (chap. 16) quite correctly records the efforts made during the persecution of Diocletian to secure the surrender of the Scriptures and other sacred books of the Christians; nor does Dr. Bury in his notes hint at any dissent. This champion of liberty appears disposed almost to justify the persecutions on the ground that, if the Christians were not suppressed, they would become persecutors of paganism. It is grossly unjust to say that "according to the humane doctrine of the Christians, pagan, that is, merely human, virtues were vices," without a word to remind the uninstructed reader of the enormous accumulation of patristic testimony which would be produced against this hideous doctrine of St. Augustine. Professor Bury makes no distinction between one Christian age and another. The doctrine never became the accepted doctrine of the Church even in the Middle Ages. I need only remind the reader of Dante's attitude towards Aristotle and Virgil. Here is another amazing *suggestio falsi:* "The Greek physician Hippocrates had based the study of medicine and disease on experience and methodical research. In the Middle Ages men relapsed to the primitive notions of a barbarous age" (p. 64). The uninformed reader would hardly gather from these words that the study of medicine in every mediæval university was based upon the study of Hippocrates and other Greek physicians. The statement that "anatomy was forbidden, partly perhaps on account of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body" (p. 65) is directly opposed to fact. Dissections were practised in every mediæval university, and the study of anatomy was required for medical degrees. Professor Bury's view of the Middle Ages is essentially the ignorant view—quite as unhistorical a view as the partisan pictures of the "ages of faith" indulged in by such writers as Cardinal Gasquet. The whole book is in the same tone. As a popular handbook of anti-Christian

polemics, it will no doubt serve its purpose; as a contribution to history its value is small.

Hastings Rashdall.

New College, Oxford.

The Practice of Christianity. By the author of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia.* Macmillan & Co. 1913. Pp. 291. $1.25.

This small volume is a timely and needed study in distinctively Christian ethics. The whole world of social relations is conceived as it would be, reconstructed on the moral principles of Jesus. The regeneration begins personally but embodies itself in all the aspects of the collective life. "The State, the family, thrift, competition, the penal system, warfare," are items showing the detail into which the exposition is carried. The result and the process portrayed can hardly be looked upon as wholly valid or probable, but they serve to bring out impressively the "regulative principle"—"kindness with trustfulness as the foundation of all goodness"—which Christ introduced, its final authority, and radical and beneficent working. The spirit of the book is one of devout loyalty and faith towards "Our Lord," of informed social feeling, and optimistic expectation for humanity.

The style of the writer is over-homiletic for persuasion or the sustained enjoyment of the reader. It suggests a background of long accumulation of sermonic material and reflections, which, however in their abundance and variety may richly furnish forth other sermon-writers in turn, and supply many shrewd observations; as this, for instance, on one of the apologies for militarism—"that it is only defensive, not for any offensive purpose": "It is always easy to discover rights that are imperilled or weakness needing to be defended. In Aesop's fable, the wolf was probably perfectly sincere, because he was so much occupied with desire to tear the lamb that he could easily persuade himself that his water was being sullied."

Charles L. Noyes.

Winter Hill, Mass.

The New Testament in the Twentieth Century: A Survey of Recent Christological and Historical Criticism of the New Testament. Maurice Jones, B.D. Macmillan & Co. Pp. xxiv, 467.

The early years of the twentieth century have been prolific in books about the New Testament. The nineteenth-century study of the "life of Christ" demonstrated that for a biography of Jesus

Christ the materials are insufficient, and in that field new phases of the study have set in; some writers attempting brief characterizations like that of Bousset, while others have studied the earliest stages and final outcome of the church's faith in Jesus as Christ and Lord. Still other investigations have treated the question, now a burning one, of what place in the picture of Jesus' thought and person the eschatological ideas of the Gospels shall be allowed to have. The problem of the relative part of Jesus and of Paul in bringing about Christianity as we know it has produced a whole group of books. And the fundamental inquiry as to whether we can have critically tested historical knowledge of the life and ideas of Jesus Christ, sufficient to be the basis of any opinions about him at all, has been raised with louder insistence than ever before; so that the sceptical view has been carried to the extreme of contending that no historical person who can be identified with the Jesus of the Gospels ever existed.

In the study of Paul fresh light has been offered from new discoveries and the study of the Greek language of Paul's contemporaries which has been stimulated thereby, and from wider knowledge and better understanding of the various religions by which civilized men of that age were already seeking for salvation.

A competent survey of all this literature—books and articles—would be instructive in a high degree. But it would need to be made by a master, possessing rare qualities of knowledge, thought, and style, and powers of insight, selection, and generalization which might better be devoted to more original work. Mr. Jones, in spite of his wide reading, has not produced such a survey. The list of topics which the literature treats and the bibliographies are the most interesting things in his book; his accounts of the controversies and his criticism of the various positions taken in the discussion will not give the reader an adequate acquaintance with the matter. Even the bibliographies are unsatisfactory, because they are not complete, and because foreign books are usually regarded as if they were written at the date when they were translated into English; while the writer has often failed to detect the relative unimportance of articles which he treats at length.

The latter half of the book takes up recent monographs, articles, and commentaries on the several books of the New Testament, beginning with the Synoptic problem and ending with Revelation. The chapters vary in merit. Those which are most nearly confined to the modest aim of reporting the opinions of others are the best. But this book cannot be recommended as a substitute for a proper

New Testament Introduction, and it does not really add anything of value to current literature about the New Testament.

James Hardy Ropes.

Harvard University.

The Historical Christ; or An Investigation of the Views of Mr. J. M. Robertson, Dr. A. Drews, and Prof. W. B. Smith. Fred C. Conybeare, M.A., F.B.A., D.D., LL.D. Watts & Co., London. 1914.

A refutation of the extravagant theory of the Idealistic Monists, who deny the historicity of Jesus and the authenticity of all the New Testament writings, and of nearly all those outside the New Testament which bear on the early history of Christianity, has value when it emanates from "The Rationalist Press Association." It has greater value when written by so thoroughly scientific an authority as Dr. Conybeare. Dr. Conybeare is not limited to his unrivalled studies in the ancient literature of the Armenian Church, but understands historical criticism. A radical himself, he is well qualified to expose the shallowness of the hyper-critics of the Drews school, who count in their number every class of writer *except* a historical critic, and he fulfils the task *con amore*.

B. W. Bacon.

Yale School of Religion.

The Gospels in the Light of Historical Criticism. Frederick Henry Chase, Bishop of Ely. New York. Macmillan & Co. 1914. $1.50.

This small book contains a reprint of an essay published in 1905 in the volume entitled *Cambridge Theological Essays*, an essay which received favorable notice at the time on account of its lucidity, its compactness, and the tone of devoutness and candor which characterized it.

To the present reviewer the value of the book seems to consist in its brief, clear statement of certain points, like the description of New Testament sources (pp. 9 ff.), influences which have moulded the tradition of sayings (pp. 21 ff.), comparison of the witness concerning the resurrection as found in Paul and in the Gospels (pp. 32 ff.), in the author's warm recognition of the duty of applying historical criticism to the New Testament, and in his expression of the spirit of caution and sense of religious values in which that criticism should be applied.

But the present significance of the book is doubtless to be found in the opening essay, which is new. Here the author speaks not

as an individual investigator but as a Bishop of the Church of England, concerning the limits of freedom of inquiry for the clergy, or rather "the limitations of the area within which a clergyman's conclusions in these questions may range" (p. xiv). In saying that the scientific worker in his consideration of evidence is "bound to take account of the Creed of the Church" (p. ix), he speaks with all gentleness and with respect for a spirit of complete candor and honesty, but the warning is unmistakable. If one, on the basis of the evidence, is forced to conclude that "Jesus Christ in his entrance into and departure from the world was like other men" (p. xiii), he has reached a conclusion contradictory to that of the Creed, and if the Bishop withdraws from such a student the authority to teach in the Church's name, "such action would without question be grave; it is only a facile rhetoric which could stigmatize it as intolerant" (p. xiv).

The timeliness of the republication of this essay becomes therefore apparent. It contains help towards reaching conclusions on certain important questions which shall be in harmony with those of the creeds. The question of the bodily resurrection of our Lord is discussed anew in the preface because in the meantime new treatments of the theme have appeared. Such a work as Lake's *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ* (1907) is probably in the author's mind, although he does not mention it by name. A careful reading of the argument, however, fails to reveal that he has added anything to the discussion in the original essay in the way of sifting of evidence. The new material consists rather of the addition of thoughts upon the nature of Christ's resurrection-body and upon the importance of the doctrine to the life of Christianity. Upon the question of the evidences for the Virgin Birth there is no new light. In the original essay the discussion of this point is left with the admission that the evidence is slight, but attention is called to the consideration that there are serious difficulties encountered in explaining the genesis of the story on any other basis than that of its historic truth. It is difficult not to think that to the clerical investigator the slightness of evidence in this case weighs less than in other cases it would in honesty be bound to weigh. At least it is noticeable that he leaves more room for difference of opinion in reaching results upon the question of the belief in miracles in the traditional sense, and we cannot help remembering that freedom here is not limited by the existence of any definite statements on this subject in the historic creeds.

On the whole, the responsibility of the religious teacher in an established church is stated with courage and conviction; but dis-

cussion is sure to be provoked as to the relation between the view here pronounced and real freedom of investigation, and further as to the place of authoritative creeds in a living church.

Eliza H. Kendrick.

Wellesley College.

The Divine Names in Genesis. John Skinner, M.A., D.D. Hodder & Stoughton. 1914. Pp. viii, 303.

Elohim ausserhalb des Pentateuch; Grundlegung zu einer Untersuchung über die Gottesnamen im Pentateuch. Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testament, herausgegeben von Rudolph Kittel. Heft 19. Friedrich Baumgärtel, Lic. Theol. J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1914. Pp. viii, 90.

Professor Skinner's book, in the main a reprint of articles which appeared in the *Expositor* during 1913, is a defence of the current "documentary theory" of the Pentateuch against the attacks of Dahse, the most pretentious of its recent assailants. In a number of publications, beginning in 1903 and extending to 1914, the most elaborate of which is his *Textkritische Materialien zur Hexateuchfrage* (Giessen, 1912), Dahse has vigorously championed the contention first put forward by Klostermann some twenty years ago, that the documentary theory is untenable, because it is based on the occurrences of the names Yahwe and Elohim in the Masoretic text, which latter, it is alleged, the Septuagint shows to be utterly corrupt and unreliable precisely in respect to those names.

In spite of some provocation to the contrary from Dahse's pugnacious ally, H. L. Wiener, Skinner maintains an attitude of courtesy and good nature, endeavoring to state his opponents' positions with lucidity and fairness, and avoiding objectionable personalities, though he writes with a vivacity that we do not ordinarily associate with English theologians. The book is good reading, and will give to any student of the Old Testament who happens to be ignorant of the subject matter and merits of this controversy, a very fair idea of both. For the rest, it is gratifying to find an English writer on the Old Testament taking for granted that persons interested in a discussion of this character will understand German, although, oddly enough, the book contains more than the usual amount of elementary information.

The author has no difficulty in showing (1) that, as matters stand today, whatever might have been the case 150 years ago, the only effect of the complete demonstration of Dahse's contentions regard-

ing the Masoretic tradition would be to make a trifle more uncertain the admittedly uncertain (and relatively unimportant) analysis of the so-called JE sections into their supposed constituent elements J and E; (2) that, in point of fact, Dahse's contentions are very far from being demonstrated, the aggregate effect of his efforts being rather to justify the customary neglect of the Septuagintal testimony as to the divine names; and (3) that his attempt to substitute for the documentary theory a constructive hypothesis of his own, to account for the phenomena exhibited by both the Greek and Hebrew texts of the Pentateuch, is fantastic in the extreme and hardly worth the serious consideration of scholars.

There are, of course, numerous points of detail on which individual students of the Old Testament will differ from the author, and some on which he is clearly mistaken. That the completed Pentateuch dates from 444 B.C., is an opinion which is being increasingly abandoned; the Pentateuch, like its counterpart the Synagogue, was the product, not the cause of the Restoration. Παντοκράτωρ is not "the usual rendering in the LXX of *Sebaoth*" (p. 108, footnote); it is the usual rendering only in the Minor Prophets. The Chronicler was anything but "reckless of the distinction between Yahwe and Elohim" (p. 151), as Baumgärtel has clearly shown; nor is it true that "when writing independently, he evinces a preference for Elohim" (p. 150); on the contrary, he very much prefers Adonai, which he spells YHWH. It is not at all certain that "neither sense nor grammar is ever affected by the substitution of one [divine] name for another" (p. 168). Skinner is right in retaining Yahwe in Gen. 16 11 against Dahse and Wiener; the appellative correlate of Yahwe was *el*, "a god" (cf. Nu. 23 f.), and Elohim is neither here nor there in this passage. And the case of Gen. 28 20, where Skinner (p. 42) actually concedes to Dahse that Yahwe should be substituted for Elohim, is by no means clear; since even an Elohistic narrative could not avoid Yahwe in verse 21. But in Gen. 12 7b, and again in 16 13, the grammar imperatively demands that Yahwe be replaced by *ha-el*, "the god." Ex. 3 14 f. (unlike Ex. 6 2 f.) does not record the "revelation" of the name Yahwe (p. 28); the whole point of the disclosure of the name to Moses is that it is the name by which the patriarchs had worshipped that deity in times past, and which would perhaps be remembered among their descendants in Egypt. It was to avoid that natural assumption that P supplied the patriarchs with the proper name El Shaddai.

On page 155 Skinner has amusingly furnished better evidence than he knew of the ease with which κύριος and θεός were confused

by the copyists. He has himself read κύριος for ὁ θεός in a statement of Dahse, with the consequence that he is forced to confess that "the meaning of this paragraph eludes his comprehension," and devotes a paragraph of his own to a bewildered assault upon an imaginary position. One is reminded of the French Deputy haranguing his constituents on the subject of corruption in public life: "So extensive and pervasive, my fellow citizens, is this evil of which I speak, that even I who stand here to address you upon the subject have not wholly escaped it!"

Dahse is admittedly an expert and indefatigable Septuagintal statistician. But statistics are of less than no value—they cumber the ground and clog the mind—except as they serve to verify or to invalidate an hypothesis precipitated by the sound historical sense of a competent investigator. In criticism as in natural science, the thing to be proved is of more importance than the proof, and is, moreover, not to be arrived at without the gift of the spirit. An ounce of Wellhausen's hypothesis, however much modification it may ultimately require, is worth more to Biblical science than tons of Dahse's "facts," the bearing of which remains to be shown. To be sure, the latter has his own hypotheses; but thus far their only service, to those hardy enough to toil in their train, has been to make the plain places rough. "Textual" criticism, like any other, must tend to simplify, or else it is not true.

Nevertheless, this controversy has not been without its value. It has unintentionally brought into notice the fact that the criticism of the last fifty years has left the question of the divine names in Genesis, and throughout the Old Testament, somewhat in the air. Unless one is dealing with inscriptions or original autographs, not even textual problems can be decided without a knowledge of the exact purport of the words under consideration. And if Yahwe and Elohim are indeed characteristic of two distinct yet fairly contemporaneous sources—the practice of P is artificial and perfectly transparent—one cannot help asking, How comes each source to employ its peculiar designation of one and the same deity? Or again, if Yahwe and Elohim have not the same semasiological value, why may not one writer, or any number of writers, employ now one vocable and now the other, according to the needs of the context or the mood of the moment? The circumstance that "*Majestät*," "*Der Kaiser*," and "*Wilhelm der Zweite*" are all used in Germany to allude to one and the same person, is not the slightest justification for assuming that their semasiological values are equal and identical or that the expressions are interchangeable. Except in

certain contexts, "*Wilhelm der Zweite*" in the mouth of a court chamberlain at the Schloss in Berlin would occasion surprise; while "*Majestät*" in the mouth of a street-vendor would be ludicrous.

It is high time this whole subject was tackled seriously and systematically. Both "textual" and "higher" critics have been operating with symbols of uncertain and to some extent mistaken value. Skinner habitually speaks of Elohim as if it were the equivalent of Yahwe, and indicates that El differed from both only in being "an archaic name for the Deity which had ceased to form part of the ordinary spoken language before these narratives were reduced to writing" (p. 106). If he had said that El was essentially an indeterminate appellative and originally associated with a polytheistic conception of Yahwe which our Old Testament has done its best to obscure, he would have been nearer the fact. Driver's treatment of the subject (*Genesis*, p. 403) is more befogging than enlightening, if only because he spells "god" with a capital. As to Elohim, Wiener is quite right in criticising Skinner for treating it as a proper name; but he is wrong in assuming that it was a plain appellative. When used of a single deity, it was a circumlocutory title, which in pre-exilic times was more or less consciously employed as such. The classical Hebrew appellative for "a god" was *el*, and for the determinate "the god" it was *ha-el*. *Elohim* is the indeterminate plural, "gods," which necessarily did duty when the generic idea of "divinity" was to be expressed, whether substantively or (in the genitive) adjectively. And the generic "Divinity" as the designation of a single deity is of course not a plain appellative. It may well be that the customary use of "Divinity" instead of Yahwe implied—like German "*Majestät*" —a certain degree of sophistication, which naturally went hand in hand with other marks of sophistication, and so may serve to characterize and identify an individual source or writer.

Enough has been said to indicate the nature of the studies demanded for the scientific and definitive settlement of the question of "the divine names in Genesis." It is not likely that the findings will have any serious effect upon the documentary theory, in so far as this distinguishes between Nationalist, Deuteronomic, and Levitical sources; though they may modify existing tenets as to the first of these elements. Whatever the outcome, a solid foundation must be laid; and a good beginning in that direction is furnished by Baumgärtel in the methodical little volume whose title appears at the head of this review.

William R. Arnold.

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Die Briefe Petri und Judä. Völlig neu bearbeitet von D. Rud. Knopf. Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, Göttingen. 1912. Pp. 329. 6.40*m*.

The sixth edition of this volume of the Meyer Series, edited by Kühl, was published in 1897. Its criticism of the three Epistles harmonized with that of the earlier editions of the Meyer Series. The positions taken there were essentially those of Bernard Weiss in his *Der Petrinische Lehrbegriff* and *Theologie des N. T.* First Peter and Jude were maintained to be genuine. The Second Chapter of Second Peter is interpolated into a letter written by the Apostle. First Peter was written to Jewish Christians in Asia Minor, of whose existence this letter is the sole evidence.

The present edition reaches critical conclusions so directly opposite to these as to make the reader ask what the name "Meyer" prefixed to the series stands for. All three letters are pseudepigraphs—First Peter written by a Pauline Christian of the second generation between 90 and 100 A.D., Jude by some unknown believer, perhaps of Syria, between 80 and 100, Second Peter between 150 and 180.

As regards First Peter, the reasons for thinking that the Apostle could not have written it are, (1) the fact that it bears no trace of personal acquaintance with Jesus or of knowledge of his teaching; (2) the mastery of Greek, in respect to which it takes a high place among New Testament writings; (3) the evident influence of the letters of Paul upon its author, apparent not only in his leading thoughts but also in the form of several passages. The last-named fact makes against the theory that the letter is composite; Peter supplying the thoughts and Silvanus or Mark giving them expression. The assumption apparently made in the letter that persecution was beginning in the provinces in which its readers lived, suggests the opening of Domitian's reign as its date. Knopf thinks that the letter was probably written in Asia Minor, and that the greeting in 5 13 from "the fellow-elect in Babylon" (*i.e.*, Rome) was added to strengthen the impression of Petrine authorship.

The date of Jude, Knopf thinks, cannot be precisely determined. The standing it had gained at the beginning of the third century obliges us to place it as early as 150. It contains nothing forbidding our assigning it a much earlier date, even putting it into the first century. As the heresy at which it is aimed seems to have gained a firm foothold in some localities, and to have much in common with the ideas and practices of the Nicolaitans denounced in the Apocalypse, we may believe it to have been written at some time during the last two decades of the century.

Second Peter, which bears plain traces of the influence of Jude, is a Catholic letter written to strengthen the weakening belief of the church in the Parousia. An indication of its date is found in its giving Paul's Epistles a place among the Sacred Scriptures (3 16). "Here the New Testament canon is in plain sight." Our author says that it is much easier to think of such an assertion being made after than before 150. A probable date for the Epistle is 180.

The commentary is written in a free style, with ample use of explanatory historical material, showing in these respects a marked contrast to Kühl's presentation of the letters in the seventh edition. Instead of detached expository comment we find a connected discourse, into which exposition, illustration, and discussion of interpretations differing from the author's are interwoven in a readable context. Those acquainted with Dr. Knopf's *Nachapostolische Zeitalter*, published in 1905, will be reminded of the ample learning and historical tact displayed in that excellent book. A marked feature of the exposition is the use made of the mystery religions in explaining the religious ideas of the readers of First Peter. Knopf differs from Kühl and most other recent commentators in regarding the "spirits in prison," to whom Christ preached after his death (1 Pet. 3 20), not as disembodied human spirits but as the sons of God of Gen. 6 2; thus finding in the passage a modification of the myth told in Enoch 6–11. In 4 6 the "dead" to whom a preaching was done are men, "the innumerable shades in the wide dark caverns of Hades." "Here appears the proud consciousness which ancient Christianity had of the universal content and value of the Gospel."

To those New Testament students who accept Dr. Knopf's critical conclusions, First Peter, Second Peter, and Jude will take on new interest and value from the help they give in connecting the Christianity of the second century with that of the Apostolic Age. In putting them to this use the author's comments on the text and especially the illustrative material he has collected will be found enlightening.

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Jewish and Christian Apocalypses. The Schweich Lectures for 1913. F. C. Burkitt. Oxford University Press. 1914. Pp. viii, 80. 3*s*.

Religious Development between the Old and the New Testaments. (The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge.) R. H. Charles. Henry Holt & Co. Pp. 256. 50 cents.

Few subjects have so greatly increased in importance for the pursuit of historical theology as the study of that period which in-

tervenes between the Old and the New Testaments. There is therefore likely to be considerable interest raised by Professor Burkitt's and Dr. Charles's recently published books.

Professor Burkitt's book is one of those rare publications which appeals both to the educated but unprofessional public and also to a small group of special students. The former will find that the body of the lectures is one of the most interesting and clearest accounts yet published of the general nature and real importance of Apocalyptic literature. The smaller group of specialists will find much interesting and some controversial matter in the appendices.

In the first of his lectures Professor Burkitt expounds the general meaning and importance of the Apocalyptic Idea, and he does so by the interesting method of contrasting the Rabbinical Judaism of Johanan ben Zakkai, which rejected the Apocalyptic Idea, with Christianity, which accepted it and for a time perpetuated its teaching. In his description of the former he does a justice which has often been denied by Christian scholars to the teaching of Johanan ben Zakkai. "This great Rabbi rejected the notion," says Professor Burkitt, "that the Kingdom of God was an external state of things which was just upon the point of being manifested, and (as a corollary) that the person of insight could know something about it beforehand. . . . He kept a sober mind, like Jeremiah before him. He saw the inevitable destruction of Jerusalem; and so, when the crash came, and the sacrifices came to an end, he was prepared to guide Jewish thought and religion into new channels, not less profound, if necessarily more narrow, than those along which they ran of old. He was content to let the future age wait for God's good time, when it should please him to reveal it; and perhaps it was as well that he could not foresee the future, or he might not have had the courage to begin his epoch-making work in the Vineyard at Jamnia."

This raises exceedingly interesting considerations, and I know of no Christian book which brings out so fully as these lectures the fact that Rabbinical Judaism must be credited with a good deed in having kept alive the national existence of the Jews through eighteen centuries, in which they have had neither land nor temple as a rallying point, but have perpetuated their national existence solely by their loyalty to a code of conduct.

The second lecture deals with the Book of Enoch. Here again Professor Burkitt illustrates his point by a comparison between two opposite points of thought, each of value for the history of Christianity. Just as in the first lecture he contrasted the treat-

ment of the Apocalyptic Idea among Christians with that which it received from the Jews, so he now contrasts the general view of the universe given in Enoch with that made popular in the Greco-Roman world by Posidonius. The comparison is entirely justifiable; Enoch cannot be understood until it be realized that it is really an attempt to give a "philosophy of history." "It is," to quote Professor Burkitt, "an attempt to see the world steadily and see it whole, to unify the physical world, the moral world, and the political world, the world, that is, of the national destiny of God's chosen People. It contains a serious attempt to account for the presence of evil in human history, and this attempt claims our attention because it is in essentials the view presupposed in the Gospels, especially the Synoptic Gospels. It is when you study Matthew, Mark, and Luke against the background of the Book of Enoch, that you see them in their true perspective."

That is admirably stated; but I am not sure that Professor Burkitt deals out equal justice to Enoch and Posidonius. For instance, when he says that "it is fair to say that Posidonius was as truly a formative influence on Pagan culture as Enoch was on Christianity," he seems to imply a contrast between the influence of Posidonius on Pagan culture and that which he exercised on Christianity, which is, I think, unjustified. If we treat Posidonius as a symbol for the general stream of thought (and it is in this way that his name seems generally[1] to be used), his influence on Christianity was in the end probably greater than that of Enoch. Again, he is certainly right in saying that Posidonius fails to explain the existence of evil in the world. But does he quite sufficiently recognize the harm done by Enoch to Christianity in explaining evil by an altogether imaginary and erroneous reconstruction of history? Finally, to continue these carping criticisms, I cannot think that Professor Burkitt is right in denying the creative function of thought. He says, "I am not a philosopher and I do not believe that philosophy, or indeed reflection in general, is really creative. Instinct and conviction, often inarticulate, are creative, and man uses his powers of thought and reflection to justify the actions to which his instincts and convictions have led him." There is, no doubt, an element of truth in these remarks, but on the whole I think that there is more untruth. No doubt, instinct is creative, and inarticulate conviction is possibly sometimes creative; but it is surely an exaggeration to

[1] In much the same way, and with not much more justification, as we use Q to represent a stream of literary activity. People speak more and more of Posidonius and Q as if they were intimately acquainted with their contents, though in actual fact neither is extant at first hand.

deny that thought has created better things than either of these, and cannot be degraded to the rank of being merely their interpreter.

The third lecture deals with the minor Jewish Apocalypses. The limitations of a review forbid any detailed discussion of the many points of interest raised, but I am glad to notice that Professor Burkitt repeats his objections to Dr. Charles's theories as to the text of the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.*

The last lecture deals with early Christian Apocalyptic writing, but in point of fact does not treat very fully this branch of the subject, largely no doubt owing to the limitations of lecturing. Professor Burkitt suggests that a difference may be drawn between the purely Jewish Apocalyptic found in Mark 13 and in cognate literature, the almost purely Pagan Apocalyptic of the Apocalypse of Peter and related documents, and a third type which endeavors to combine the method of Jewish Apocalypse with the desire to set forth the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation. I notice that he does not discuss the *Shepherd of Hermas.* This is undoubtedly an Apocalypse, and it seems to represent a further development of his third class in that it deals with the problems of existing church life as well as with the doctrine of the Incarnation. The most important part of this lecture is the contention that the *Ascension of Isaiah* is a Christian Apocalypse of the third type. Those acquainted with the subject will realize that in thus treating the *Ascension of Isaiah* as an essentially Christian document, Professor Burkitt is differing from many of those who have studied the subject, and his discussion ought certainly be read by all who are interested in early Christian literature. Personally, I think that he makes out a satisfactory case, and that the attempts to dissect the text into a primitive Jewish document with a series of later Christian interpolations are unsatisfactory; but the subject is difficult and will no doubt meet with extended treatment from specialists.

The appendices cannot be reviewed at length. The most important deals with the Greek text of Enoch, and is an elaborate attempt to show that the text of the Gizeh manuscript is preferable to that of the Ethiopic Version and the quotations of Syncellus. This is a point which can scarcely be appreciated properly except by the somewhat limited class of those who are equally at home in Greek, Aramaic, and Ethiopic, and it would be foolish for others to express positive opinions until the controversy is finished. After reading Professor Burkitt, I am inclined to think that he makes out an exceptionally good case, but I imagine that Dr. Charles will have some reply to make.

Dr. Charles's book on the religious development between the Old and the New Testaments, is, like everything he writes, marked by a deep knowledge of the later Jewish literature; but it is impossible to feel that it is a very satisfactory production. In reading his pages I have been unable to escape the feeling that I can understand what he means only because I have already some knowledge of the facts to which he refers, and am constantly irritated by the apparent assumption of pontifical authority in matters which, after all, are not yet settled. The most useful part of the book is the last two chapters, which give a satisfactory account of the literature of the Old Testament Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, an admirably clear statement of Dr. Charles's views on all these books, and in many cases a summary of the opinions of other scholars.

The weakest part of the book, which the general editors of the Home University Library ought surely to have dealt with, is the digression into ecclesiastical politics on pages 169 to 184. There is hardly a word in these paragraphs which has anything at all to do with the subject of the book. They are controversial to a high degree, and the views advocated seem to many entirely mischievous. What, for instance, is to be said of such a paragraph as this: "To the thoughtful students of the past and of the present it is not disestablishment, but re-establishment of national Churches that is now necessary, if the Church and State of the various Christian nations would each achieve their highest"? Similarly, the attack on the Roman Catholic Church on page 177 would justify any purchaser of the book in complaining that he bought it to obtain the views of a scholar on ancient religious history, not of an Orangeman on Roman Catholicism. The sad fact is that as soon as Dr. Charles deserts his own subject, the positiveness of his utterance seems to increase in inverse ratio to the controversial character of his statements. For instance, on page 130 Dr. Charles says, "The doctrine of eternal damnation is a Judaistic survival of a still more grossly immoral character. This doctrine is antagonistic in the highest degree to the Sermon on the Mount, where a man is taught to love his enemies even as God does." One can only feel that although Dr. Charles is a very learned scholar on Jewish Apocalyptic writing, he has yet to learn how to treat the New Testament from a scientific standpoint. It is almost incredible that any one should be able to write such a passage and completely ignore the fact that in the Sermon on the Mount we are told, "Whosoever shall say 'Thou fool,' shall be in danger of the fire of Gehenna" (Mt. 5 22); and,

"If thy right hand cause thee to stumble, cut it off and cast it from thee; for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish and not that thy whole body go into Gehenna" (Mt. 5 30). I do not believe in eternal punishment in a physical Hell any more than Dr. Charles does, but surely our opinion on this point cannot blot out the fact that we have the Synoptic Gospels against us.

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LIVES OF THE ENGLISH MARTYRS DECLARED BLESSED BY POPE LEO XIII IN 1886 AND 1895. Written by Fathers of the Oratory, of the Secular Clergy, and of the Society of Jesus. Completed and edited by DOM BEDE CAMM, O.S.B. Longmans, Green, & Co. 1914. Vol. I, pp. lxvi, 545; Vol. II, xlii, 691. $5.00, 2 vols.

When Gregory XIII was Pope, the English College at Rome was adorned with a series of frescoes representing English saints and martyrs before the Reformation, and to these were added pictures of modern martyrs who suffered in the reigns of Henry VIII and Elizabeth. The papal permission to include these moderns with the ancients was afterwards adjudged to be an informal but sufficient beginning of the long process of their possible canonization. In this process the holy person is first pronounced Venerable, then Blessed, and at last, after much examination of the matter, Saint. By decree of Pope Leo XIII, all of the martyrs whom the artist had depicted in the fresco with the saints were numbered among the Blessed. They were accorded what is technically called Equipollent Beatification. The faithful in England were permitted to honor them with public veneration. Brief biographies of these sixty-three persons appear in these volumes.

Of course, this kind of writing is hagiography rather than history, but within the limits thus prescribed it is admirably done. Records and documents have been carefully searched, and the results are recorded as quietly and dispassionately as the circumstances permit.

The Blessed show more human nature than appears in most of the conventional saints. "'Sirrah,' says the Lord High Treasurer to Thomas Woodhouse, 'was it you that wrote me a letter the other day?' 'Yes, sir,' saith Mr. Woodhouse, approaching as near his nose as he could, and casting up his head to look him in the face, 'that it was, even I, if your name be Cecil'; whereat the Treasurer, staying awhile, said more coldly than before, 'Why, sir, will ye acknowledge me none other name nor title than Mr.

Cecil?' 'No, sir,' saith Mr. Woodhouse. 'And why so?' saith the Treasurer. 'Because,' saith Woodhouse, 'she that gave you those names and titles had no authority so to do.' 'And why so?' saith the Treasurer. 'Because,' saith Woodhouse, 'our Holy Father the Pope hath deposed her.'"

This is the sort of thing which the Quaker martyrs were forever saying to the Puritan magistrates. In most persecutions there are martyrs who suffer more for their impudence than for their convictions. They are martyred for their bad manners rather than for their good conscience. Their decisive offence consists not in treason or heresy but in approaching as near as they can to the nose of the judge and casting up their head to look him in the face. Under these conditions the most impartial judge finds justice difficult.

But for the most part, the sympathy of the reader is with the martyr. The torturing and killing of honest and devout men who resolutely refuse to do or say what they believe to be wrong, arouses the indignation of fair-minded persons. They hate the substitution of violence for reason. No language is too strong to express the thoughts of their hearts as they read the tragic stories of Thomas More and Bishop Fisher and the last Abbot of Glastonbury.

These emotions are equally aroused, however, by Foxe's *Book of Martyrs*, which ought to be re-read along with these biographies. The war of religion which was fought in England in the sixteenth century is described by Foxe from the point of view of the Protestant army; Dom Camm and his associates describe it from the other side. Foxe glorifies the men whom the Roman leaders killed when they got the chance; Camm praises the virtues of those who fell when the Protestants were victorious. Every war is followed by similarly contrasting biographies. It is perhaps too much to expect that either side, in the heat of such partisan writing, should recognize the provocation or the justice or even the valor of the other. Foxe, at least, is pardonable, writing as he did only five years after the end of the "unlucky and rueful reign of Queen Mary."

It may be set down as a general principle that all the martyrs are right. Every man who for conscience' sake resists even to death the endeavor to compel him to deny the truth, is worthy of our praise. We will give him whatever honorary degree the canon law allows. We will call him Venerable or Blessed or even Saint. But this we will do without any very careful scrutiny of his opinions, and without caring much about the side on which he stood. We will not insist that his idea of the truth must square with ours.

The fact that in a world much dependent upon comfort and prosperity this man put these under his feet and gave his life for a principle, entitles him to a place among the heroes, whether he was a German or a Belgian, whether he called himself a Catholic or a Protestant.

A difference between the Catholic and the Protestant martyrs is that the Catholics suffered mostly in courts secular, the Protestants in courts ecclesiastical. The Catholics were put to death for treason, the Protestants for heresy. The Catholics made themselves obnoxious by their allegiance to the Pope, the Protestants by their interpretation of Scripture. It is to the disadvantage of the fame of the Catholic martyrs that they lost their lives in a losing cause. The Pope, whose rights they maintained so nobly, was put out in spite of them, and religion in England was rather helped than hindered thereby. The Protestant martyrs, on the other hand, died to secure a freedom of thought and speech in which we gratefully rejoice today.

The chief interest and value of these books is in the careful accounts which they give of the devotion of obscure men. Nobody will ever tell the story of Thomas More so well as William Roper did; but Thomas Woodhouse, and John Nelson, and Ralph Sherwin, and Robert Johnson, and William Lacy, and a score of others are new accessions to the friendship of the general reader.

George Hodges.

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The Western Rebellion of 1549. (An account of the Insurrections in Devonshire and Cornwall against Religious Innovations in the Reign of Edward VI). Frances Rose-Troup. Smith, Elder, & Co. 1913. Pp. xvi, 520. $5.00.

Mrs. Rose-Troup's book has definitely to do with the uprising in the southwestern part of England caused by the publication of the Prayer Book of 1549 and the enforcing of radical religious changes. It brings into especial prominence the religious condition of the people of Devon and Cornwall, their contentment with the older forms of the faith, their resistance to innovations of any kind, even to the point of the attack on Exeter and of the defence of the adjoining country against the king's soldiers, their willing self-sacrifice for institutions that gratified real spiritual need, and their consequent annihilation in large numbers. In writing the book Mrs. Rose-Troup's particular service has been to show that this south-

western rebellion was worthy of more attention than it has as yet received from any of the English historians; that it was primarily religious rather than agrarian, and that it represented a large number of people militantly opposed to the policy of Edward VI and actively loyal to the old Roman forms. The study will be of value not only to students of English political history, but to those looking for further information in regard to the attitude of the English towards the Prayer Book.

Henry B. Washburn.

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In the Service of the King. A Parson's Story. Joseph B. Dunn. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1915. Pp. x, 158. $1.25.

Autobiography is always interesting. This book is pre-eminently so, because the emphasis is laid not upon the events of the author's life but upon their bearing on the experience of ministers. It is full of cheerfulness, courage, humor, and deep piety; full of stimulus for those who fish for men.

The Papers of the American Society of Church History, Second Series, Volume IV, edited by Professor William W. Rockwell, and published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1914 (pp. xxii, 215; $3.00), contains, in addition to Reports of three Meetings, Addresses and Papers of permanent value. Among these are "Servatus Lupus, a Humanist of the Ninth Century," by the late president, Dr. Samuel M. Jackson; "The Mediæval National Church," by the president, Professor J. C. Ayer, Jr.; "The Stigmata of St. Francis," by C. H. Lyttle; "John Huss," by D. S. Schaff; "The Relation of Wessel Gansvoort to the Reformation," by E. W. Miller; "Luther and Toleration," by J. A. Faulkner; "The College of Cardinals and the Veto," by H. B. Washburn; "Religious History of the Negroes in the South," by R. C. Reed.

Frederic Palmer.

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The Dread of Responsibility. Émile Faguet, Member of the French Academy. Translated, with introduction, by Emily James Putnam. G. P. Putnam's Sons. Pp. 221.

This brilliant monograph may properly claim the attention both of the psychologist and of the student of society. Its thesis is that the French people, mentally keen and able as they are, are unwilling

to accept, or temperamentally inhibited from accepting, the responsibilities which their various professions and occupations would naturally impose on them, and that the results of this tendency make themselves felt in the administration of justice, in the life of the family, in the history of the professions, and in the political life of the nation as a whole. "The French character," M. Faguet says, "is not on as high a level as the French mind, and that is the cause of all the trouble." The French mind is of the very first order. But the benefits which this intellectual power should render do not come to the fore, because as a people the French are, the writer thinks, light, wanting in character and will.

"We are prompt to give in. We are children, we are greybeards, we are never—I speak of the majority—in the prime of life. Without being lazy—far from it—we like to lie back on those who make us work. It is the paradox of our nature. We like to surrender ourselves to the State while allowing it to impose even heavy tasks upon us. The basis of this paradoxical inclination is the lack of personal will, and this lack of personal will itself comes from the horror of responsibility."

This thesis is supported by arguments based on a large array of facts. The first group of these is drawn from the state of legal procedure in France. The author says that the whole system of law (in France) and the whole legal usage of the régime which followed 1789 are dominated by the idea that he who judges is irresponsible, and that no blame is to be cast upon him. "In fact, the judge does not judge in equity, but in accordance with the law. In other words, he is not a judge, he is a clerk."

In this respect the French judges are compared unfavorably with English judges, and one is reminded here of the comparison which Francis Parkman drew between the French and English régimes in their American colonies during the long period which ended with the English occupation of Canada and the West. The French leaders were expected, Parkman says, to refer back continually to headquarters in Paris for instructions as to the conduct of their affairs. The Englishmen stood and marched forward, each man for himself, but with the sense that they were all working for the whole.

"The great vice of the bench in France," M. Faguet writes, "is that it is a career, like the department of registration, which one enters very young, at a very small salary, and in which, as everywhere, one advances very slowly if he confines himself to the correct performance of his duties; and where, as everywhere, one advances rapidly if he renders services to the government. Well, a man seeks advancement, he is dominated by the care for advancement, and he often does what is necessary to obtain it.

In England the bench is not a career; it is the crown of a career. There they make judges of old barristers, men who have achieved their career, and a brilliant one, at

the bar, and who have there formed habits of independence which they do not lose; moreover they have no reason to desire advancement because there is hardly anything left to advance to."

Among other examples illustrating the unfortunate side of this situation M. Faguet examines at some length the legal management of the questions involved in the decision of the Court of Cassation with regard to the final disposition of the case of Captain Dreyfus. This decision was evidently inspired, he says, not by a desire to do legal justice to the situation but to satisfy the government. The civil court felt itself irresponsible and wanted to be so. It said virtually, "Every one will understand that in bending the law to put an end to the Dreyfus case I obey the desire of the government. Carry your grievance to the government." Then the writer goes on to say:

"But what sort of a bench is that? It is a very wise bench, very prudent, very learned, even very honest, from which every thought of responsibility has vanished; that is the whole trouble. One of its ancestors, under the Restoration, said to the government of the time, 'The court gives decisions, not services.'"

Passing next to the professions, the author says the Frenchman's

"passionate desire, whether for himself or for his sons or for his daughters, is a profession of complete repose. . . . The fear of risk among us is appalling. The greatest insult you can offer the French bourgeois is to say to him, 'You ought to have your daughter learn a trade.' 'A trade? dressmaking? for what do you take me?' 'A less lucrative trade, school-teacher, professor.' 'A student? for what do you take me?'"

This same habit of mind, he believes, regulates the family life, and—to speak of only one point—determines the low birth-rate so characteristic of French society.

The most important portion, perhaps, of the whole argument relates to the political constitution and the political customs of the French people. The writer contrasts here the "real (though often slighted) responsibility" of the king with the relative irresponsibility of each of the constituent parts of the present government. "In our day," he says, "we have so constitutionally limited the responsibility of power as to make it practically nil." Really the president of the French Republic is a cipher, and yet is the nominal head. The author considers that France is the best example of a "pure democracy," the only other equally good example being the Athenian Republic during a short period. The Spartan, the Roman, and the Venetian Republics were, he thinks, not democ-

racies, but aristocracies; and "as for the American Republic, it is a constitutional monarchy, and nothing else."

This would not be the place to go far in the study of these conclusions and the consideration in detail of the arguments that are declared to lead to them. It will be enough to say that M. Faguet believes the best government to be an aristocracy, but an aristocracy not social but real—that is, based on merit and the power of co-operation.

> "The aristocratic element in a nation is all that part which has enough of vitality and of cohesive force and of sense of responsibility to form a group, an association, an assemblage of parts, an organism, to become a living thing, that is to say, a collective person."

The writer admits, however, that the present system might be made to work fairly well if all persons concerned would consent to recognize the responsibility that rests on them to assume to their full extent the powers and obligations which are theirs by law. This brings us back to the main thesis of the book—namely, that while the French mind is of the very best sort, the French character and will do not match up to it.

Referring, in the last paragraph, to Nietzsche's much-talked-about "will to power," M. Faguet says,

> "There is a great deal to be said about that; but there is a will of power that cannot be too highly recommended to and wished for those one loves, beginning with oneself; it is the will of power over oneself."

The reviewer does not feel competent to say whether the author of this book has marshalled his facts justly; and indeed, one criticism is made by the translator, Miss Emily James Putnam, in her interesting introduction. However this may be, it is an eminently useful task to call attention to the significance of a great psychological tendency such as that which the author defines under the name of the dread of responsibility. To discuss the thesis here involved from the psychological standpoint would again carry us too far. The reviewer would only say that in his opinion it is eminently desirable to get away from psychological characterizations which imply a lack and failure, and to substitute for them characterizations that call attention to active forces which are at work. Everything in the world is active. Failure is the result of a conflict in which tendencies of an inferior sort but still active gain the ascendency. Looked at in this way, it would certainly be found that behind the dread of responsibility there lay a craving which

could be referred to a tendency having its main root in childhood which had outlived its usefulness and had become harmful. That such results can happen is due to men's ability to repress their childhood longings and yet to keep them virtually alive.

The translation is excellent to a rare degree, done in first-rate English yet without sacrifice of the flavor of the original.

JAMES J. PUTNAM.